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The motivating concern of this thesis is the development of what Reiner has referred to as 
a ‘necessary evil discourse’ in relation to policing. Allegations of assault, false 
imprisonment or malicious prosecution by the police can be addressed via the civil legal 
process or by bringing a formal complaint. This thesis explores what the interaction 
between these two processes reveals about how police legitimacy is conceived. It 
delineates two ideal types of police legitimacy, organisational and constitutional, aligning 
the former with the police complaints process and the latter with the process of bringing 
civil claims against the police (police actions). The overarching analytical frame is formed 
by further alignments: one between constitutional legitimacy and Habermas’s conception 
of legitimacy as vesting in the structures in place to secure a “culturally established 
background consensus shared by the citizenry” and a second between organisational 
legitimacy and legitimation of the administration by processes of thick proceduralization 
as envisaged by Black. The thesis traces the legitimating features of the police from the 
original office of constable to the establishment of the new police in the 19th Century and 
the development of a police organisational identity from the 20th Century onwards. It uses 
the themes identified in that process in textual analysis of government documents 
generated during the passage of the Policing and Crime Act 2017 and several judgments 
concerned with damages in police actions. This analysis is then extended to police actions 
claims data and interviews with police legal personnel and professional standards officers 
undertaken as part of this research. The thesis concludes that recent changes to the 
structures aimed at securing police legitimacy have resulted in a shift towards systemic 
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This study explores the interaction between the police complaints system and civil actions 
against the police in England and Wales1 and considers what this interaction reveals about 
police legitimacy (and how that is currently conceived).  
It is valuable at the outset to stress the narrow focus of this enquiry. Throughout this 
research ‘police’ refers to the ‘public police’. Increasingly, debate in this area engages with 
security more generally and the contributions of ‘private policing’ thereto2. It is 
contended however that just as a broad conception of policing which extends beyond 
what the public police do may assist in understanding changes to the public police 
(Crawford, 2013: 5), so too the symbolic nature of the public police (Walker, 1996) is such 
that changes in the conceptions of what legitimates the public police will impact on 
debates concerning policing more broadly defined.  Police complaints and civil actions 
against the police are each means by which officers may be held to account for their 
activities through initiation by members of the public. This sets these mechanisms apart 
from other forms of police governance and accountability, for example fiscal constraints, 
and the general oversight role of Police and Crime Commissioners, both of which are 
beyond the scope of this research.3   
There is considerable debate concerning whether the police should be subject to a duty 
of care in relation to negligent performance of their crime investigation function (see 
Horsey, 2013; Horsey and Rackley, 2015: 157-168; Tofaris and Steel, 2016; Conaghan and 
Torrible, 2017) which is also not addressed in this thesis. Similarly, complaints can be 
brought against the police for a wide variety of concerns including service delivery and 
incivility. However, the types of civil actions against the police that are the focus of this 
research are actions for the intentional torts of assault, battery, false imprisonment and 
 
1 To support this enquiry, the experience of police complaints and police actions in other jurisdictions is 
drawn upon where relevant; moreover, the arguments considered, and data analysis are likely to be 
pertinent to debates concerning officer and police organisational legitimacy and accountability in other 
jurisdictions.  
2 In respect of which see Wood and Dupont, 2006; Zedner 2009; Crawford, 2014,2014a. 
3 Under the Policing and Crime Act 2017 (PACA), Police and Crime Commissioners’ duties have been 
extended to include how complaints are handled by their force and this aspect of their role is discussed in 




malicious prosecution (hereinafter referred to as ‘police actions’). Consequently, the 
aspects of the complaints system that are of interest for purposes here are those that 
seek to address complaints which include allegations that would align with those torts.  
Similarly, some abuses by police of their powers and some failures of the police to exercise 
their powers to appropriate effect are actionable under the Human Rights Act 1998.4 
Under Article 3 of the European Convention Human Rights (ECHR), persons are protected 
from being subject to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and this provision 
is most aligned with the torts that are of interest in this research. However, while the 
protections provided by the ECHR are “becoming stronger” the alleged treatment must 
still reach a “minimum level of severity” before becoming actionable (Clayton and 
Tomlinson, 2004: 655). The ECHR provides basic protections and the types of police 
conduct which are of interest in this research may not amount to an actionable breach of 
the ECHR, while nonetheless still amounting to an unjustifiable intrusion by state actors. 
Moreover, the status of Human Rights Act and indeed the ECHR in England and Wales is 
precarious (see Spurrier, 2017). Therefore, the Human Rights dimension of police 
regulation is not considered further in this thesis and reference to ‘citizens’ ‘rights’ not to 
be unlawfully arrested etc. are common law rights.  
The central motivating concern of this research is that insufficient normative debate 
concerning police abuse of their powers may operate to facilitate further abuses. Felstner 
et al point to the emergence and transformation of disputes in terms of naming, blaming 
and claiming (Felstner et al, 1980-81). For a dispute to arise, a potential complainant or 
claimant must first perceive themselves to have been subject to an injurious event i.e. 
they need to name the event as injurious (1980-81: 633). In addition, they need to blame 
another individual or social entity in the sense of attributing their injury to the fault of 
that party (1980-81: 635). Finally, the interaction regarding a harmful incident may 
transform into a claim or complaints when the grievance is voiced (1980- 81: 637).  
Policing is a complex and necessarily contested social practice and the transformations 
from naming to blaming and ultimately voicing a complaint or making a claim against the 
police are intimately connected to how policing is conceived. Seron et al found that the 
 




public were accepting of some abusive or threatening behaviour on the part of officers in 
certain circumstances (2004: 969). Similarly, Smith argues that “[a] person…who has been 
subjected to a minor assault by a police officer and who does not seek legal advice, 
because he/she was not arrested or was released from custody without charge is unlikely 
to make a complaint”. He suggests that incidents of this type contribute to “a generally 
accepted level of police wrongdoing” (Smith, 2009: 61). Smith’s observations resonate 
with Maguire and Corbett’s finding that non-respondents in their sample of complainants 
were more likely to be young, unemployed and have previous convictions (1991: 14). This 
is of particular concern, because this group includes the class of people who are most 
vulnerable to police abuse (Reiner, 2010: 123) and, as noted in Chapter 4 (at 4.1), remain 
least likely to complain. In line with these observations, Reiner has warned of a “pragmatic 
necessary evil discourse” developing in relation to policing (Reiner, 2010: 23) by which he 
means the routine tolerance of some unlawful police practices on the basis of a dominant 
narrative that such tolerance is necessary to preserve the existing social order.  
Consequently, in probing the interaction between police complaints and police actions 
this research is concerned to explore the way in which each process separately (or the 
manner in which they combine) may either strengthen or undermine that necessary evil 
discourse. 
The police complaints system is arguably the main way of bringing police misconduct to 
light (Sanders and Young, 2008: 302) and effective police complaints systems are seen as 
both a fundamental element of police legitimacy (Smith 2010, 2013) and central to 
securing public confidence in the police (Maguire and Corbett, 1991; Smith, 2001, 2005; 
Waters and Brown, 2000). However, the regulation of officer conduct is complex and any 
assessment of what it means for a police complaints system to be effective is likely to be 
contested (as discussed in detail in chapter 4 at 4.1). This has resulted in public confidence 
in the police complaints system itself becoming a primary focus of attention and there is 
a large volume of data (also explored in Chapter 4) concerning how the current oversight 
body, the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC)5, has sought to foster and 
maintain such confidence.  
 
5 Under reforms introduced by the PACA the IPCC was renamed the Independent Office of Police Conduct 




In contrast, while the level of police actions increased and became controversial in the 
1980s and 1990s, they have received comparatively less media coverage since that time 
(Epp, 2009: 157). This is matched by police actions also receiving very little academic 
attention (both within England and Wales and other common law jurisdictions). The lack 
of focus is not however unsurprising.  As Ransley et al (2007) make clear in an Australian 
context and Miller and Wright (2004) in the context of the US, there is a striking lack of 
available data concerning the number of police actions brought, the number settled, the 
proportion that go to trial and the overall costs to the public purse in terms of payments 
in damages. In England and Wales, the Home Affairs Committee (HAC) recommended that 
annual figures in relation to police actions be made available to the public as long ago as 
1997 (HAC 1997/8 Second Report). In addition, the IPCC initially indicated that it intended 
to publish such figures (Smith, 2006: 63)6 but has not done so. The lack of data inevitably 
has a chilling effect on public debate and limits the development of both formal and 
informal discourses surrounding the function of police actions as a means of police 
regulation. This is perhaps illustrated by the fact that when reference is made to police 
actions in key works on policing, they are presented as an alternative to the complaints 
process and their coverage is generally limited to a few paragraphs (See for example 
Reiner, 2010: 224-226; Jones, 2008: 713).  Similarly, those academic articles which do 
address this area tend to focus on the difficulty in obtaining accurate figures relating to 
the level of claims received by forces (Archibold   
 
 Maguire, 2002; Miller and Wright, 2004; Ransley et al, 2007).  As a result, very little is 
known about how police forces handle police actions or the reasoning which motivates a 
decision to settle in any given case.  
The lack of information about settlement of police actions makes it impossible to analyse 
other aspects of how they impact on police accountability. For example, in a sample of 27 
 
allegations against the police. The impact of these changes is not yet clear. Therefore, much of this thesis 
explores the interaction between police complaint and police actions in the context of the IPCC. The PACA 
is however discussed at length in Chapter 4 and (as discussed below) aspects of the reform process the 
reform process are subject to empirical enquiry the findings of which are discussed in Chapter 7.  
6 In its 2010 Statutory Guidance, the IPCC also indicated that it would seek to ensure “robust links” (IPCC 
SG 2010:47) between police complaints and police actions but has not done so and the subsequent 




misconduct cases in Australia which had proceeded to trial, Ransley et al found that 25 
had been successful. They speculate that this high success rate points to claimants 
bringing these actions only when there is strong evidence to support them or (in contrast 
to lower success rates for other types of actions) and that courts are more likely to accept 
evidence regarding cases involving misconduct than for the cases involving negligence or 
failure to act (Ransley et al, 2007: 154). These are potentially interesting insights; 
however, they fail to recognise the significance of the number of claims which might have 
been initiated, but were settled or successfully rebutted, either pre-proceedings or pre-
trial. From such a perspective, it might equally well be argued that the high claimant 
success rate at trial shows that the police lawyers too often chose to defend when 
settlement would have been more appropriate. This may have been the result of a specific 
policy to defend all claims or a misjudgement as to how the evidence would come out in 
court. However, it may also suggest that the police solicitors were under pressure to 
accept officers’ account of events, following a closing of ranks from within, or to legal 
counsel having effectively ‘gone native’ through their immersion in police occupational 
culture. The necessarily speculative nature of these observations is testament to the need 
for considerable empirical analysis of how police actions are settled and what motivates 
the decision to settle or defend a given claim. This research does not purport to address 
all the empirical needs outlined above but it does seek to raise the importance of such 
empirical enquiry and give some initial data upon which later projects might draw.  
An important matter to acknowledge at the outset is the researcher’s professional legal 
experience in handling police actions prior to entering academia. Acting for the chief 
constable of a medium-sized force but employed by the Police Authority (which at that 
time was statutorily empowered to oversee7 the force) produced a status that was never 
fully ‘insider’. Nevertheless, working closely with professional standards officers for 
several years (who operated as the de facto client) conferred a status (and an overall 
perspective) that was (and remains to varying degrees) considerably less ‘outsider’ than 
many other researchers (Merton, 1972). This has inevitably had some influence on the 
formulation of research questions and the gathering and analysis of data. Chapter 1 
 
7 Police Authorities were replaced by Police and Crime Commissioners in 2012 as noted below and 




discusses the methodological approach adopted for this research and addresses these 
methodological issues, outlining the research questions and setting out the theoretical 
framework employed to address them. In brief, the research comprises a thematic 
qualitative analysis which will focus on three specific areas: the complaints system; the 
judicial approach to police actions; and the settlement of police actions respectively. The 
thesis moreover is in two parts. Part One (chapters 1-5) is concerned with the 
development of the themes that will be adopted in the empirical analysis and Part Two 
(chapters 7-10) discusses the methodology in detail and presents the findings of the 
empirical analysis and applies these to the research questions.  
The analytical framework developed for this research, delineates two forms of legitimacy, 
labelled organisational and constitutional legitimacy respectively, and hypothesises that 
the police complaints system seeks to promote the former while police actions are largely 
concerned with the latter. Chapter 2 thickens this argument by charting the development 
of police organisational identity from the frankpledge of Anglo-Saxon times to the Royal 
Commission of policing in 1960. It argues that a large element of the early authority and 
legitimacy of the office of constable was founded on the organic connection between that 
office and the community in which the constable operated. However, as the historical ties 
between officer and community were severed, officers’ authority began to be drawn 
instead from their membership of the police as an organisation. This resulted in an official 
concern to maintain a public perception of the police (as an organisation) as beyond 
repute and a consequent tension between this and the public accountability of officers 
for their conduct.   
Chapter 3 extends this historical analysis from the time of the Royal Commission 
established in 1960 (and the subsequent Police Act 1964) to the 1997 decision in 
Thompson v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, Hsu v Commissioner of Police of the 
Metropolis (“Thompson and Hsu”).8  It charts the rise in the use of police actions during 
this period and examines the connection between this rise and the perceived failings of 
the police complaints system.  In doing so it highlights how, instead of focussing on the de 
facto internal or external accountability of the police, two dominant concerns emerged 
 




during this era; public confidence in the police and the level of independent9 oversight 
within the police complaints system.  
Chapter 4 outlines the difficulties in assessing what it means for the police complaints 
system to be effective and explores how current arrangements seek to address them. The 
arrangements have changed significantly since the outset of this research. The Police 
Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 (PRSRA) introduced Police and Crime 
Commissioners (PCCs) and the Policing and Crime Act 2017 gives PCCs responsibility for 
how their forces handle complaints. However, (as discussed in Chapter 4 (at 4.2)), 
notwithstanding these modifications to the overall landscape of police regulation, some 
fundamental aspects of the police complaints process remain unchanged. Most notable 
among these is the degree of control the police retain over most complaints (and in 
particular those with which this research is concerned).  
This raises the question of whether police actions might be used to subject police control 
over these complaints to greater scrutiny. Chapter 5 explores the role of tort law 
generally. It distinguishes between the theoretical underpinnings of the intentional torts 
of assault, battery, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution with which this research 
is concerned, and those of negligence actions where harm and compensation are less 
controversially the main function of any action. It suggests that the arguments concerning 
the utility and value of settlement in negligence claims do not easily translate into the 
context of intentional torts against state actors.  
As indicated above, each of the chapters in Part One develops the themes that are used 
in the empirical analysis, the results of which are presented in the chapters 7-9 in Part 
Two. Chapter 7 presents the findings of a thematic critical legal analysis of higher court 
judgments in relation to police actions.  This reveals a pattern of police misconduct in 
which senior officers support perjury by lower ranking officers particularly in relation to 
 
9 Chapter 4 (at 4.2) argues that the ‘independence’ of external police oversight bodies became significant 
when the IPCC was established to conduct ‘independent’ investigations into some police complaints. The 
words ‘independent’ and ‘external’ are largely used interchangeably in relation to the police complaints 
oversight bodies that preceded the IPCC, and likewise are used interchangeably in Chapters 1-3 (unless 





the malicious prosecution of would-be complainants.  It also points to the limited judicial 
censure of such practices.   
Chapter 8 comprises a thematic analysis of the texts generated at an official level during 
the passing of the Policing and Crime Act 2017.  This reveals a shift in conceptions of the 
role of the complaints and discipline system toward systemic concerns about police 
practices.  
Chapter 9 discusses attempts at the outset of this research to obtain accurate figures 
relating to police actions and their outcomes. This did not result in a full set of figures for 
each force but the figures that were made available permit some tentative conclusions to 
be drawn concerning the volume of claims and motivations to settle.  The attempt to 
obtain police actions claims figures is supplemented by semi-structured interviews with 
force legal personnel and professional standard officers and these are subject to analysis 
using the themes developed in Part One.  
Chapter 10Chapter 10 draws together the arguments in the earlier Chapters and the 
results of the empirical research to address the central research question and makes 














The premise of this research is that a study of the interaction between police actions and  
police complaints will cast light on how we understand police legitimacy.  Legitimacy is, 
however, a contested concept (see for example Beetham, 1991; Crawford and Hucklesby, 
2013) and any consideration of police legitimacy is additionally complex because policing 
is a multifaceted and contested practice.10 Therefore, this chapter clarifies the way in 
which the term ‘legitimacy’ will be used during the research, sets out the research aims, 
develops a structure for analysis of the empirical data, and outlines the methodology that 
will be adopted.   
 
The development of the police complaints system is addressed in Chapter 3 and the 
current system is explored in detail Chapter 4. Similarly, the development and current role 
of police actions are considered in depth in Chapters 3 and 5 respectively. However, to 
provide a context in which to discuss the theoretical framework that will be adopted by 
this research, section 1.1 of this chapter briefly sets out some of the key issues regarding 
the effectiveness of police actions and police complaints in holding police officers to 
account. 
 
Section 1.2 explores the role and function of the police. It highlights the tension between 
the conception of the police as a ‘force’ or as a ‘service’ and considers the ways in which 
this distinction impacts on discussions of how the police might most appropriately be 
judged. From this, two ideal types of police legitimacy are delineated - constitutional and 
organisational - and links are suggested between these and the mechanisms of police 
actions and police complaints respectively. 
 
 




Section 1.3 outlines Habermas’s work on deliberative democracy and Black’s critique 
thereof based on her conception of ‘thick’ proceduralization. It then draws on these to 
create an analytical framework that incorporates the ideal types developed in section 1.2. 
This consists of two hypothetical mappings, one between Habermas’s conception of 
deliberative democracy, the constitutional legitimacy of the police, and police actions, and 
a second between Black’s understanding of thick proceduralization, the organisational 
legitimacy of the police, and the police complaints process.  
 
As indicated in the Introduction, the empirical data upon which this research is based 
comprises government texts, court judgments, responses to Freedom of Information Act 
requests for statistics on police actions, and the content of semi-structured interviews 
with professional standards officers and force legal personnel. Section 1.4 explores the 
methodological issues raised by this mixed approach and explains how these will be 
addressed within the framework that has been developed earlier in the chapter.   
 
1.1 Police Complaints and Police Actions  
 
1.1.1 Police Complaints  
 
As noted in the Introduction, the police complaints system is perceived as the primary 
vehicle for raising concerns about police misconduct (Sanders and Young, 2008: 302). 
Consequently, the efficient and appropriate functioning of the system is considered 
fundamental to securing public confidence in the police (Maguire and Corbett, 1991, 
Smith, 2001, 2005; Waters and Brown, 2000). Debates about how to achieve a well-
functioning police complaints system have been dominated by arguments concerning the 
degree of external oversight the system should encompass (Smith, 2004) and there has 
been a steady increase in the powers of external oversight bodies since the inception in 
1976 of the first such body, the Police Complaints Board (PCB). The current oversight body 
is the IPCC11 which was established by the Police Reform Act 2002 (PRA). The IPCC is 
 
11 As noted in the Introduction at footnote 5, the IPCC was renamed the IOPC in January 2018 as a 




tasked with securing suitable arrangements for the recording, handling and investigation 
of complaints12 and ensuring that public confidence is maintained in those 
arrangements.13 It also has powers to supervise or manage complaints and, significantly, 
to investigate serious14  complaints itself.15   
 
Under the system in place until the Policing and Crime Act 2017 is enforced, police 
complaints fall into three categories. The PRA extended the procedure of informal 
resolution created by s. 85 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, renaming it local 
resolution. A local resolution allows complaints to be handled informally at district level 
in circumstances where, even if substantiated the allegation would not result in any 
criminal or disciplinary proceedings16 being taken against the officer in question. For this 
process, the emphasis is on speedy informal resolution of the matter and overall service 
recovery (Young et al, 2005: 280-283). In contrast (as noted above), serious matters and, 
in any event, those which involve death or serious injury must be referred to the IPCC 
which has power to determine whether any associated complaint should be investigated 
by the IPCC itself or by the force in question, either under the management or supervision 
of the IPCC. 
Those cases which are neither so serious as to be mandatorily directed to the IPCC nor 
sufficiently straightforward to be diverted to local resolution, are investigated by the 
police under what is called ‘local investigation’.17 The HAC Report 2009-1018  confirmed 
that, in 2008-2009, only 10% of “serious” cases referred to the IPCC were subsequently 
managed by them and that overall, only 1% of all complaints made against the police were 
directly investigated by the IPCC. As explored in detail in Chapter 4, although the IPCC’s 
 
12 PRA 2002 s10 (2). 
13 PRA S10(1)(d). 
14 These include serious assault, serious sexual assault, and serious corruption. Regulations 4 and 7 of the 
Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2012 state that the definition of each of these will be set 
out in Statutory Guidance given by the IPCC, but the current version of that guidance does not contain any 
such definitions. It does however define ‘serious injury’ as “[a] fracture, deep cut, deep laceration or injury 
causing damage to an internal organ or the impairment of any bodily function”. 
15 PRA Schedule 3 s15(4).  
16 PRA s6(3)(a). 
17 The Policing and Crime Act 2017 s22 makes explicit Police and Crime Commissioners’ (PCCs’) duty to 
hold chief constables to account for the internal handling of complaints and gives them the power to elect 
to take responsibility for some aspects of the police complaints system currently handled internally by 
local police forces. This is discussed in Chapter 4 at 4.3. 




capacity to undertake its own investigations has recently been increased (in terms of both 
its staff and its powers), most complaints continue to be handled by forces (Glass, 2014: 
9). This large group of mid-range complaints is the primary focus of this research because 
it includes complaints about conduct that could also be the subject of police actions (for 
the assault, battery, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution) and, because they do 
not necessarily receive the level of media attention that is attendant upon an IPCC 
investigation of a major policing incident.  
It was noted above that debates concerning the effectiveness of police complaints 
systems have centred on the level of independent oversight they embody, which is 
discussed in detail in Chapter 4. Such debates are fuelled by a deep disquiet about the 
police investigating their own personnel (Brown, 1987: 37; Landau, 1996: 300-302). In 
part, this is in recognition of an inevitable difficulty for any internal process to 
demonstrate impartiality. However, this concern notwithstanding, the ability of police 
professional standards officers to deliver impartial investigations has repeatedly been 
brought into doubt (Waters and Brown, 2000: 627,631; Strudwick, 2010: 43; Young et al, 
2005: 300; Smith 2003).  
In 2011-2012, the IPCC upheld 38% of appeals relating to locally investigated complaints. 
Subsequent IPCC research into these figures revealed that most appeals concerning local 
investigations were “upheld either because insufficient evidence was gathered during the 
investigation of the complaint or because the conclusions reached were not reasonable 
in light of the evidence gathered” (Hagger-Johnson and Hipkin-Chastagnol, 2011: 11). The 
most recent figures do not alleviate concerns regarding the internal investigation of 
complaints. The IPCC also handles appeals against the non-recording of complaints (which 
includes failing to record a complaint at all or recording it as appropriate for local 
resolution when a local (internal) investigation should have been conducted) and in 
2015/16 the IPCC upheld 40% of non-recording appeals (IPCC 2015/16: 7-8). Similarly, 
while for 2015/16 the number of appeals the IPPC received concerning local investigations 
decreased by 4% on the previous year, the proportion of those upheld increased to 41% 
and remained at 40% for the year 2016/17 (IPCC 2016/17: 14).  The fact of the appeals 
and that these figures are available is, of course, testament to the system operating 




proportion of upheld appeals raises doubts about how the police decide which cases are 
appropriate for local investigation and the rigour of the local investigations they do 
undertake. 
 
1.1.2 Police Actions  
 
Since May 2015, disciplinary hearings relating to complaints of gross misconduct on the 
part of officers may be held in public19 with a legally qualified chair. This change was 
introduced to increase transparency and therefore accountability within the discipline 
process. However, it can have no impact in relation to those cases for which it has been 
erroneously decided that there is no case for the officer(s) to answer. In contrast, the 
ability to bring a police action is not limited by internal police determinations of the 
seriousness of the allegation. In addition, police actions focus on claims of unlawful 
interference with citizens’ rights rather than officers’ compliance with police regulations. 
They may therefore be seen to be constituting a more externalised check on officer 
conduct than is provided by the police complaints system. However, the extent of this 
externalised check is potentially limited in several ways.  
 
First, while, the police complaints process is open to all citizens, litigation is a complex and 
expensive process. Consequently, in many cases, the ability to bring a police action will be 
dictated by the availability (or otherwise) of legal aid or the willingness of solicitors to take 
the case on a contingency fee basis.20 
 
Second, police complaints offer the potential for individual accountability because they 
are made against the officer(s) who, it is alleged, have erred. In contrast the Police Act 
1996 s88,21 makes chief constables vicariously liable for officer torts. Significantly 
therefore, while, for the purposes of a complaint, the individual officer is engaged at a 
 
19 See “Consultation on changes to the Police Disciplinary System: Holding disciplinary and appeal hearings 
in public, introducing legally-qualified chairs in disciplinary hearings, protecting whistle-blowers and 
changes to chief officer compensation payments” at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/375965/PoliceDisciplina
ryWhistleblowingCon.pdf. 
20 Funding for police actions is discussed in Chapter 5 at section 5.3.1. 




personal level and is potentially subject to disciplinary proceedings, there are rarely any 
personal ramifications for individual officers in relation to a police action.22   
Third, while police actions encompass the possibility of officers being cross-examined 
about their conduct at court, this is seldom realised.  The Civil Procedure Rules which 
govern how civil litigation is conducted are designed to encourage settlement.23 
Therefore, the majority of police actions will be subject to settlement rather than resulting 
in officers’ accounts being formally tested.24  
This brief account of the processes surrounding police complaints and police actions 
suggests that despite being conceived as ways in which individual officers are held to 
account for their conduct, neither may be particularly effective in this regard. This invites 
questions about how, if at all, each process contributes to the legitimacy of the police. In 
addition, if the direct contribution of police actions and police complaints to individual 
officer accountability is limited, a secondary question arises as to whether, individually or 
collectively, these processes serve alternative, potentially broarder functions.  
It is not possible to discuss the function or effectiveness of either police complaints or 
police actions without first seeking to establish the role of the police and the basis upon 
which they should be held to account. The following section seeks to address these issues 
and suggests ideal types which might assist with the analysis.  
  
 
22 S10 of Schedule 3 of the PRA requires any conduct matter that arises in the course of civil proceedings 
to be considered as a potential disciplinary issue. This point is explored further in the discussion of the 
interview findings in Chapter 8. 
23 See   https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil. This is discussed in Chapter 5 at 5.3.2. 
24 There is a vast literature concerning settlement practices in litigation and ‘bargaining in the shadow of 




1.  The Policing Function 
Policing is a complex, social and inevitably political activity (Lustgarten, 1986: 15-18). It is 
argued that it must “first and foremost” be understood as “one means by which members 
of British society express solidarity and give institutional effect to that solidarity” (Loader 
2013: 46). Consequently policing “affects a whole network of social relations and 
understandings through its institutions, actions and rhetoric” (Walker, 1996: 55). This 
permits Marenin to suggest that “[i]t is obvious…that one’s conception of the function 
and role of the police depends more on one’s theory than one’s observations” (Marenin, 
1982: 253).  
At a more pragmatic level, Morgan and Newburn observe:  
The police undertake crime control. They are the principal law enforcement 
agency. They provide the only real 24-hour general emergency service. But they 
also constitute an all-purpose social service. All these descriptions make up part 
of what we understand the police to be. But none on its own describes 
accurately or fully what the police are (1997: 75). 
In order to disentangle some of these issues it is valuable to delineate two ideal types 
relating to how the terms ‘police’ and ‘policing’ are understood.  
Lopreato and Alston refer to an “indescribable confusion” concerning the use of ideal 
types as an analytical tool (Lopreato and Alston, 1970: 88). The methodology adopted for 
this research is addressed in sub-section 1.5 below where the ideal types suggested in this 
subsection will be developed as theoretical idealisations (Lopreato and Alston, 1970: 91-
92). At this initial stage however, the two ideal types serve as propaedeutic heuristic 
devices to uncover and assist in articulating the complexities of policing and police 
regulation. While neither ideal type reflects the reality of policing, each will assist in 
delineating analytically important elements of what policing entails. This dualistic 
approach is particularly pertinent in this context because policing is frequently described 
in binary terms. For example, there are debates concerning whether the police are more 
appropriately understood as a ‘force’ or a ‘service’ (Reiner 2010: 141) which is also 
reflected in their dual role of crime control and keeping the peace. Similarly, the 




concerning officers’ status and identity and overall a picture emerges of a peace-keeping, 
service-orientated group of citizens, which can be contrasted with a uniformed force 
focused on responding to and reducing crime. 
Reiner draws attention to the over-reporting of serious crime. He also points to the 
exaggeration of police successes in crime detection in the news media and popular fiction 
and argues that this encourages a perception of the police as primarily a ‘force’, tasked 
with fighting and controlling crime (Reiner, 2010: 180-183).25 He maintains that  this 
perception of policing forms the main focus of “policy, research and public political 
debate” (Reiner, 2010: 141) and fuels a “cross party neo-liberal consensus on crime and 
disorder which consistently defines policing in terms of crime control” (Reiner, 2010: 104-
105). Further, this narrow crimefighting perception of policing both underpins the 
rationale for the introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners26 (Crawford, 2013; 
Loader, 2013) and is potentially promoted by the constraints on PCCs’ potential to 
“influence or engage with crime prevention policies of non-police organisations” 
(Crawford, 2013: 10). 
However, in contradiction to this emphasis on the crime control function of the police, 
empirical research repeatedly reveals that most police time is spent on tasks that are not 
directly (or in some circumstances even remotely)27 connected with crime control 
(Marenin, 1982: 255; Allen et al 2006; Reiner, 2010: 141). On this view, policing can be 
conceived (in line with the continental understanding of the word) as a “broad descriptor 
of order, security and welfare, of the general condition of stability and prosperity” (Loader 
and Walker, 2001: 14). Inherent in this is some blurring of the distinction between police 
and governance with ‘police’ being seen to some extent as a set of civic norms, and 
‘policing’ as a diffuse activity that operates throughout society in the enforcement of 
these norms.28  As such the ‘public police’ is tasked with supporting these norms generally 
and, in this, the service role is emphasised (Loader, 2013: 46)  
 
25 As regards police influence on the media, see Crandon and Dunn, 1997; Mawby 1999, 2000 and 2003; 
Greer and McLaughlin, 2010. This is a complex area which is largely outside the scope of this project.  
26 Discussed in Chapter 4 at 4.3. 
27 For example, J. Allen et al 2006 confirm how for 2003/4 and 2004/5, 13% and 11% of public-initiated 
calls to the police were for advice or simply a social chat (Table 2.02). 




It is valuable to pause here and note how some arguments concerning police legitimacy 
become entangled with these prior definitional issues regarding the role and function of 
the police. The history of the police is explored in Chapter 2 and outlines how the ‘new’ 
police were constructed in circumstances of “bitter political conflict and acute social 
divisions” in the early 19th Century (Reiner, 2010: 70). This resulted in the conscious 
development of a style of policing that would be accepted as legitimate. It was considered 
important that officers were seen as bureaucratically organised, non-partisan, 
accountable, service-providing ‘citizens in uniform’, effective in crime control and 
prevention, using minimal force and constrained by the rule of law (Reiner, 2010: 70-77).  
Arguably some aspects of these legitimating factors, namely the identification of the 
police with the public, align with the conception of the police as a service, whereas others, 
for example being bureaucratically organised and effective in crime control, are more 
aligned with the idea of the police as a ‘force’.  
The extent to which other factors suggest a conception of the police as a force or a service 
is less clear. For example, it is possible to construct arguments both for and against the 
necessity of compliance with the rule of law as a means of securing the legitimacy of the 
police, understood as a force, and the same is true of the police, understood as a service. 
Importantly, however, the arguments in each case are fundamentally different and draw 
on different values.   
Arguments concerning the degree to which the police, understood as a force, should be 
held to comply strictly with the rule of law are influenced by where (at a normative level) 
one views the correct balance between Packer’s ‘crime control’ and ‘due process’ models 
of the criminal justice system (Packer, 1968).  If the crime control model is favoured, the 
occasional use of excessive force or ‘bending’ of the rules might be tolerated to facilitate 
what are perceived to be ‘appropriate’ or ‘just’ results.  It is here that Reiner’s idea of a 
necessary evil discourse in relation to policing (noted in the introduction) has resonance. 
Bittner highlights the potentially insidious effects of a figure of speech which refers less 
to crime control and instead suggests a ‘war on crime’ (Bitner, 1970: 48-51), stressing that 




perhaps reflected by the results of a survey conducted by HMIC29 following the G20 
protests in 2008 in which the majority of those polled supported the use of force “not only 
to restrain or respond to violence but to prevent disruption” (Reiner, 2010: 103) (emphasis 
added). This suggests a dominant perception of criminal justice that leans towards the 
crime control model and a concomitant understanding of the rule of law as appropriately 
transgressed in the wake of pragmatic concerns regarding ‘public order’.   
In contrast, a normative commitment to a due process model of the criminal justice 
system would eschew this slide towards relaxing the strictures of compliance with the rule 
of law on the basis of pragmatic arguments concerning public order or crime control. On 
such a view, the overall good is better served by ranking the importance of protections 
against state interference with individual freedom over a pragmatic solution in a 
particular case. 
The notion that evidence should be excluded from the criminal process if it was obtained 
following (or as a direct result of) an officer’s failure to comply with the rule of law, is 
consistent with the due process model. However, the exclusionary rule is only effective 
when the police wish to secure a conviction and several commentators suggest there are 
occasions when police power is exercised without the intention that it should lead to the 
formal legal process being invoked (Bittner, 1970: 28-29; Bradford and Loader, 2016; 
Choongh, 1998; Hillyard and Gordon 1999). In these circumstances, the fact that a 
prosecution cannot follow is of little import. Hence, as Bittner points out, there are large 
areas of police activity (where their conduct is designed to harass certain members of the 
population rather than to secure conviction) which fall outside the controlling possibilities 
of the criminal justice process (Bittner, 1970: 24-25). This is the area of police activity that 
is most difficult to regulate and which the mechanisms of police complaints and police 
actions are, in part, designed to address.  
A similar but distinct tension concerning the rule of law can be seen from the perspective 
of the police as a service.  As service providers within the community the police must be 
bound by the same rules as the rest of the populace. They may have greater powers 
 
29 Recently renamed “Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of the Constabulary Fire and Rescue Services” (HMICFRS) 




concerning the use of force, but these do not include the authority to arbitrarily exceed 
those powers. Notwithstanding this, the fact that the police can use force to impose a 
solution in a very wide variety of situations may operate to extend their de facto mandate 
since "neither the range of problems [the police face] nor their range of treatments 
can…be confined within narrow legal terms” (Walker, 1996: 56). Walker goes on to 
propose that even if one concedes some difficulty with this extrapolation of police 
practices outside the rule of law on the basis of exigency, one might still accept that “such 
characterisations of the police role resonate with broader public understandings” 
(Walker, 1996: 57). The argument here is that this extension of the mandate only makes 
sense by reference to a conception of the police as service providers within the 
community. The police can only legitimately operate outwith the strict legal rules to the 
extent that they are deeply embedded within the community in which the situation giving 
rise to their involvement has arisen. Only in this way can it be suggested that they could 
understand what an ‘appropriate’ solution would be. 
Hence the two ideal types for the police suggested above, as a force tasked with crime 
control or as a service tasked with general peace-keeping, result in differing assessments 
of the boundaries of legitimate action on the part of officers. They also draw on diverse 
reasoning concerning the demarcation of those boundaries. The following subsection 
extends this analysis to focus on the impact of these insights on the evaluation of officer 
conduct.  
A corollary to a conception of the police as primarily concerned with crime control is the 
idea that their success will be reflected in the outputs of the criminal justice system. This 
view lends itself to managerial-style mechanisms for assessing police activity (at a macro 
level) in terms of the efficient use of resources in relation to reductions in the number of 
crimes committed and increases in detection rates.30  However, reports that the police 
can and do manipulate crime figures (Maguire and McVie, 2017) serve to underscore the 
relative futility of assessing their success by reference to reported or detected crime. 
Moreover, the “levers and causes of crime lie far beyond the traditional reach of criminal 
 
30 These managerial issues are largely beyond the scope of this research but, for a discussion of police 




justice” (Crawford 2015: 76) and vest instead in the “political economy and culture of a 
society” (Reiner, 2010: 17).  
Hence, a conception of police practice as primarily concerned with crime control fails to 
provide suitable criteria by which the police might be judged. However, the conception of 
the police as service providers concerned with keeping the peace, is also problematic. 
Marenin distinguishes between the role of the police in maintaining the ‘general order’ 
and the role in sustaining ‘specific dominations’. By the former he means “an irreducible 
minimum of confidence in the future which allows groups and individuals to engage in 
routine activities – a guarantee of public tranquillity and safety” (Marenin, 1982: 258).  He 
uses the latter to denote the use of state power to promote particular interests (1982: 
259). However, as Stenson observes, “promoting social cohesion and security for the 
majority demonizes minorities” (Stenson, 2005: 267).  The line between the general and 
specific may not always be easily drawn, and consequently any judgement concerning 
police performance in this broader service-providing role is, at the very least, exceedingly 
complex.  
One potential way of assessing how the police are performing is by reference to the public 
confidence they enjoy. However, attempting to use this as a measure begs the question 
of whether the emphasis is put on confidence in them as a crime-fighting force or as a 
peace-keeping service, with all the divergent underpinning values previously outlined. It 
is therefore necessary to probe the notion of public confidence and explore how public 
confidence in the police and ideas of police legitimacy may be related.  
The following section explores these concepts in greater detail and seeks to develop two 
ideal types of police legitimacy that might be useful in structuring analysis of police actions 
and police complaints.  
1.3 Legitimacy and Confidence in the Police  
 
The previous section highlighted the need for deeper analysis of the relationship between 
public confidence in the police and police legitimacy. The idea of police operational 
independence is extremely important in probing this relationship. The methods of macro 




more recently Police and Crime Commissioners, do not formally impact on how chief 
constables seek to achieve the targets they are set. Their operational discretion in how 
they realise the aims set for them is preserved by common law31 and statute32 and this 
extends to individual officer conduct.  However, police operational discretion is subject to 
one overarching control. In the performance of their operational duties officers are very 
much dependent on the cooperation of the public (Tyler and Fagan, 2008: 233, Crawford, 
2013: 12). There are insufficient resources for officers to resort to the use of force in all 
situations of conflict; therefore, in routine encounters they require compliance with their 
requests (Tyler, 2004: 85). In addition, the police require the assistance of the public in 
coming forward with information upon which they can act in advancing their crime control 
function (Tyler, 2004: 85). Thus, for the police, to be held in a certain level of public esteem 
is an organisational imperative. The question arises as to whether (and the extent to 
which) public cooperation is borne out of mere confidence in the police or, more 
fundamentally, stems from some conception of them as legitimate.  
This is an important distinction for this thesis. Weber argues that the social scientist’s 
enquiry concerning legitimacy should be framed and limited to a study of what people 
believe as legitimate. However, while for Weber “legitimacy is equivalent to belief in 
legitimacy and legitimate power is power that is believed to be legitimate”, Beetham 
highlights how this approach fails to recognise that “[a] given power relationship is 
legitimate not because people believe in its legitimacy but because it can be justified in 
terms of their beliefs” (Beetham, 1991 :10). The distinction between public confidence in 
the police and the two types of police legitimacy delineated below has parallels with this 
distinction.33 
 
31 For example, see R v Commissioner of the Police for the Metropolis ex p Blackburn 1968 2 Q.B 118. 
32 The Coalition Government sought to preserve chief constables’ operational independence when PCCs 
were introduced but the conceptual distinction between operational and policy matters is ‘hazy’ 
(Crawford 2013:4); consequently, the extent to which this is realisable in practice is questioned (see 
Crawford, 2013, Lister 2013). 
33 There is a vast literature on links between legitimacy, understood in the Weberian sense, and 
procedural justice. There is a consistent finding across many cultures and demographics of a correlation 
between people being treated in a procedurally just way by those in authority (or their perception of 
processes as procedurally just) and their acceptance of and compliance with that authority (MacCaun 
2005; Sunshine and Tyler 2003; Tyler 2013). The causal relationship between procedural justice and 
legitimacy is contested (MacCoun, 2005: 180) and arguably reciprocal (MacCoun, 2005: 181, Waddington 




The police complaints system provides an example of how the public having confidence 
in the police and the police operating legitimately are not coextensive.  As noted above 
(at 1.1.1), the efficient and appropriate functioning of the police complaints system is 
considered fundamental to securing public confidence in the police (Sanders and Young, 
2008: 302; Maguire and Corbett, 1991; Smith 2001, 2005; Waters and Brown, 2000). This 
suggests an instrumental link between confidence in the complaints system and 
confidence in the police themselves. It is difficult to question the logic of such a position 
but, at a practical level it becomes equally difficult to sustain it. How might one assess 
what is a ‘healthy’ number of complaints? What might the proportion of substantiated 
complaints suggest about the complaints system? Clearly, a high level of complaints, with 
a high proportion being upheld,34 would highlight areas of concern regarding officers’ 
conduct. But in those circumstances, the fact of high substantiation rates might, at least, 
be a cause for some confidence that the complaints system was operating to achieve that 
‘highlighting’ function. However, in a community that trusts the police, a low level of 
complaints and a low substantiation rate may accord with that community’s view of police 
conduct. Conversely, if the police are not trusted, then a low level of complaints might 
indicate a lack of faith in the complaints system and low substantiation rates would 
confirm that lack of faith. Therefore, arguably, the purely instrumental view is too narrow 
and the relationships at play are considerably more complex. 
Inherent in a suggested link between the complaints system and confidence in the police 
is the idea that the system itself is effective in holding officers to account. However, as 
argued above, and explored in detail in Chapter 4, it is not clear that the system is 
successful in this sense. Accordingly, to the extent that the complaints system is presented 
externally as effective, it might operate to preserve or promote public confidence in the 
police when the basis of that confidence is opaque (Torrible, 2018: 467). 
 
occurred in the US (Jackson et al, 2013: 32). They argue that the historical development and symbolic 
character of the police in England and Wales is very different from that of the US and that the impact of 
procedural justice on police legitimacy in this setting may therefore be different (2013: 34-45). The idea of 
‘organisational legitimacy’ delineated in this section (and developed throughout the thesis) aligns with 
Jackson et al’s desire to probe this area further.  
34 The words ‘upheld’ and ‘substantiated’ are being used interchangeably in this context. There is a 
technical distinction between how there are used within the police complaint process (see further Chapter 




Clearly legitimacy and confidence overlap in a several areas and, as noted above, what is 
seen as the legitimate use of police discretion is not always limited to strict compliance 
with the rule of law. However, a claim to legitimacy (in the sense in which it is being used 
in this thesis), is distinct from an assertion of public confidence because it requires some 
substantive element, some reason for the confidence to be well-founded.35 It is therefore 
valuable to extend the analysis above and delineate two ideal types of legitimacy, namely 
constitutional legitimacy and organisational legitimacy. At its core, constitutional 
legitimacy is connected with the mandate to use force which stems from the state. On 
this view, the police are embedded state actors and since the power to use state-
sanctioned force is devolved to chief officers (and by the nature of the office of constable 
to individual officers) that devolution has to be legitimated at a constitutional level. 
Conversely, when officers are conceived as service providers, they are not embedded 
state actors in the same way as suggested above. Here, their mandate is more connected 
to their direct links with the public. For example, on this conception of the police, their 
legitimacy will be enhanced by the sensitive handling of a non-emergency situation that 
engenders a sense of alignment of values as between the officer and the public. The ideas 
of organisational and constitutional legitimacy are developed in greater detail in 
subsequent chapters. However, to flesh them out slightly more at this stage, a 
commitment to diversity in employment, might promote organisational legitimacy but 
although remaining non-party political may foster organisational legitimacy, it is primarily 
a necessary aspect of constitutional legitimacy.  
This distinction proves useful in the difficult area of the exercise of police officers’ 
discretion. Constitutionally legitimate conduct would include that officers are not 
motivated by prejudice i.e. the extent to which citizens are treated equally, for example, 
in being subject to an officer’s discretion not to arrest. In contrast, the police might be 
seen as organisationally legitimate to the extent that their potentially unconstitutional 
(because prejudicial) exercise of discretion is nevertheless pragmatic in resolving a 
situation quickly. Hence, being clear about what type of legitimacy is being accorded 
 




weight in any given discussion will assist in clarifying how officer conduct should be 
judged. 
Ultimately the constitutional legitimacy of the police must stem from the state. 
Constitutional legitimacy requires accountability processes which transcend managerial 
level concerns relating to the efficient and effective direction of funds towards the 
achievement of specific aims. On this conception of police legitimacy, the state is under 
an obligation to provide a mechanism for achieving a degree of accountability which is 
directly linked to the devolution of police powers. The courts stand as the arbiter of 
executive discretion, and a key way in which this oversight role is achieved in relation to 
the exercise of police powers is via the use of police actions.36 Consequently, police 
actions are fundamental to the constitutional legitimacy of the police insofar as they 
provide a mechanism for holding officers to account for those aspects of their conduct 
that are directly related to the legal norms which outline and delimit their coercive 
powers. 
In contrast, while the state mandate to resort to force in specified circumstances is a 
defining feature of public police (Bittner, 1970), police organisational legitimacy vests in 
the police as an organisation being perceived to be fit to hold those coercive powers. 
Hence, while many police complaints will involve allegations that officers have behaved 
unconstitutionally, the police complaints process is more concerned with police 
organisational legitimacy in seeking to ensure that the police as an organisation is (or is 
viewed as being) sufficiently well-regulated to warrant being bearers of that mandate to 
use coercive powers against citizens. For analytical purposes, it is therefore valuable to 
consider a loose mapping between constitutional legitimacy and the potential to bring a 
police action and a similar mapping between organisational legitimacy and the police 
complaints system.  
  
 




1.4 Conceptualising Constitutional and Organisational Legitimacy  
 
Habermas’s work on the legitimacy of democratic states (Habermas, 1996) and Black’s 
critique thereof (Black, 2000a and 2000b) support and have parallels with the distinction 
that has been drawn between organisational and constitutional legitimacy. This section 
uses these theorists’ work to develop what were hitherto heuristic ideas into clear 
theoretical idealisations that can be used to create a framework for the analysis of the 
empirical data in this project.   
1.4.1 Habermas and the Modern Democratic State 
Habermas’ theory of the modern democratic state stems from his theory of 
communicative action. Fundamental to this is the idea that, since we access the world 
through language, there must be some mutuality in our conception of it and, as a result, 
inter-subjective understanding is a prerequisite to any communication. Hence, while 
communication may be entirely self-seeking or geared towards deception, the form of 
language necessary for communicating or achieving those aims has a shared core. We 
may, for example, have different opinions about a certain point, but inherent in our 
speech rules is an understanding of which arguments concerning each opinion are valid 
(Habermas, 1996: 16). Habermas’ idea of the lifeworld links with this. For Habermas the 
lifeworld comprises those aspects of our background knowledge that are assumed and 
unquestioned and which “form both the horizon for speech situations and the source of 
interpretations”. As a result, it provides the background consensus against which 
communicative action can take place (Habermas, 1996: 22). 
A second key element to Habermas’ theory is the discourse principle. This states that 
“[j]ust those norms are valid to which all possible affected persons could agree as 
participants in rational discourses” (Habermas, 1996: 107). 
Habermas draws on these two elements to formulate a theory of democracy that sits 
between (or rises above) liberal and republican views. While the liberal view rests on 
equal rights and universal suffrage to ensure fair parliamentary representation, and the 




background consensus shared by the citizenry” (Habermas, 1996: 296), Habermas’ 
discourse theory seeks to blend these such that democratic legitimacy is grounded in the 
procedures for securing deliberative processes: 
Democratic procedure, which establishes a network of pragmatic 
considerations, compromises, and discourses of self-understanding and justice, 
grounds the presumption that reasonable or fair results are obtained insofar as 
the flow of relevant information and its proper handling have not been 
obstructed.  According to this view practical reason no longer resides in universal 
human rights or the ethical substance of a specific community, but in the rules 
of discourse and forms of argumentation that borrow their normative content 
from the validity basis of action orientated to reaching understanding (1996: 
296).  
This view recognizes the inevitable circularity between law and a politically constituted 
society. If citizens are self-legislators, they must use the medium of law to realize their 
aims. However, to judge the legitimacy of the laws they enact (by reference to the 
discourse principle), they must have free forums for deliberation, which must be legally 
guaranteed (Habermas, 1996: 126-7). Inherent in this is Habermas’s view that the 
legitimacy of law vests in on-going active deliberation about its validity, i.e. that it is in the 
practice of deliberation that citizens are ‘made’ (Habermas, 1996: 83, 1996:121).  
Habermas recognises that different circumstances require different types of 
argumentation and different forms of reasoning; practical, ethical and moral. These can 
be seen in a hierarchy relative to their degree of abstraction from specific contexts. In 
moral discourses, the reasoning remains external to the pragmatic considerations of a 
particular situation and the reference system for moral justification is “humanity or a 
presupposed republic of world citizens” (Habermas, 1996: 108). By contrast, ethico-
political issues need to be justified by reference to a particular political community 
(Habermas, 1996: 108) and “call for discourses that push beyond contested interests and 
values and engage the participants in a process of self-understanding by which they 
become reflectively aware of deeper consonances in a common form of life” (Habermas, 




appropriate for those circumstances where compromises are reached by parties (who 
may settle for different reasons) and the rules which ensure the fair bargaining position 
for such compromises must be justified in moral discourses (Habermas, 1996: 166-7). 
Political will formation and public opinion formation operate at different levels and law 
has a significant role because it formalises the forms of discourse that are necessary for 
legitimate political will formation: 
Depending on the issue, the various types of discourse and bargaining fill 
different roles for a rational political will-formation. These types are realized in 
the corresponding forms of communication and the latter must in turn be legally 
institutionalized if the citizens’ claim to the exercise of their political rights is to 
be guaranteed (Habermas, 1996: 176). 
It is, therefore, the procedures for the structure of the communication processes within 
the institutions of a state that confer legitimacy on that state. From this perspective, the 
separation of powers can be understood by reference to the forms of communication and 
patterns of argumentation in which various institutions engage. In turn, these can be 
determined by the “distribution of the possibilities for access to different sorts of reasons 
and to the corresponding forms of communication that determine how these reasons are 
dealt with” (Habermas, 1996: 192) (emphasis in original). Hence at an abstract level, 
political legislators are alone in having access to ‘normative, pragmatic and empirical 
reasons’ and are only limited in their use of these by the democratic processes which 
constrain their actions. The judiciary has access to those reasons inherent in the law 
(Habermas, 1996: 439) and is limited by the need, in its application, to aim at decisions 
which are consistent over time. However, while the legislature and the judiciary may 
complement each other in “justifying and applying norms”, the administration is much 
more limited (Habermas, 1996: 22).  
The administration is shielded from having to engage in the sorts of reasoning that the 
legislature and judiciary invoke to justify their decision-making and cannot change 
anything constructed from the hierarchically superior reasoning of these institutions. The 




the world created by the legislature and judiciary, and use them in its own “empirically 
informed purpose rational decision making” (Habermas, 1996: 192): 
In contrast to the legislature and the judiciary…the administration is not 
permitted to deal with normative reasons in either a constructive or 
reconstructive manner. The norms fed into the administration bind the pursuit 
of collective goals to pre-given premises and keep administrative activity within 
the horizon of purpose rationality (Habermas, 1996: 192). 
It is not immediately easy to see how the multifaceted role of the police might fit into 
Habermas’ conception of administration. Black contends that Habermas’ position 
fails to recognise the complexity of the tasks undertaken by the administrative arm 
of the state and the following section outlines Black’s critique of Habermas’ work and 
considers how it might assist in this research. 
1. Black and the Proceduralisation of Administration 
Black argues that the tasks undertaken by the administration are intricate and extend to 
matters for which their actions cannot be legitimated by reference to the judiciary and 
legislature. For her, therefore, they must find their sources of legitimation elsewhere: 
As the administration is not simply implementing the requirements of the 
legislature or executive it cannot derive its legitimacy from the connections 
between the political institutions and communicative power. Instead it has to 
derive its legitimacy from a direct line between it and communicative power… 
and requires the democratization of the administration; the insertion of 
deliberation directly into the administrative and regulatory process (Black, 
2000a : 613-614).  
Habermas recognises these difficulties to some extent (Habermas, 1996: 440-442) 
suggesting that procedural law must be “enlisted to build a legitimation filter into the 
decisional process” of the administration (emphasis in original) (Habermas, 1996: 440). 
Black’s contribution is to build on this and her interest lies in the proceduralization of 
regulation. By this she means “the use of law not to impose substantive ends but to 
structure decision processes to ensure that the results achieved are acceptable” (Black 




compromises” (2000a: 599) but Black also suggests a ‘thick’ form of proceduralization 
“where participation could be orientated towards the mutuality, consensus, and inter-
subjective understanding of deliberative democracy” (Black 2000a: 599). Arguably a 
properly functioning system of restorative local resolutions with ‘lesson learning’ 
feedback to other officers has the potential to fall within this conception of thick 
proceduralization (see Young et al, 2005). 
 
Black notes that blockages may occur in communication and asserts that it is in the 
treatment of these that her position differs most from that of Habermas. Black focuses on 
four aspects of such blockages: the gap between consciousness and language; inter-
subjective difference; difference in modes of discourse; and manifestations of power 
relationships in discourse (and their inclusionary/exclusionary effects).   
As regards blockages in inter-subjectivity, she draws on Bourdieu’s notion of habitus:  
Those who have a homologous habitus have the same language, they are part of 
the same interpretive community” (Black 2000b: 40). However, ‘understanding’ 
means more than shared linguistic competences and requires cognizance of the 
rationality and validity of claims of others” (Black 2000b:40).  
For Habermas, language performs a transcendental function which overrides these issues 
(Habermas, 1996:  348, 352-4). However, Black suggests that this seems to 
“underestimate the difficulties of translation out of the specialized code or logic and into 
the language that others can comprehend” (2000b: 41). Hence, while accepting that 
difficulties arise in regulators’ adopting these roles she proposes the incorporation of 
some translation and/or mediation into deliberative processes. 
In a policing context, possibilities for translation or mediation would be important to the 
promotion of ‘policing by consent’ within a diverse society. Similarly, the high proportion 
of police complaints appeals upheld by the IPCC is indicative of a difference in the 
assessment of evidence as between professional standards officers and IPCC staff and 
speaks of the need for some process that embodies a greater form of translation or 
mediation, such that these differences can be made plain and deliberated. However, it is 




such deliberation. Black points out that Habermas assumes the form of discourse will be 
clear and that ultimately, the decision regarding the appropriate form of discourse will be 
a moral one. However, she suggests this misses the point that in fact all the forms of 
discourse will be used at the same time, and the choice is ultimately a matter of the power 
relationships at work, which can then prove determinative of the outcomes (Black 2000a: 
242-245). 
It is here that the question of what broader functions police actions and police complaints 
might serve becomes pertinent.  As noted above, it is not immediately clear how the police 
might be conceived in relation to Habermas’ conception of democracy and Black’s critique 
thereof. Similarly, police actions and police complaints might be seen as an aspect of the 
lifeworld, but alternatively could be conceived as mechanisms which confer legitimacy on 
the state by structuring the communication processes within institutions. 
Arguably, in arresting the alleged perpetrator of a crime, the police are applying given 
norms in a pragmatic way and are therefore acting entirely consistently with Habermas’ 
conception of the administration. The ability to seek redress from the state in the form of 
a police action also fits with this conception. The courts adjudicate on whether the actions 
of the officer accord with the law and, in doing so, give guidance to other officers about 
the legal boundaries of their mandate to interfere with citizens’ freedom. 
However, how should we conceptualise the myriad other functions that the police 
perform and, for example, the exercise of their discretion not to arrest in particular 
circumstances? In describing the many different options available to an officer on being 
summoned to a minor fight, Lustgarten notes that “[t]o say…that he must uphold the law, 
or is responsible to the law is in practical terms meaningless. His discretion involves either 
making value judgments about the worthiness of the people involved, or public feeling, 
or the seriousness of the incident or the long-term gains and losses involved in sanctions 
of varying severity” (Lustgarten, 1986: 11).  
Failure on the part of the police to make appropriate investigations is generally not 
actionable (Horsey, 2013; Tofaris and Steel, 2016). Similarly, the courts have refused to 




considered to be solely governed by internal discipline  procedures.37 There is, therefore, 
a large area of police activity that is outside the effective control of the courts and which 
may be seen as ‘administration’ (in the way Habermas uses the term) in that it entails the 
implementation of a level of control that has been deliberatively agreed upon. Here, 
however, the actions of the police may nonetheless be ‘quasi-judicial’ in the sense that 
they have a direct impact on citizens’ rights (e.g. being treated in an undignified manner 
by an agent of the state may be interpreted as a form of punishment). On Habermas’s 
conception, the legitimacy of these administrative practices cannot come directly from 
the communicative sphere. Instead it stems from the subordinate position of the 
administration, in that the solutions to the normative elements of the conflicts it 
encounters have passed through the ‘sluices’ of the legislature or judiciary (Habermas, 
1996: 358). In contrast, Black’s observations regarding the proceduralization of regulation 
suggest that those aspects of officer conduct that are not susceptible to direct legal 
oversight need to be regulated in ways that permit translation and mediation and that, 
within this, attention should be paid to the forms of discourse employed.  
The earlier parts of this chapter delineated ideal types in relation to the role of the police 
and the criteria by which they might be judged. This culminated in the development of 
two types of police legitimacy, organisational and constitutional, which represent 
heuristic paradigms against which real situations might be compared and described.  In 
section 1.4 a brief comparison has been made between Habermas’s conception of 
deliberative democracy and Black’s critique of his views concerning legitimation of the 
administrative activities of state. From this it is possible to suggest two additional ideal 
types. The first is a form of administrative (for this research, police) action which is 
considered legitimate within Habermas’s deliberatively democratic conception of the rule 
of law, operating only within the confines of practical reasoning and subject to review by 
the courts. The other form of administrative (police) action is broader, extending to quasi-
judicial activities (the decision to caution rather than suggest the CPS charge with an 
offence, for example) and requiring normative and ethico-political reasoning. This would 
 




need to be legitimated by reference to a style of regulation that incorporates 
opportunities for thick proceduralization in the form of mediation and translation.  
These ideal types may be combined with those discussed in earlier sections to formulate 
theoretical idealisations that will be used in structuring the analysis of police actions and 
police complaints envisaged by this research. Lopreato and Alston distinguish a 
theoretical idealisation from propaedeutic paradigms of the style delineated in section 
1.3 on the basis that “their logical strategy requires the introduction of additional 
statements of theory whose function is to account for discrepancies between the actual 
situation and the hypothetical ones the idealisations describe” (Lopreato and Alston, 
1970; 92). Therefore, two hypothetical mappings are suggested to serve as theoretical 
idealisations for this research. The first is between police actions, the constitutional 
legitimacy of the police and police conduct legitimated via Habermas’s conception of 
deliberative democracy; and the second is the police complaints system, the 
organisational legitimacy of the police and the proceduralization of administrative process 
espoused by Black.  
The value of these mappings can immediately be illustrated by reference to Walker’s 
observation that, for the police, “minimal force is not only a moral imperative, but also a 
strategy” (Walker, 1996: 55). To the extent that minimal force is conceived in terms of a 
moral imperative, it is an aspect of police constitutional legitimacy and invokes a moral 
discourse as regards the extent of its application in each case. But when considered as a 
strategy, it might be viewed more as an aspect of organisational legitimacy and as invoking 
a more practical discourse. Here, the logic of how the balance might be struck between 
the competing key elements of effectiveness and minimal force may well be different 
depending on whether one is viewing it from an organisational or constitutional 
standpoint and an assessment of the legitimacy of the action (and the means by which it 
might be understood as legitimate) might vary accordingly. The idealisations suggested 
for analysis here will therefore be useful in delineating and making sense of the potentially 
conflicting arguments regarding such issues.  The methodology adopted in this research 
is discussed in detail in Chapter 6, but the following section sets out the key 




1.5 Methodology  
Lopreato and Alston suggest that theoretical idealisations “explicitly invite research to 
help bridge the theoretical gap between the hypothetical and the real” (Lopreato and 
Alston 1970: 92). For this research two idealisations are being contrasted, which inevitably 
increases the complexity of the analysis required. In addition, the data set is mixed and 
comprises government documents, court judgments, correspondence relating to 
Freedom of Information Act requests and interviews with police professional standards 
officers and legal personnel. Thematic analysis has therefore been selected as the 
appropriate methodology.  
Thematic analysis shares features of both thematic discourse analysis and grounded 
theory in that it comprises a search for themes across an entire data set rather than within 
a specific data item (as in narrative analysis of a single interview for example) (Braun and 
Clarke, 2006: 79-81). It differs from these approaches, however, in not being wedded to 
any pre-existing theoretical framework (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 81).  The use of 
theoretical idealisation invites empirical enquiry which is designed to explore the disparity 
between the idealisation and ‘the real’. For this research, however, the epistemological 
approach adopted is broadly constructionist. While real police officers engage with real 
citizens, the police complaints system, the legal system and indeed ‘the police’ are all 
social constructs. The disparity to be explored is, therefore, between the theoretical 
idealisations and the way in which the empirical data suggests each of the processes is 
understood. This makes a latent thematic analysis an appropriate qualitative analytical 
approach. As such, the research will seek to “identify or examine the underlying ideas, 
assumptions and conceptualizations - and ideologies - that are theorized as shaping or 
informing the semantic content of the data” (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 84).   
Thematic analysis can be conducted in conjunction with grounded theory, in which case, 
it will seek themes that are closely linked to the data themselves rather than stemming 
from writer’s perspectives and interests (Braun and Clarke, 2006). However, as noted in 
the introduction, the writer has previous professional legal experience in handling police 




cannot be explored in detail, it is acknowledged that it is likely to have influenced the 
positing and formulation of the research question.38  
A key assumption underpinning the research is that the way in which settlement of police 
actions is understood will be dependent on underlying assumptions concerning the 
processes of police complaints and police actions (and the broader roles these processes 
may perform).  It is, therefore, important to analyse the data concerned with police 
complaints and police actions first so that the results can then inform analysis of the data 
concerned with settlement of police actions. To do this, secondary questions have been 
formulated in relation to police actions and police complaints: What are the broader 
functions of these processes? How is police legitimacy conceived within them? What are 
they seen to contribute to police legitimacy? Consequently, for this research, a theme is 
anything that encapsulates or denotes something about the data that is important in 
relation to those questions and, in particular, which either aligns or distances them from 
theoretical idealisations.  
The development of the themes is itself an interpretive exercise (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 
84) and accordingly, the research is in two parts. The first part (Chapters 2-5) explores the 
development of the police, the police complaints system and the use of police actions. 
This is not an expressly empirical element of the research. However, it is in the interpretive 
aspects of the exploration of these processes that the themes to be deployed in coding 
the empirical data are developed. This part also operates to thicken the concepts of 
organisational and constitutional legitimacy. Part Two of the thesis (Chapters 6-10) then 
presents the findings of the full empirical analysis conducted using the themes developed 
in Part One and concludes by addressing these to the research questions outlined above.  
 
 
38 Much has been written concerning the impact of insider and outsider status in relation to the gathering 
and interpretation of data (Merton, 1972; Merriam et al, 2001); it is therefore important to acknowledge 
the writer’s previous professional experience and its possible influence on elements of the research. This 










Chapter 1 delineated two ideal types of police legitimacy, organisational and 
constitutional legitimacy. This Chapter explores the history of the police in the period from 
Anglo Saxon times to the establishment of the Royal Commission on policing in 1960. It 
charts the development of police organisational identity, highlighting the way in which 
police organisational legitimacy was forged in the first half of the 20th Century.  
Any discussion of the history of policing demands some definition of what the term 
‘policing’ is being used to denote (Rawlings, 2002; Zedner, 2006). This is not, however, a 
constant, and historical analysis of the structures by which ‘policing’ is delivered have to 
take account of the shifting understanding of what ‘policing’ involves. Indeed, the 
structures themselves both reflect changes to common understandings of policing and 
influence or dictate future conceptions of what policing and police legitimacy may entail. 
It has to be accepted, therefore, that accounts of the history of policing are inevitably 
value laden (Reiner, 2010).  
Detailed discussion of policing history (and the divisions within it) is beyond the scope of 
this work. However, the historical development of the office of constable and the 
structures that secure the delivery of (public) policing do suggest some themes that 
augment the ideal types of organisational and constitutional legitimacy introduced in 
Chapter 1.  
Three phases can be discerned in the development of the police as an organisation and 
the structures whereby officers within the police are held to account. These are: the 
period from Anglo Saxon times to the creation of the ‘new police’ in the early 19th Century; 
the period between then and the Police Act 1964; and the period from the passing of that 
Act to the present. This Chapter explores the development of the police and police 
organisational identity in the first two periods and Chapter 3 extends the discussion in 




2.1 The Office of Constable 
 
There is consensus within policing histories that the office of constable emerged from the 
Anglo-Saxon tythingmen system whereby all male members of groupings of the 
community called tythes were “enrolled for police purposes” (Critchley, 1967: 2). This was 
achieved by means of an oath called ‘the frankpledge’ in which everyone in the tythe 
accepted an obligation for the good behaviour of all the other members (Critchley, 1967: 
2). By the 13th Century the feudal manor had replaced the tythe as the key unit of 
community responsibility (Critchley, 1967: 4-5) but the concept of community 
involvement in the enforcement of local norms remained and was overseen by a 
constable. The manorial court was responsible for electing and swearing in the local 
constable who would hold an annual term (Rawlings, 2002: 35). The constable was 
responsible for raising the alarm in relation to suspected felons or wrongdoers by means 
of the ‘hue and cry’, in response to which all (male) members of the community were 
expected to assist. Constables were also responsible for making presentations to the 
manorial court about local matters (Critchley, 1967: 5), which included information 
regarding suspected offenders, but could also concern largely administrative matters, 
such as the regulation of ale houses (Rawlings, 2008: 50).   
Policing histories of this period are inconsistent or unclear concerning whether the office 
of constable primarily embodied community, local or central functions. For example, 
while many aspects of the role of constable were deeply local in character, constables 
were also under a duty to keep the King’s Peace and their position was given a “royal 
flavour” (Critchley, 1967: 5) by virtue of the label having ancient origins associated with 
the Crown. Rawlings points out that even prior to the Norman Conquest, codes set out by 
the Saxon kings may be understood as seeking to “rearticulate the rights of the victim and 
the roles of kin and broader community into duties owed to a superior authority” 
(Rawlings, 2008: 47). In contrast, Simpson notes that the Crown was necessarily remote: 
“it must be remembered that the early acts of parliament embody the ideas of crown 
lawyer and offices of a semi-foreign courts, who were not likely to be very familiar with 
workings of our native local institutions” (Simpson, 1895: 628). Besides, the King’s Peace 




somewhat less of a ‘royal flavour’ and, writing in 1895, Simpson argues that the role of 
constable remained as a representative of the community beyond 1827 (Simpson, 1895: 
628). What seems clear, therefore, is that there was a lack of clarity regarding which 
aspects of a constable’s duties were understood as being owed to the Crown, the manorial 
court, or the community.39  
The Statute of Winchester 1285 was the only significant piece of policing legislation 
between 1285 and the statutes which created the new police in the early part of the 19th 
Century (Critchley, 1967: 7). It sought to “reaffirm…the principle of local responsibility” 
(Critchley, 1967: 6) by requiring all the men in each town to be on a roster (administered 
by the constable) to serve as watchmen. More importantly however, it also revived and 
bolstered the practice of ‘hue and cry’ (Critchley, 1967: 6)40 by obliging the community to 
compensate any victim who had raised the hue if the offender subsequently escaped 
(Rawlings, 2008: 48). This suggests the duties surrounding the hue and cry were 
considered to be owed at least as much to the victim as to the King and that the Crown 
itself was seeking to reinforce a collective response to crime. Further, Lambard’s Duties 
of Constables 1633 (quoted in Simpson, 1895) suggests that responsibility for keeping the 
peace attached to a constable not as a king’s officer, but as representative of his parish 
and was created not by statute but by ancient common law (Simpson, 1895: 632). 
The Statute of Winchester operated over a 500-year period which saw significant cultural, 
social and economic changes and the way in which the statute operated evolved 
accordingly (Critchley, 1967: 16). The status and role of constable developed in response 
to surrounding social needs and accounts differ in their emphasis on officers’ efficiency 
and general standing (Critchley, 1967; Reiner, 2010; Rawlings, 2002; Emsley, 1991). 
Throughout this period, however, there was an evolving set of relationships in a 
hierarchical line between the Crown (and later parliament) via the manorial court (later 
magistrates) to the constable. There is little discussion of legitimacy or formal 
accountability mechanisms within these relationships, but, there is consensus that they 
 
39 Arguably this lack of clarity regarding officers’ duties was still evident in 1909 – See Betts v Stephens 1 
K.B.1.  




operated with considerable flexibility at a practical level in each locality (Rawlings, 2002: 
55; 2008:50-51; Emsley, 1991: 37).   
Constables were appointed annually, and every male member of the community was 
obliged to take his turn holding the position (Critchley, 1967: 9).41 They were selected by 
their village, lived in the village and would continue to do so once their term expired 
(Rawlings, 2002: 35; Emsley, 1991: 11). This made their position complex. While 
constables were liable to a fine for failing to make a presentation to the justices (Rawlings, 
2002: 35) their role was to support the victim in apprehending any alleged offender rather 
than undertaking the investigation themselves (Rawlings, 2002: 37; Lustgarten, 1986: 27). 
However, the victim might not see prosecution as his or her main aim, preferring a public 
apology or simply the return of stolen goods (Rawlings, 2002: 43). Similarly, given their 
community ties, constables might choose not to make a presentation out of sympathy for 
a neighbour, seeking instead to broker compromises between parties rather than take the 
matter to the local court (Emsley, 1991: 37). So, a degree of informal justice remained and 
was overseen by the constable. This suggests that the role of the constable included a 
complex balance between community values and those more associated with being a pure 
servant of the Crown. In addition, constables’ embeddedness in the community and the 
yearly rotation limited the level at which officers might enforce measures, particularly in 
relation to unpopular laws. They therefore operated very much as custodians of the 
people’s understanding of justice.  
Constables were also personally liable for failures in their duties (Clayton and Tomlinson, 
1987: 12) and Rawlings suggests that uncertainty concerning their powers left them open 
to “harassment by litigation” (Rawlings, 2008: 51).42 However, once again the role of the 
constable and their embeddedness within the community is significant. Any desire for 
reparation from a constable for failures in his duty may have been tempered by the 
thought of a person’s own potential term in office and an appreciation of the complexity 
of the role as described above.  
 
41 The office was unpaid and unpopular and those who could afford to delegate their term sought to do 
so. Histories differ on the extent to which this led to the office ultimately being delegated ‘down’ to those 
least able to perform the function adequately (see Emsley, 1991: 24 cf Critchley, 1967:10).  




While, arguably, the shift toward constables’ oath being sworn before justices of the 
peace (rather than the manorial courts) might have resulted in the role being regarded as 
more directly under Crown control (Simpson, 1895: 635), the justices were in most cases 
the very same people who had headed the manorial courts, so the significance of the 
change will have been lost in many circumstances (Critchely, 1967: 17). Moreover, while 
constables were indictable for neglect of duty in respect of, for example, the execution of 
a warrant,43 the justices themselves were not mere conduits for Crown concerns. Their 
workload was “largely dependent on [their] personal inclinations” (Emsley, 1991: 14) and 
“it is clear that some justices upheld a community view of order while others…took the 
stricter jurists’ line” (Emsley, 1991: 14). Significantly, therefore what emerges is a system 
that was not purely topdown and hierarchical but more a negotiated equilibrium between 
communities, constables and justices.  
It is important to recognise that the hierarchical line described above operated in the 
context of a classical understanding of social order. Dodsworth argues that the 18th 
Century perception of government rested on a conception of liberty understood in terms 
of civic virtue i.e. that it was public service that created the conditions of liberty:  
The most important aspect of citizenship was that it designated its bearer a free 
man. Freedom in this sense was understood as independence, that is, freedom 
from obligation, domination or arbitrary interference. This was a condition and 
a duty, not a right, and in order to possess his freedom (for only a limited number 
of mature, wealthy, landed, usually English, men could qualify as independent) 
it was necessary that the citizen actively participate in the civic life of the 
community (Dodsworth, 2010: 211).  
Thus, the conception of the office of constable, a constable’s “original authority”,44 rested 
on a model of the virtuous citizen practising his public duty to generate and maintain a 
‘free’ community. It is submitted that on this understanding of liberty and public service 
there is no room for the notion of formal accountability because the public service is being 
undertaken not as a role outside the community but is itself constitutive of the community 
 
43 R v Wyat 1703 91. E.R. 331. 




as a body of free citizens. On this conception, there is ‘accountability’, but it is not 
consistent with the way the term is used in the 20th Century and, instead vests in every 
aspect of the respective roles in the negotiated equilibrium outlined above. 
A combination of the long unstructured evolution of the office of constable and the 
flexibility of the relationships between officers and justices in the context of the classical 
understanding of civic virtue and liberty resulted in the precise legal and constitutional 
status of the constable being unclear. Interestingly this lack of clarity was preserved under 
the Acts which created the new police from 1829.  
 
2.2 The New Police 1829 – 1960 
 
2.2.1 Structural Development Within the New Police  
 
Three Acts of Parliament between 1829 and 1839 introduced the ‘new police’ and thereby 
formed the foundations for the modern policing system in England and Wales. These 
changes were extremely controversial, and the Metropolitan Police Act 1829 was finally 
passed after several attempts to introduce similar legislation over the preceding half 
century had failed (Critchley, 1967: 35-45).   
 
The enormous social changes brought about by the Industrial Revolution and the 
movement of large populations to cities resulted in a perception that crime and public 
disorder (in London in particular) were becoming problematic (Critchley, 1967: 21). Once 
again, commentaries are divided concerning whether this necessitated the reforms that 
created the new police. The dominant view highlights the failure of the existing systems 
of social control but, Emsley questions this interpretation (Emsley, 1991: 22-24) and 
Rawlings draws attention to the way the law had developed to criminalise the activities 
of the poor (Rawlings, 2002: 44-51). 
 
There was concern that the establishment of an organised police force would result in the 
style of despotic government that was being experienced in France, with the concomitant 




conception of the new police was entirely alien to the classic understanding of liberty 
based on civic duty, which had predominated in the preceding centuries (Dodsworth, 
2010).  
 
These ideological and political difficulties resulted in the Acts that created the new police 
leaving many details concerning organisational management and police powers 
ambiguous and open to development over time. The organised forces were “grafted onto 
and clothed with the power of the traditional office” (Lustgarten, 1986: 25) and 
consequently the old conception of the office of constable was preserved.  The disquiet 
about central government control or a national force also resulted in the creation of three 
separate systems for the establishment and management of local forces. The 
Metropolitan Police Act 1829 provided for constables to be under the command of two 
commissioners who reported directly to the Home Secretary and were given the power 
to “recruit, train and discipline” the officers (Wall,1998: 21). The Municipal Corporations 
Act 1835 injected a direct democratic element into the creation and control of police in 
the boroughs by requiring local borough councils to create subcommittees called Watch 
Committees which were tasked with the establishment of local police forces (Rawlings, 
2002: 129). The County Police Act 1839 governed the establishment of a new police force 
in the Counties and provided for the Magistrates in quarter sessions to appoint a chief 
constable responsible for appointing, dismissing and disciplining officers (Wall, 1998: 36-
37). 
 
Sir Robert Peel spearheaded the creation of the new police and sought to promote their 
public acceptance by ensuring they were uniformed, disciplined and not of ‘officer class’ 
(Wall, 1998: 22). Accounts differ as to how fully this aim was achieved. There is, however, 
consensus that the new police in London were initially met with considerable opposition 
by the general public and there were frequent claims of police violence, particularly in the 
context of public order (Critchley, 1967: 54; Emsley, 1991:61). Critchley suggests that final 
acceptance of the new police might be attributed to ‘fickleness’ on the part of the public 
(Critchley, 1967: 55) but the transition was more complex and, again, related to the ability 





The officers in the new police were subject to strict discipline and military style drill and 
the conditions of service of early constables in the new police were so onerous and the 
discipline so harsh that retention of good officers and the maintenance of a continued 
commitment to public service among those that remained became problematic (Rawlings, 
2002: 131).  Wall describes how chief constables were introduced in the Metropolis to 
bridge the social, cultural and educational gap between the Commissioners and officers 
(Wall, 1998: 22).  The need for an effective chain of command was underlined in 1886, 
when the Metropolitan Police failed to deal with disturbances in the capital. A subsequent 
‘Disturbances Committee’ recommended the intermediary role between the 
Commissioners and officers be taken by gentlemen of good character who were typically 
ex-officers in the military. This was considered important because “such men would be 
treated with respect and regarded with confidence by the force” (Wall, 1998: 24)45 which 
suggests that the Committee was concerned about the motivation of new constables and 
how they might be controlled.  
 
A comparable need for a ‘bridge’ between Watch Committee members and ordinary 
officers was emerging in the Boroughs where the franchise was still extremely limited and 
linked to property ownership46. It became customary for Watch Committees to appoint 
chief officers (Wall, 1998: 31) who were under a duty to obey the lawful commands of 
both the Watch Committee and the Justices.47 Lustgarten argues that having grown up 
through the ranks, these chief officers were accustomed to obeying orders as a means of 
securing promotion and suggests a relationship of some subservience (Lustgarten, 1986: 
37). In contrast, Wall argues that the de facto power relationship was more complex. He 
notes how Watch Committee members, who were elected officers with their own 
interests, did not have the time and expertise to undertake detailed control of the police 
in their area (Wall, 1998: 31). In contrast, chief officers were able to endear themselves 
to the “townsfolk, offsetting local opposition and often giving them considerable personal 
legitimacy that was independent of the local council” (Wall, 1998: 31) (emphasis added). 
As a result, once the Watch Committees had delegated their powers to chief officers, they 
 
45 Quoting the Administration and Organisation of the Metropolitan Police Force Committee 1886:4.  
46 Lustgarten refers to England during this period as a political oligarchy (1986: 39). 




were not easy to regain.  Here then, once again, there is lack of consensus within the 
historical commentaries, but it is nevertheless clear that the relationships between 
officers, chief officers and Watch Committees continued to evolve and remained local in 
character. Furthermore, we see a tension between legitimacy stemming from personal 
contact with the community and legitimacy born of the status as crown servants.  
 
Unlike their borough counterparts, county chief constables held statutory office. They 
were men of social standing equal to the justices themselves, recruited from ‘gentry 
families’ and frequently had military experience (1986: 41,42).  It is not clear if and how 
the ‘bridging’ function exercised by the chief constables of the Metropolitan Police and 
chief officers in the boroughs operated in the counties. However, the new system in 
counties ran alongside the old system of parish constables for some time (Critchley, 1967: 
88-92) and Emsley suggests that “[t]he shift from an old style of policing to a new one was 
far more gradual than much traditional police history has allowed” (Emsley, 1996: 62). 
The above discussion illustrates how the Acts which brought about the establishment of 
the new police instigated a process of continued evolution rather than producing 
immediate radical change.  This continued development is often charted as largely 
concerning increased centralisation of power over the policing process (Emsley, 1996: 
160-161) which is undoubtedly true to some extent.48 Importantly however, the latter half 
of the 19th Century and first half of the 20th Century also saw the notion of policing as an 
embedded community function replaced by the idea of ‘the police’ as an institution and 
the development of a police organisational identity  
 
2.2.2  The Development of a Police Organisational Identity  
 
The development of a police organisational identity occurred at several levels. Arguably, 
the disaffection of early officers noted above, combined with the politically expedient 
imprecision of officers’ original role and powers, altered constables’ relationship with the 
local community. Rawlings’ account suggests that there was a considerable degree to 
 
48 For example, the Police Act 1919 standardised pay and conditions and considerably increased the 




which officers’ authority began to stem from their ability to mete out summary 
punishment rather than prosecute and thereby demonstrate their power to choose the 
form of retribution (Rawlings, 2002: 156).  
Wall notes how “the brutal experience of early officers is belied by historical 
sentimentality based on parliamentary rather than contemporary records” (Wall, 1998: 
22).  So, while placards were posted in London demanding to be rid of “Peel’s bloody 
gang”, (Critchley, 1967: 54) and Emsley lists several occasions where the new 
Metropolitan Police used excessive force, noting how “complaints about police 
brutality…were to recur throughout the [19th] Century” (Emsley, 1991: 61), a 
parliamentary committee sitting in 1833 and 1834 reported that “complaints against the 
police had not been well founded” (Critchley, 1967: 56). This official inclination to dismiss 
allegations of misconduct resurfaces in 1893 when Asquith, the then Home Secretary, was 
asked about a woman having been treated violently by the police and he responded, “I do 
not see any reason for doubting the accuracy of the police statement”, a sentiment he 
repeated in respect of a similar incident in 1894 (Emsley, 1991: 94).  
This disconnect between official statements concerning the police and the practical 
realities of policing continued into the 20th Century. Rawlings suggests that the 1929 
Royal Commission on Police Powers and Procedures knowingly emphasised the 
connection between the police and the public as a means of presenting the police as 
egalitarian in their methods:  
… calling the police constables and so drawing on the ancient tradition of officers 
who were drawn from the people, enabled the Royal Commission on Police 
Powers in 1929 to claim that the police were merely ‘citizens in uniform’ 
(Rawlings, 2002: 153).  
This is supported by Critchley’s extremely critical assessment of the Commission’s 
position:  
If the Commission merely intended to stress the civilian character of a 
policeman, the passage is harmless enough, but if it was intended to be taken 




that the whole point of the new police was to provide a force distinct from the 
general body of citizens (1967: 201).49   
This divergence between the actualities of policing and the official representations of the 
police is not neutral in its effect. An official commitment to the good character of ‘the 
police’ presents all officers as having a unified status in the eyes of official actors and 
thereby undermines the ancient community embeddedness of the office of constable. 
The recognition in the officers themselves of their own power, relative to the bodies which 
oversaw them also contributed to the development of a police organisational identity. 
Constables in the new police were prepared to petition on matters concerning pay and 
conditions from as early as 1848 (Emsley, 1991: 90). More significantly, officers in 
Manchester successfully used mass resignation during a major dispute in the cotton trade 
to pressurise the Watch Committees into agreeing a pay increase (Emsley, 1991: 91). 
Significantly, the Police Act 1890 gave officers the right to a pension after 25 years. This 
increased the autonomy of chief officers as against Watch Committees in the boroughs 
who had previously been able to use their discretion over granting a pension to exercise 
control over chief constables (Wall, 1998: 48). In addition, the borough chief officers 
created a Chief Constables’ Association in 1893 which enhanced the sense of policing as 
a professional concern (1998: 95).  
However, it was not until the early part of the 20th Century that increasing agitation on 
the part of the rank and file for a police union led to police discipline and conditions of 
service appearing on the political agenda (Emsley, 1996: 99-103; Wall, 1998: 51). This 
pressure, and the police strikes of 1918 and 1919, were instrumental in the appointment 
of the Royal Commission of 1919 (also referred to as the Desborough Committee) to 
advise the Home Secretary on police pay and conditions of service (Wall, 1998: 56). Their 
deliberations are discussed in the following section but significantly they acceded to the 
call for a representative body. 
The First World War strained the fragmented structures for the delivery of policing and, 
in response, the Home Office sought to coordinate arrangements for the county and 
 
49 He also comments on how the term “citizens in uniform”was apparently invested with “the authoring of 





borough police by district conferences of the chief constables (Wall, 1998: 52). These 
continued after the end of the war under the chairmanship of the Home Secretary but 
ultimately achieved an independent chair (Critchley, 1967: 261) thereby also giving chief 
officers a separate power base.  
 
2.2.3  Police Organisational Identity and the Emergence of Accountability 
 
Marshall suggests it is “remarkable” that accountability did not emerge as an issue in 
policing until the 1950s (Marshall, 1978: 52). In contrast the historical analysis above 
suggests that the lack of any sustained narrative concerned with the accountability of the 
police is less surprising than it might appear.  As discussed above, ‘accountability’ in the 
modern sense did not feature in the conception of policing prior to the new police because 
constables were embedded in the community and strove towards organic relationships 
within a hierarchical structure of control infused with the classical understanding of 
liberty.  Further, while the creation of the new police as a bureaucratic force was 
anathema to the understanding of liberty based on civic duty, the classic conception of 
liberty, in fact, pervaded debates concerning the new police. Dodsworth maintains that 
supposedly functional aspects of the new police, i.e. vigour, trustworthiness and 
independent status “were far from neutral in meaning” (Dodsworth, 2010: 206) but 
represented civic virtue in the classical sense. The emphasis on the new police as being 
“capable of description in terms of independence, virtue and activity”, demonstrates the 
extent to which the “classical ideals were still active in the formation of the new police” 
(Dodsworth, 2010: 213). Moreover, inherent in the ancient office of constable, which was 
legally retained within the Acts creating the new police, was a specific classical 
understanding of public service and civic virtue.  
The new police also intentionally preserved the existing lack of clarity concerning which 
of an officer’s duties were owed to the Crown and which were owed to the community. 
This is important because authority for actions relating to those duties owed to the Crown 
would stem from the Crown and, ultimately, some form of accountability to the Crown 
for those actions would be necessary. However, for those aspects of the role of constable 




extensiveness with the public and, as argued in section 2.1, the idea of a formal external 
accountability mechanism misunderstands the nature of the role.  
The judgment in Fisher v Oldham Corporation50 is taken as the starting point for the 
modern day articulation of the status of constable. Interestingly, the tension between the 
sources of officers’ power (noted in the previous paragraph) is evident in McCardie J’s 
articulation of the constable’s role. In holding that the corporation were not liable for the 
acts of officers effecting what was an unlawful arrest, McCardie J stated that the officers 
“were not acting as the servants or agents of the defendants. They were fulfilling their 
duties as public servants and officers of the Crown”51 (emphasis added). Significantly, an 
analysis which recognises the persistence of the classic sense of service suggests that 
McCardie J’s conception of ‘public service’ is consistent with the conception of officers 
‘original authority’, stemming from community-embeddedness (particularly perhaps 
when put in juxtaposition to a different quality of duty that is owed to the Crown).52 
 
This is an important context in which to view the continued commitment to the 
community-embeddedness of constables in the Royal Commissions on Policing of 1919, 
1929 and 1949. For example, the 1919 Desborough Commission placed considerable 
emphasis on the connectedness of constables to the communities they policed:  
 
 We consider it important also to bear in mind that the constable, even in the 
execution of his duty for the preservation of peace, acts not as an agent of the 
Government exercising powers derived from that fact, but as a citizen 
representing the rest of the community and exercising powers which at any rate 
in their elements are possessed by all citizens alike.53 
As noted above, this position was reasserted and highlighted by the Royal 
Commission of 1929: “The police in this country have never been recognised, either 
in law or by tradition as a force distinct from the general body of citizens” (emphasis 
 
50 [1930] 1 KB 364. 
51 [1930] 1 KB 364 at 377 
52 [1930] 1 KB 364. 
53 Cmnd 253.  (1919) Report of the Committee on the Police Service of England Wales and Scotland Part 1.  
The Desborough Committee also produced a second report in 1920 [Cmd. 574] Committee on the Police 




added). 54  Twenty years later, the 1949 Commission quoted Lord Desborough’s 
comments at length and stated: “we entirely agree with these observations”. 55 
It is submitted that this official emphasis on the connection of officers with their 
communities operated (consciously or not) to prioritise an understanding of authority as 
stemming from the ancient, more organic police role and, thus, diverted attention away 
from the need for formal accountability measures. More specifically, it permitted 
discipline (which had been a defining feature of the new police) to be conceived as an 
internal matter rather than associated with a need for officers to be publicly accountable 
for their actions.  
While stressing the constable as a ‘citizen in uniform’, the Desborough Commission also 
recognised (without noting the contradiction) the difficulties and “social disabilities” 
inherent in a constable’s role: “[H]e must at all times, both on and off duty maintain a 
standard of personal conduct befitting to his position and this does impose upon him 
certain restrictions which do not exist in ordinary employment” (Cmnd 253 1919: 8). In 
addition, there was frank reference to “obvious”, “special temptations” to which 
constables are exposed. The level of remuneration the Commission recommended was 
intended to “not add to his temptations, the difficulties and anxieties incidental to an 
inadequate rate of pay” (Cmnd 253 1919: 8-9) and to “preserve” the “essential” “sense of 
obligation to the public” which was fundamental to the role (Cmnd 253 1919: 8).  It was 
in response to these difficulties i.e. the risk of corruption and the need to maintain a 
“sense of obligation to the public”, that police pay and conditions were improved. 
Interestingly, no link was made between these “obvious special temptations” and 
discipline. Instead in a separate part of the Commission’s report, discipline is linked with 
“public confidence”:  
 
In a service such as the Police it is essential that a high standard of discipline 
should be maintained, and the irregularities of conduct which would not be 
noticed in other employment should be the subject of disciplinary treatment. 
 
54 1928-29 [Cmd. 3297] Report of the Royal Commission on Police Powers and Procedure. 
55 1948-49 [Cmd. 7831] Home Office. Scottish Home Department. Report of the Committee on Police 




Otherwise the police would be unable to retain the public confidence, and the 
proper performance of their duties would become impossible. But good 
discipline involves both loyal obedience to all orders of superior officers and a 
just considerate and impartial treatment of subordinates; and we regard the 
maintenance of a sound esprit de corp and relations of mutual confidence 
between the various ranks as one of the principal tests of the efficient 
management of a police force. (Cmnd 574 1920: 122)56 
This is a very significant point for this thesis. ‘Public confidence’ is conceived as stemming 
from discipline which is, in turn, conceived as an internal matter. Implicit in this is the idea 
that the public should have confidence in the police because they are disciplined, not 
because they are accountable.  In the Committee’s second report the prospect of public 
accountability is specifically rejected:  
[W]e are strongly of opinion that the public discussion of the delinquencies of 
individual constables before the Watch Committee or the Town Council is 
prejudicial to discipline (Cmnd 874 1920: 124). 
 
This seems inconsistent with the identification of officers with the public since if the police 
were citizens in uniform, it would surely be appropriate for grievances or delinquencies 
to be aired publicly. The final quotation above also includes an oblique suggestion that 
there are some aspects of police discipline that are ‘better’ handled privately and that 
publicity concerning them would be detrimental to the police organisation. This 
suggestion that some discipline matters should remain private also implies (although it is 
not specifically articulated as such) a commitment to public confidence in the police as an 
organisation potentially taking precedence over the compliance by officers with the rule 
of law. Besides, one does not commonly speak of ‘public confidence’ in a particular officer, 
but in an organisation, which also supports the argument above that officers started to 
draw their authority from their membership of the police as a disciplined organisation.  
 
 




Prior to the Police Act 1964, the only formal accountability mechanism for allegations of 
police misconduct was a public enquiry instigated under the Tribunals of Enquiry 
(Evidence) Act 1921. This permitted the establishment of a tribunal “by either His Majesty 
or the Secretary of State” into “definite matters described in the Resolution as of urgent 
public importance”.57  However, an inquiry into the circumstances of the arrest in 1928 of 
an eminent MP, Sir Leo Chiozza, concerning his conduct with a young woman, Irene 
Savidge highlighted the limitations of this mechanism. The charges against Mr Chiozza 
were dropped, and Ms Savidge complained alleging that she was bullied for five hours 
during her questioning (Critchley 1967: 201). The majority of tribunal members were 
“unable to accept Ms Savidge’s statements on the material matters as to which there was 
a conflict of evidence between her and [the] Chief Inspector”. But one member, Mr Lees-
Smith MP dissented, and his minority report gives a detailed and cogent account of why 
he preferred Ms Savidge’s evidence over that of the two police officers who had also given 
evidence. He also suggested that the chief officer’s handling of the matter could be “fully 
accounted for by the presence of an unconscious bias58 in favour of the police arising out 
of the esprit de corps which marks the Force” (Cmnd 3147 1928: 28). Importantly, he also 
raised the issue of independent investigation of complaints against officers, suggesting 
that the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) be given staff to conduct enquiries in certain 
circumstances (1928: 31).  
The affair served as a catalyst to the Royal Commission on Police Powers in 1929 
(Critchley, 1967: 200). “Frequently quoted as evidence of uncritical support for the police” 
(Rawlings, 2002: 177), the Commission’s report is thick with carefully guarded 
representations of contradictory evidence and concludes that, for the most part, the 
existing safeguards of the Judges’ Rules and the disciplinary codes were sufficient.59 
Accordingly, the 1929 Commission was able to recommend an amendment concerning 
 
57 Tribunals of Enquiry (Evidence) Act 1921, s 1. 
58 The resonance with the notion of institutional racism expressed in the MacPherson Report (Report of 
the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry (Cm 4262, 1999) some 70 years later is unavoidable.  
59 For example “It is not suggested that [the police] induce people to plead guilty who they believe to be 
innocent or that persons who are in fact innocent do plead guilty as a result of Police advice although we 
have the evidence of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate that unintelligent persons are surprisingly prone 




the ease with which a special inquiry might be set up, but in relation to Mr Lees-Smith’s 
suggestion of independent investigations, the Commission concluded:   
We prefer to continue to trust the police in the belief that having the 
responsibility for their own discipline, they will discharge it more faithfully in the 
absence of interference from some outside authority. A divided responsibility is 
always weak (Cmnd 3297 1929: 107).   
This excerpt is of particular significance because it is the only official reference the present 
researcher has found in which independent investigation is equated with lack of trust in 
the police. Instead, (as discussed in subsequent chapters) official statements 
predominantly emphasis the trustworthiness of the police and stress that independent 
investigation is necessary only in order to address declining public confidence.   
To summarise, the ‘original’ authority of constables was derived in part from the Crown 
and in part from their embeddedness within the local community. Officers’ ancient 
community ties were severed at many levels during the 19th and early 20th Centuries but 
official pronouncements and, in particular, the Royal Commissions of the early part of the 
20th Century, continued to emphasise constables’ role as ‘citizens in uniform’. It is 
suggested that this official focus on the ancient origins of the office of constable was 
adopted to present ‘the police’ collectively as egalitarian in character. Coupled with an 
official reluctance to question police accounts of events, it coincided with and contributed 
to the development of a police organisational identity. As a result, the police authority 
which had stemmed from constables’ connections with the public became drawn instead 
from officers’ membership of the police as an organisation.   
This is significant because it explains the central importance of police organisational 
legitimacy. If authority is to be drawn from membership of the police as an organisation, 
then the organisation must be legitimate. However, from its origins, the new police 
depended on discipline rather than accountability as its legitimating process. That 
emphasis on internal discipline (which might be better conducted away from the public 
gaze) reveals the origins of modern-day police autonomy over discipline matters, 






2.2.4 Matters leading to the 1960 Royal Commission 
 
Critchley emphasises the problems of rising crime and ‘chronic’ recruitment difficulties as 
significant contributing factors to the establishment of the Royal Commission on Policing 
of 1960 (Critchley, 1967: 267).  He does however concede that there were several other 
pressing concerns.  As noted above, the first half of the 20th Century involved significant 
realignment of the relationships between the citizen and the state. During this period, the 
diverse lines of management and the unclear constitutional position of the police became 
problematic and a series of high-profile incidents generated considerable political 
pressure for police accountability to be addressed.  
 
In Fisher v Oldham Corporation, McCardie J had described individual constables as neither 
servant of the Crown nor of the local authority.60 Their constitutional status was later 
summed up in Attorney-General for New South Wales v Perpetual Trustee Co. Ltd61 where 
constables’ authority was described as “original, not delegated and…exercised at his own 
discretion by virtue of his office: he is a ministerial officer exercising statutory rights 
independently of contract”.62 However,  this understanding of the constitutional position 
of the police arguably became unsatisfactory because as the police organisational identity 
emerged, the whole became very much more than the sum of the original authority of 
the individual parts. As the police developed into an organisation, the constitutional 
position of that institution was also in need of clarification and the existing deliberately 
opaque governance arrangements were no longer sustainable.    
The Acts that established and refined the new police left the relationships between chief 
officers and Police Authorities or Watch Committees ambiguous, and this increasingly 
became a source of conflict (Critchley, 1967: 272). In 1959, a dispute arose between the 
Chief Constable of Nottinghamshire, Captain Popkass, and his Watch Committee which 
highlighted the tensions in these relationships. The Chief Constable had instigated 
enquiries (conducted by another force at the suggestion of the Director of Public 
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Prosecutions) into suspicions of corruption by members of the City Council (from whom 
the Watch Committee were drawn). The DPP decided to take no further action and the 
Watch Committee demanded that the Chief Constable report to them regarding the 
investigation. He refused on the basis that enforcement of the criminal law was his 
responsibility, as a result of which the Committee suspended him. Ultimately, the Home 
Secretary was able to sidestep the substantive issue between the parties by relying on his 
general responsibility for the maintenance of law and order and held that he could not 
accept that the suspension was proper (Critchley, 1967: 272). However, the whole affair 
served to underscore the difficult balance of power between Watch Committees and Chief 
Constables.  
Moreover, between 1956 and 1957 three cases of alleged maladministration or 
corruption arose concerning chief constables.  One resulted in the amalgamation of two 
forces; in another, two senior officers were found guilty of associated offences though the 
chief constable was only censured by the trial judge; while, in a third, the chief constable 
himself was convicted of fraud. (Critchley, 1967: 270). In addition, despite the confidence 
in police discipline expressed by the Royal Commission of 1929, officer conduct and 
control of that conduct was becoming a source of concern. It was necessary to establish a 
Special Tribunal of Enquiry63 in 1959 in relation to a high-profile incident of an alleged 
assault by two officers in Thurso on a sixteen-year-old boy. The allegations in this case 
extended to the handling of the associated complaint and included suggestions that an 
offer of payment had been made in return for the withdrawal of the complaint.64 
At a national level, the different management structures for the counties, boroughs and 
the Metropolitan police led to inconsistent democratic control or accountability between 
forces. It was possible to raise questions in parliament concerning the conduct of officers 
in the Metropolitan Police, because they were ultimately directly answerable to the Home 
Secretary. But this could not be done in relation to other forces. So, in 1936, the then 
Home Secretary was able to refuse to answer parliamentary questions concerning the 
policing of a political demonstration in Oxford, stating that: “[t]he Oxford police are 
 
63  Under the Tribunal of Enquiries Act 1921 discussed above. 





subject to the ratepayers of Oxford and to the people who elect the City Council out of 
which the Watch Committee is formed” (Critchley, 1967: 269). However, by 1957, the 
policing of trade union disputes resulted in attempts to force responses to questions in 
parliament based on the threat of a general breakdown in law and order.65 
It is therefore, significant for purposes of the present discussion that despite the many 
pressing concerns that might have motivated a review of the structure of policing and 
police accountability, it was a police action which brought matters to a head and led to 
the establishment of the 1960 Royal Commission. The case in question is Garratt v 
Eastmond 66 which concerned an alleged assault by a police officer. The matter resulted 
in the then Home Secretary facing a motion for censure for his authorisation of a payment 
out of public funds in settlement of the action when the officer involved had not been 
disciplined. It is valuable to analyse this case in some detail, because it raises several 
points central to this thesis.  
 
2.3 Garratt v Eastmond  
 
The primary source of disquiet surrounding Garratt v Eastmond was that public funds 
were spent on settling the action without an admission of liability in circumstances where 
there was no disciplinary inquiry and consequently, the facts were never formally tested. 
Since the case was settled there is no official case report and the facts set out below are 
taken from an article in The Spectator written by Bernard Levin.67  It is conceded that this 
may not be a neutral account. However, in the parliamentary debate the MP for Esher, 
speaking for Mr Garratt, stated that according to him (Mr Garratt) it was “a reasonable 
and fair outline of what precisely took place” [1260] and the debate proceeds on the basis 
that these are the given facts. 
In December 1957, Brian Rix, a famous actor, was stopped by PC Eastmond and booked 
for speeding. Mr Garratt, who was deputy keeper of communications at the Science 
 
65See Hansard 25.7.1957 Col 600-605. 
66 The case was settled and there is no formal citation other than the reference in Hansard discussed 
below.  




Museum and who had no previous knowledge of Mr Rix (and was not aware of his fame), 
had noticed the officer trailing Mr Rix’s car and, (driving in convoy behind them) had 
monitored the speed.  As a result, when he saw the officer pull Mr Rix over, he stopped 
his own car some way ahead and once Mr Rix was allowed by the officer to drive off, Mr 
Garratt flagged him down and offered to give evidence as to his speed. As Mr Rix and Mr 
Garratt were exchanging addresses, PC Eastmond approached and demanded to know 
what they were talking about. When they both refused, PC Eastmond asked Mr Garratt to 
accompany him to the station and, when he declined the officer arrested him. In the 
scuffle that followed, Mr Garratt was “pushed vigorously” over a privet hedge. As a result, 
Mr Rix called the police who when they arrived “unceremoniously bundled Mr Garratt 
into the police car”.  
At the station, an inspector gave Mr Garratt a full apology and had it not been for Mr Rix’s 
fame this would have been the end of the affair. However, a passer-by who witnessed the 
incident had recognised Mr Rix and informed the Daily Mail. 
On the matter becoming public, Mr Garratt asked for a formal apology to clear his name. 
Fascinatingly, this was refused by Scotland Yard, who denied that anything improper had 
occurred on the police side and suggested that Mr Garratt had started the trouble by 
kicking PC Eastmond.  Mr Garratt, therefore, issued a writ against Mr Eastmond, (again in 
order to clear his name) and it is important to note, therefore, that compensation was not 
Mr Garratt’s chief aim. It is also important to highlight that the position adopted by 
Scotland Yard in this case is remarkable, and so inconsistent with the inspector’s response 
to the incident that without, further explanation, it invites deep distrust (at an 
organisational level) in the police handling of complaints.68 Fascinatingly, despite 
featuring in the parliamentary debate as a fact that resulted in the suit, Scotland Yard’s 
false allegation against Mr Garratt is not, however, raised as a cause of concern.  
Mr Garratt’s writ was against PC Eastmond (in person) because police are not subject to 
the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 and there was no formal mechanism whereby the force 
 




or the Commissioner could be sued.69 Notwithstanding this, it was the practice for the 
Commissioner in the Metropolitan Police to ‘stand behind’ officers in such situations. 
After long negotiations, Mr Garratt agreed to accept a sum of £300 in settlement. 
However, when the settlement was announced in court it was without an admission of 
liability on the part of the police, and therefore Mr Garratt’s reason for bringing the action 
was frustrated. This was compounded by a subsequent announcement that no 
disciplinary charges would be brought against PC Eastmond. Moreover, no charges 
concerning the alleged speeding offence were ever pursued against Mr Rix. 
In 1960 the average annual salary of a clerical officer was £78970 and the average house 
price was £2530.71 So £300 was a considerable sum. The parliamentary debate does not 
indicate a sophisticated understanding of legal procedure on the part of all the MPs who 
took part. However, it is interesting that while MPs expressed outrage concerning the fact 
of the payment to Mr Garratt, this did not extend to the quantum.  Arguably this is 
indicative of an understanding of police actions as not primarily concerned with 
compensation (as discussed further below). 
As noted above, the central concern in the parliamentary debate was that the police had 
used (and the Home Secretary had sanctioned) a payment of public funds to avoid a trial 
that would have uncovered the facts of the alleged incident. This was coupled with 
disquiet that there had also been a decision not to hold a disciplinary hearing, which was 
the only other way in which the evidence could be tested. One statement during the 
motion to censure summarises the key issue: 
... if there is no court hearing and no disciplinary hearing no one ever finds out 
and neither the officer nor the plaintiff nor the public ever receives any benefit. 
So, what does the £300 do? [Col 1266] 
This statement is of considerable significance in what it reveals about the conception of 
police actions72  at that time. Importantly, as noted above Mr Garratt was primarily 
 
69 S49 of the Police Act 1964 made chief constables vicariously liable for officer torts and this is discussed 
in Chapter 3. 
70 HC Deb 18 November 1959 vol 613 cc1239-1303 
71 Cockcroft, L. 2009. 




motivated by a desire to clear his name, and there is no suggestion that a payment in 
settlement without him having achieved that serves any useful function. In addition, the 
above statement indicates a clear understanding that the benefit of being able to bring 
the action was not individualistic, but very much connected to a broader, more public 
conception of the role of police actions. The benefit the ‘public’ would receive in a court 
or a disciplinary hearing relates to transparency, but also suggests a collective interest in 
the mechanisms for public engagement concerning officer conduct, which directly accords 
with Habermas’ view of deliberative democracy. 
In any event, the Garratt v Eastmond saga demonstrated a legitimate public interest in 
the circumstances in which police actions are settled and the need for chief officers (or 
the police as an organisation) to be publicly accountable in relation to that function. This 
then is the context in which the 1960 Royal Commission was established, and some of its 
deliberations and the resulting Police Act 1964 are discussed in detail in the following 
Chapter. 
Conclusion and Themes 
 
This Chapter has charted the history of the police from Anglo-Saxon times to the 
establishment of the Royal Commission on Policing in 1960 (which reported in 1962). 
Histories of policing vary, but there is sufficient consistency to suggest that the position 
of constable prior to the new police included the following features. The source of 
constables’ powers was unclear, stemming both from their appointment as officers of the 
Crown and from having significant roots in their embeddedness in the local community. 
The officers’ role therefore included the negotiation of a set of hierarchical relationships 
between the people and the manorial court or justices. This included a degree of personal 
autonomy over when formal legal mechanisms were employed. In this context (and on 
the understanding of civic duty at the time), the issue of formal accountability did not 
arise. Instead, legitimacy was drawn from relationships with both the community and the 
justices.  
The new police retained much of this organically developed vagary and two legitimating 




identity with the people) and the fact that they were a disciplined force. These two 
features operated in tension. Government and official statements by ministers and Royal 
Commissions presumed the good character (and discipline) of officers in the face of 
accusations of misconduct. This effectively gave all officers a unified (and indeed 
privileged) status in the eyes of official actors and thereby contributed to changes in the 
nature of constables’ ancient community ties. These factors necessarily undermined the 
suggested coextensive relationship between the police and the public and promoted 
police organisational identity. As officers’ relationships with local communities changed, 
the aspect of their legitimacy that had been derived therein, was instead drawn from their 
membership of the police organisation. 
The official position of police good character was underlined by a focus on internal 
discipline by chief officers. Significantly, it is in this context that the idea of public 
confidence in the police starts to emerge. The Royal Commission of 1919 specifically 
linked ‘public confidence’ in the police with police discipline and confidence in the 
organisation to maintain such discipline. This extended to a suggestion that public scrutiny 
of the discipline process was not appropriate. Thus, one of the pillars of organisational 
legitimacy is that the police remain able to persuade the public of their ability, as an 
organisation, to ‘maintain a disciplined force’.73 Save for the minority report of the 
enquiry into the Chiozza affair, the value of police autonomy in this regard was apparently 
unquestioned. This theme of discipline and public confidence is developed in the following 
chapters.  
The official denial of potential police wrongdoing also operated at an individual level by 
suggesting a starting point in complaints investigations of disbelieving or discounting the 
complainants’ accounts of events. For example, in the Tribunal of Enquiry into the Chiozza 
affair, the majority’s analysis of the available evidence is limited and difficult to sustain in 
comparison with the detailed account given in the minority report. Arguably, an official 
premise that the officer’s version of event is more likely to be correct contributed to the 
poorer reasoning of the majority (and to that being found acceptable). The Royal 
Commission of 1929 preserved police autonomy over discipline, rejecting calls for 
 




independent oversight of the complaints process and maintaining a stance of: “We prefer 
to continue to trust the police”. This indicates that the starting position and perceived 
purpose of investigations may impact on the rigour with which they are conducted, which 
is an important theme developed in later chapters.74 
Several high-profile incidents questioning police probity at all levels challenged the official 
orthodoxy. Public inquiries suggested complainants were offered money to withdraw 
complaints of assault; senior officers were found guilty of corruption; and there were 
disputes between chief officers and Watch Committees. These issues arose in a context 
of social change which included new formulations of the relationship between citizens 
and the state and, by the 1950s, there was a pressing need for the existing mechanisms 
for delivery of policing to be reviewed.  
At this stage, the idea of accountability was still anathema to the official articulation of 
the police as being above question. Reiner refers to a ‘mystical’ connection between the 
police and the community as a legitimating element within the new police (2010: 74). The 
history of policing as set out in this chapter assists in disentangling this mystique. In the 
famous novel, Peter Pan,75 readers (and, in particular, child listeners) are implored to clap 
loudly to confirm their belief in fairies in order to prevent the fairy character Tinkerbell’s 
imminent death. There are similarities between this and the concern for public confidence 
in the police. To require accountability is to destroy some “mystical” aspect of the policing 
process. The need for police accountably finally severs the ancient basis of the organic ties 
to the community which, it has been argued, were the defining (legitimating) feature of 
the original office of constable. The original authority vests in us continuing to clap and a 
relationship founded on accountability is of a different form.  
The case of Garratt v Eastmond is important because it is the first public record of the 
organisational and constitutional legitimacy of the police intersecting. In contrast to the 
closed nature of the police disciplinary process, the open parliamentary debate 
surrounding the Garratt v Eastmond affair reveals that the civil process was conceived as 
one in which both the plaintiff and the public had a stake.  This collective concern related 
 
74 See the discussion of PCA reports at 3.2.2 and the HAC 2012 report into the IPCC discussed in chapter 4 
at 4.2.1. 




to ensuring that public funds used in settlement were put to good use, but also extended 
to a presumption of a public interest in transparency regarding what had occurred, and 
appropriate censure for the officer involved.  
The analysis in this chapter therefore suggests a link between discipline, public confidence 
and organisational legitimacy on the one hand, and accountability (understood in terms 
of the transparency and public engagement provided by the civil legal process as set out 
above) and constitutional legitimacy, on the other. The following chapter focuses on the 
relationship between police complaints and police actions in the second half of the 20th 












The previous chapter explored the history of the office of constable, the establishment of 
the new police in the early 19th Century, and the development of a police organisational 
identity in the period leading up to the Royal Commission on Policing of 1960-1962 
(hereinafter, “The Commission”). This chapter charts the tensions in police regulation and 
accountability in the latter part of the 20th Century.    
 
3.1 The Royal Commission and the Police Act 1964  
 
The Commission’s terms of reference were to consider: the constitution and function of 
local police authorities; the status and accountability of members of police forces, 
including chief officers; the relationship of the police with the public; the means of 
ensuring that complaints by the public against the police are effectively dealt with; and 
officer remuneration (Cmnd 1728: 1). The report of the Royal Commission (“The Report”) 
addressed the crisis that had emerged concerning police governance by recommending a 
tripartite structure between the police, the Home Office, and Police Authorities which 
(subject to the replacement of police authorities with Police and Crime Commissioners)76 
is still in place today (Crawford, 2013: 3).  However, the issue of control over police 
complaints and police actions being in the same hands spans the middle three of the 
Commission’s terms of reference rather than falling squarely within one head. This 
perhaps explains why, despite being the catalyst for the establishment of the Commission, 
the issues raised by Garratt v Eastmond are never expressly referred to in the Report.  
In discussing the relationship between the police and the public, the Report echoes the 
official commitment to police probity outlined in Chapter 2:   
 




 … so far as an explanation of the success of the British Police is to be sought in 
constitutional factors, first place must be given to the subjection of the 
constabulary in all their activities to the rule of law… (Cmnd 1728:328) 
However, later in the same section, having reviewed a “body of evidence too substantial 
to disregard” concerning officers committing perjury, extorting confessions and 
fabricating evidence to secure convictions, the Commission states: 
the excuse that the officer’s only object was to secure the conviction of a guilty 
man ought not to carry any weight at all. For it cannot be too strongly 
emphasised that a police force in which dishonesty of any kind is connived at 
cannot for long hope to retain the confidence of the public (Cmnd 1728: 370).  
It is of note that in this excerpt the Commission expresses disapproval of what is 
commonly referred to as ‘noble cause corruption’ (Punch, 2011: 107)77  not because it 
breaches the rule of law but because of the impact it may have on ‘public confidence’ in 
the police.  
Contrary to much of the evidence in front of them, the Commission was able to find that 
relations between the police and the public were good.78 The majority were therefore 
satisfied that a fully internal police complaints system should be retained (Cmnd 1728: 
478).  However, a powerful dissenting minority advocated independent oversight of the 
complaints process. Importantly, the minority explained their position by stating that 
while fully sharing “the confidence of their colleagues in the fitness of the police to deal 
with complaints”, this view “missed the point”  
No harm can result from the imposition of some form of independent external 
check on the actions of chief constables in handling complaints, and the interests 
of justice and the public no less than those of good relations between the police 
and the public require it. (Cmnd 1728: 479) 
 
77 Police corruption is discussed in Chapter 4 at 4.1.  
78 Maguire (1991) suggests that the Commission “largely ducked” the issue of controlling individual police 
misconduct (1991: 180) and Rawlings quotes the Spectator on 8th June 1962 commenting that the 
overwhelming majority of witnesses were police officers and the report recommended “little but 




The reference to ‘justice’ and the ‘public’ is consistent with the idea that independent 
oversight would offer some level of transparency and accountability. However, coupled 
with the minorities’ earlier comment confirming their own confidence in the police 
handling of complaints, this excerpt is more suggestive of the idea that the prominent 
purpose of external oversight is not accountability and transparency concerning the 
discipline function, but to secure public confidence in the police; to confirm that the 
official confidence is not misplaced. This is not neutral in effect as discussed in section 3.3 
below.   
In outlining the background to their enquiry, the Royal Commission makes brief reference 
to Garratt v Eastmond,79 but the Report does not refer to the concern that the settlement 
of police actions might be used to suppress information regarding officer misconduct (and 
the police response to it). This issue therefore goes unaddressed. Furthermore, the 
question of vicarious liability for police torts is discussed in the context of police 
authorities’ powers and thus is separated from any consideration of the handling of 
complaints. Interestingly, despite this, the Commission’s recommendations did provide 
the scrutiny required to overcome the issues raised in Garratt v Eastmond. The Report 
refutes the idea that police authorities being vicariously liable for officer torts is 
inconsistent with police operational independence. By drawing an analogy with the 
vicarious liability of hospital managers for doctors’ clinical judgements, the Commission 
found no contradiction in the police authority being given responsibility for litigation while 
having no control over officers’ discretion (Cmnd 1728: 200). Accordingly, the Report 
recommended that chief constables should retain responsibility for police complaints 
(with police authorities being under a duty to satisfy themselves that complaints were 
properly handled (Cmnd 1728: 468)) but that police authorities should be vicariously liable 
for officers’ torts (Cmnd 1728: 201). Hence, under this scheme, conduct of the litigation 
would be a matter for the police authority which would be on notice of occasions when a 
matter was settled for which a disciplinary investigation might have been pursued but was 
not.   
 




It is unfortunate that the Commission’s deliberations concerning police actions and police 
complaints are diffuse throughout the Report. Consequently, it is unclear whether the 
collective outcome of their recommendations in separating control over litigation and 
control over complaints was designed to address the concerns raised by Garratt v 
Eastmond or was, instead, merely a happy accident. The Commission was however clearly 
alive to the prospect that chief officers being vicariously liable for police actions would 
result in a large concentration of power in that office. In summarising their 
recommendations, they state:  
If the complaint is of conduct amounting to a crime, the question of prosecution 
will have been decided by the Director or Public Prosecutions. …If it amounts to 
a civil wrong the complainant will be entitled to sue the police authority, 
whether or not he can identify the police officer concerned. Hence the only clear 
field in which disposal of a complaint will still be dependent on the unaided 
decision of a chief constable will comprise complaints either not so serious as to 
give rise to legal action, or in which the complainant for reasons that may appear 
reasonable to him does not wish for a prosecution or is unwilling to sue (Cmnd 
1728: 478) (emphasis added).   
Significantly, this passage repeats the presumption that police actions operate as an 
accountability mechanism, rather than being primarily viewed as a means of 
compensation, which was highlighted in the excerpt from the parliamentary debate 
concerning Garratt v Eastmond (above at 2.3). It also contains an implicit assumption that 
the outcomes of police actions might ‘aid’ the chief constable in his handling of police 
discipline matters.  
There is a tantalising footnote on page 65 of the Report which states that while it was also 
suggested that chief constables might be vicariously liable for officer torts, the 
Commission thought only that “such an arrangement is open to objections”. It is highly 
regrettable that the Report did not explain this point because the Police Act 1964 reversed 
the Commission’s recommendation concerning vicarious liability for police actions 




In introducing the Police Bill to parliament in May 1963, Richard Butler the then Home 
Secretary, stated that he had considered the Commission’s recommendation that police 
authorities be vicariously liable for police torts but that it “raised a number of very difficult 
questions” which he was “discussing with law officers”.80 However, these questions were 
never themselves explored, nor was the point ever subject to any sustained debate. The 
discussion in standing committee covers no more than six columns and when the matter 
returned to parliament, the government relied on the issue of control over police 
operational independence (which the Commission had soundly rejected as invalid).81 
Thus, while vicarious liability for officer torts was treated as a technical matter relating to 
police operational independence, discussions concerning the police complaints system 
centred on public confidence in the police. As a result, the tension raised by Garrett v 
Eastmond, which in essence concerned the balance between discipline and accountability 
as competing legitimating mechanisms, was sidestepped. It is unfortunate that this 
tension was not discussed at this point, just as the organisational identity of the police 
was crystallising, because it did not abate. Instead, the ability of police actions to 
undermine internal police discipline decisions (which Garratt v Eastmond highlighted) was 
to become an increasingly dominant feature of debates concerning police accountability 
in the following forty years.  
 
3.2 Police Complaints and Civil Actions after the Police Act 1964 
 
As discussed above, the Police Act 1964 vested enormous powers over individual officers’ 
accountability in chief constables. It is accepted that the police were subject to local and 
central fiscal controls and the edicts of Home Office circulars. They were also subject to 
inspections by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of the Constabulary,82 and the 1964 Act (again 
contrary to the Royal Commission’s recommendations) made police authorities 
responsible for ensuring that each local force was effective.83 However, the Act gave chief 
 
80 Hansard 9 May 1963 (Col 687). 
81 Standing Committee D HC  4th February 1964. 
82 The HMIC (Now HMICFRS) is discussed Chapter 4 at section 4.4. 
83 Police authorities also had control over the police fund and so in effect did have some ability to 




constables power over all three pillars of officer accountability (disciplinary, civil and 
criminal). They were vicariously liable for officer torts (s 48). Chief constables were also 
responsible for recording complaints and causing them to be investigated (s 49(1)) and, 
on receipt of the reports of investigations, they had the power to determine whether they 
were “satisfied that no criminal offence had been committed” (s 49(3)) and, therefore, 
whether to forward the report to the Director of Public Prosecutions. It is submitted that 
this very high degree of autonomy over the control of officer conduct enhanced and 
cemented police organisational identity and thereby reinforced the associated need for 
them to be seen or presented as above reproach at an organisational level.  
The proposition that the police as an organisation (and chief constables’ exercise of their 
autonomy over discipline) were above reproach, was however undermined by the 
outcomes of police actions. In 1964, the standard of proof for disciplinary proceedings 
against police officers was the criminal standard84 and, therefore, police actions could be 
lost or settled in circumstances where there was insufficient evidence for disciplinary 
proceedings to be brought. This, in turn, could undermine public confidence in the police 
disciplinary process even in circumstances where there was no mala fides on the part of 
the officers conducting the internal investigation of complaints. However, as discussed 
below, the suggestion that such mala fides did not exist became increasingly difficult to 
sustain over the following three decades and the growing use of police actions was 
fundamental in exposing this.   
 
Since 1964, the issue of police accountability has been subject to continuing cycles of 
scandal and reform (Smith, 2005). Smith suggests that each of the ‘cycles’ included 
catalytic events which prompted reform, but that these occurred against a background of 
high profile incidents raising ongoing concerns regarding the abuse of police powers 
(Smith. 2005: 132-136). The government response on each occasion was to increase the 
degree of external oversight within the police complaints system85 (Smith, 2005). The 
 
over the litigation that would have given insight in the cases. In any event police authorities were 
generally weak and ineffectual in their overall police governance role (see, Day and Klein 1987, Millen and 
Stephens 2011). The position of PCCs is discussed in Chapter 4 (at 4.3).  
84 This is discussed in detail below. 




significant statutes in this regard are: The Police Act 1976, which created the Police 
Complaints Board (PCB); the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), which replaced 
the PCB with the Police Complaints Authority (PCA); and the Police Reform Act 2002 (PRA), 
which replaced the PCA with the IPCC.86 During this extended period, police complaints 
and police actions emerged as “competing mechanisms” (Smith, 2005: 379) in relation to 
officer accountability, and the interaction between the two processes was an important 
feature in the disquiet that accompanied and motivated each of the reforms.  
 
3.2.1 The Police Act 1976 
 
While the Royal Commission of 1960 was extolling the good relations between the police 
and the public, public concern regarding the activities of Metropolitan Police officers was 
increasing (Smith, 2005: 124).  Between the second reading of the Police Bill and the 
debates which followed, the House of Commons was required to consider a report 
criticising the Metropolitan Police regarding the death in custody of Herman Woolf.87 
There were also reports of a culture of violence by officers in Sheffield and a series of 
incidents which saw 11 officers in Leeds facing criminal proceedings (Smith, 2005: 128) 
and soon after the inception of the 1964 Act, there were a series of major corruption 
scandals concerning the Metropolitan Police in particular (Maguire, 1991: 181; Smith, 
2005: 128).  
Police actions were a feature in this ongoing disquiet. Three factory workers involved in 
an industrial dispute were arrested in Stockport in November 1967 and on appearing in 
court, were clearly sporting physical injuries, each with fractured nasal bones and 
bruises.88 (Russell, 1985: 8). There was considerable independent evidence to corroborate 
the factory workers’ accusations that they had been assaulted by the police in Stockport 
Police Station. Despite this, when the complaints investigation file (which recommended 
 
86 As noted in the introduction, the IPCC has recently been renamed the IOPC and these changes are 
discussed in Chapter 4 (at 4.2).   
87 It was alleged that Mr Woolf’s death was the result of severe beating by the police who had also failed 
to inform his next of kin that he was under arrest despite them having reported him as missing, see HC 
Deb 15 May 1964 vol 695 cc837-53.    
88 Charges against two were dismissed and the third was convicted of obstruction and assault on an officer 




that the officers be prosecuted for assault) was sent to the DPP he disagreed and refused 
to authorise the prosecution. Subsequently, the police complaints against the officers 
were declared unsubstantiated. However, when the three men sued the chief constable, 
their solicitor was able to obtain a copy of the investigators’ report and the force agreed 
to settle the action (Russell, 1985: 9). It is important to reiterate that the standard of proof 
for police complaints at this stage was the criminal standard. Nevertheless, Russell 
concludes, “[t]he view which some citizens hold that partiality does influence verdicts 
[concerning police discipline following a complaint] may be reinforced when they read in 
the press of a case where a complaint is unsubstantiated, but the complainants 
subsequently successfully bring a civil action against the police officer(s) complained 
against” (Russell, 1985: 8). 
In the wake of these ongoing concerns, the catalyst for the Police Act 1976 was a private 
members’ Bill: The Police Acts (Amendment) Bill, laid by the MP for Derby North, Mr Philip 
Whitehead (Paling, 1973; Leigh, 1977) (the Bill). The Bill was brought because the current 
system permitted “numerous opportunities for evasion” for accused officers together 
with “unease that pressure may be put by superiors on lower ranking officers not to give 
evidence in relation to some complaints” (Paling, 1973: 283). 89 Significantly, therefore, 
the Whitehead Bill raised concerns that the underlying issue was not with the system in 
place for handling complaints and discipline but instead, lay with the commitment, on the 
part of the police, to truly address the conduct about which   complaints were being made, 
i.e. that there was an organisational lack of commitment to the rule of law (See Reiner, 
2010: 83). These concerns were expressed in the parliamentary debates on Whitehead’s 
proposals and it is valuable to cite aspects of the second reading at length, because they 
give a tenor of the political climate at the time.  
Mr Abse MP explained his interest:  
For me, in Wales, the turning point in my attitude to this whole question came 
after the complaints made about police behaviour following upon the anti-
Springbok demonstration in Swansea. It will be recalled that altogether 236 
 
89 This suggestion of pressure being put on younger officers is not a feature of later debates and is 




members of the public made signed statements about police behaviour as a 
result of that demonstration. The witnesses included teachers and social 
workers who came forward making statements alleging that they saw police 
officers rabbit-punching people, throw them on to spiked railings, purposely 
stamp on people's spectacles, fling three schoolgirl spectators to the ground, 
kick men in their testicles, and repeatedly punch people in the face whilst they 
were being held down by other officers, in some cases alleging that bleeding was 
caused needing hospital treatment. I recall that a university lecturer, 
corroborated by an independent witness, reported to the Home Office that he 
saw a senior officer punch a girl's face until she collapsed backwards into a bush. 
[…] the bland response to these allegations had a serious effect upon relations 
between the public and the police. After a five-month investigation, the police, 
who refused to publish a report or answer any questions beyond announcing 
that there was no evidence to justify any policeman being prosecuted or even 
disciplined, regarded the matter as closed. […]One thing is certain. Whether the 
allegations were puffed up or not, such internal investigations with such bland 
findings satisfied nobody. 
…I believe the police should stop leaning against the Home Secretary to the 
extent to which they are. I believe the Home Secretary should stand up and 
counsel the police to recognise that this House, expressing the views of its 
constituents, has come to the end of its patience over forms of procedure which 
are clandestine and which, however exhaustively conducted,90 leave the general 
public with little or no information as to how the police force has come to its 
conclusions. I trust, therefore, that we shall not have some soporifics coming 
along, when the Secretary of State intervenes.91 
Mr Lewis MP refers to clear evidence of police officers enforcing the law (requiring licence 
plates on vehicles) in an arbitrary fashion and asks: 
 
90 On this point, see Torrible, 2016: 8-10.  




Is this getting at the police? When I produce such evidence, am I to be attacked 
because my constituents claim that they are being unfairly treated? We know 
what the drill is for these things. I have been in the House for 28 years, and this 
is not a party-political point. One takes the matter up with the local officer and 
gets nowhere. So, one takes it up with the Home Secretary who refers it back. 
There is a so-called investigation, but no one sees the report. The police officer 
concerned decides that no action will be taken. He writes to the Home Secretary, 
who agrees with the police officer. The Member is informed and then it goes 
back to the complainant. I do not think that is good enough.92 
The Bill was withdrawn on the basis that the Government committed to considering ways 
in which the police complaints process might be amended.  Fascinatingly, in the context 
of the extracts above and reason the Bill had been suggested, Mr Whitehead stated that 
he “had not introduced the Bill in any spirit of antagonism to the police but regarded it as 
a measure which would increase public confidence in them in the difficult job they do” 
(Paling, 1973: 287) (emphasis added). 
It will be recalled that in rejecting the minority report calling for external oversight of 
police complaints, the majority of the 1929 Royal Commission was bold enough to say, 
“we prefer to continue to trust the police” (as discussed in Chapter 2 at 2.2.3). That 
statement was highlighted earlier because, in all the subsequent official discussions of the 
issue of external oversight or involvement in police complaints, the idea that the police 
might be appropriately distrusted is never entertained. Mr Whitehead’s statement in 
withdrawing his Bill provides a further example of official reluctance to address the 
substance of disquiet concerning police discipline practices. It also echoes the minority 
report of the 1960 Royal Commission, discussed above, confirming their full confidence in 
the police internal handling of police complaints and indicating that their suggestion of 
external oversight was instead aimed merely at increasing public confidence.   
It is submitted that this almost euphemistic reference to public confidence as the primary 
motivating factor in recommendations for external oversight of police complaints and 
discipline processes, has significant substantive effect. It shifts the focus away from 
 




‘officer’ commitment to compliance with the rule of law (and a police institutional 
commitment to ensuring such compliance) and instead problematises whether the 
complaints and discipline process enhances public confidence in the police (or enjoys 
public confidence in itself).93 It therefore has a chilling effect on deliberative debate about 
police discipline practices at two levels. One, as noted above, is the very fact that it diverts 
attention away from the substance and potential causes of officer misconduct. Second, 
and more subtly, measures of public confidence have no normative component (whereas, 
for example, the central elements of organisational legitimacy can be debated at a 
practical and normative level). The degree of public confidence the police enjoy is the 
result of a complex set of social practices which undoubtedly include how officers behave 
towards the public (and indeed how the system for handling grievances operates).94 
However, public confidence in the police is also influenced by the news media, over which 
the police themselves exercise considerable control (Crandon and Dunn, 1997; Mawby, 
1999, 2002, 2003, 2010; Greer and McLaughlin, 2010; Wilcox and Young, 2007). Hence, 
the official rhetoric of unquestionable police propriety promotes a focus on public 
confidence in the police. However, this is in circumstances where the police may be able 
to exert influence over that measure of their performance in ways which are not 
connected to how they respond to abuses by officers of their powers.  
A working party was set up in 1974 to consider how some elements of external review 
might be brought into the Police Complaints system.95 Amid fierce police opposition to 
external oversight, the 1976 Act established a paper-only review of complaints by a new 
body, the PCB.  Maguire notes that although the PCB had one power which “looked good 
on paper”, it was “largely toothless” (Maguire, 1991:182). However, even this limited level 
of outside scrutiny was considered so controversial that Sir Robert Mark, the then 
Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, resigned in protest describing the machinery 
created by the 1976 Act as “unnecessary, cumbersome, expensive and potentially 
sinister” (Mark, 1978:228). 
 
93 The relationship between public confidence in the police and public confidence in the police complaints 
process is discussed in Chapter 4 at 4.1.  
94 See the extensive literature on procedural justice and people’s attitudes towards the police (and 
authority in general) discussed in Chapter 1 at footnote 32  
95 The Handling of Complaints Against the Police Report of the Working Group for England and Wales 




The police exerted considerable lobbying power during the passage of the Bill (Leigh, 
1976: 115). In particular, they indicated that they would not comply with the subsequent 
Act unless it included a provision that officers would not face disciplinary action if they 
had been cleared of criminal charges in relation to the same incident (referred to as the 
‘double jeopardy’ rule).96 This threat of non-compliance with statutory provisions from a 
body that is specifically tasked with enforcing the law is remarkable.97 As a compromise, 
to assist its “stormy” passage through parliament (Smith, 2004: 128), the 1976 Act did 
provide for introduction of the double jeopardy rule, but this measure was to prove 
problematic as discussed in section 3.2.2. below.  
 
3.2.2 Police Complaints Board to Police Complaints Authority (PACE)  
 
Despite being “emasculated” in relation to specific complaints (Smith, 2004: 128), the PCB 
was the first body to have access to confidential complaints files and, importantly, was 
empowered to issue reports to the Home Secretary “on any matters to which they 
consider his attention should be drawn”. 98 The Board was also under a duty to produce 
annual reports “on the discharge by the Board of its functions”99 which the Home 
Secretary was to lay before parliament.100  The PCB used its reporting functions to 
question police eagerness to resort to arrest and to advocate greater independent 
oversight of serious assault cases where there was conflicting evidence (Smith, 2005:  
129). It also expressed concern that in the handling of complaints into serious assaults, 
investigating “officers were sometimes too ready to accept the word of the police officer 
against the complainant and did not pursue the evidence sufficiently rigorously” (Hewitt, 
1982: 13).101 Importantly, therefore, (as with the introduction of the Whitehead Bill), the 
concern being raised was not one of misplaced public disquiet about the police 
investigating their own, but of a seeming lack of commitment within the police 
 
96 Standing Committee col 461 1975-1976 session.  
97 The police disregard for legal controls is explored in Chapter 7 (at 7.1). 
98 S8(2) Police Act 1976. 
99 S8(3). 
100 S8(4). 
101 There are striking similarities between these findings and the findings of the Home Affairs Select 




organisation to conduct those investigations with diligence and impartiality. Here then, 
independent oversight was casting doubt on the official narrative of police propriety being 
beyond question. As noted in Chapter 2, and earlier parts of this chapter, this doubt had 
been raised on many occasions. However, it was now being raised by a body whose job it 
was to do so. The official rhetoric could no longer sweep the issue aside.  
It is contended that the presence of an oversight body specifically tasked with 
commenting on the veracity of the police investigation of complaints has resulted in (or 
at least coincided with) an increase in resort to a ‘bad apple’ conception of officer 
misconduct. Here the ‘bad apple’ is essentially the “deviant cop who slips into bad ways 
and contaminates the other essentially good officers”, with the necessary corollary being 
that removing the apple will leave the rest of the barrel’s moral virtue intact (Punch, 2003: 
172).  Arguably, a commitment that the barrel (and indeed the orchard) is above reproach, 
requires that when acknowledgement of officer misconduct is unavoidable, it is presented 
in ‘bad apple’ terms. A thorough historical analysis of the use of bad apple reasoning is 
beyond the scope of this research but it is discussed in greater depth in the conclusion to 
this chapter and again in Chapter 4. 
Lord Plowman, the then Chairman of the PCB, was appointed to lead a Working Party to 
consider how the additional independent elements suggested by the PCB might be 
introduced into the complaints system.102 However, widescale rioting in the summer of 
1981 led to the appointment of Lord Scarman to conduct an inquiry into public disorder. 
Lord Scarman’s report emphasised the need for public confidence in the police complaints 
process and advocated a fully independent system for the handling of complaints:  
It is clear to me that many will continue to criticise it so long as the investigation 
of complaints remains in police hands. These people argue that the fact that the 
police investigate the police means that the investigation, if not obviously rigged 
in favour of the accused officer, is likely to be generally favourable to him. Only 
the establishment of an independent service for the investigation of all 
complaints will silence the[se] criticisms (Cmnd 8427: 117). 
 
102 The PCB had suggested a central pool of seconded police officers answerable 




This reasserts (albeit in somewhat weaker terms) the official position which problematises 
public confidence in what are, in fact, fair and impartial internal police investigations. 
Significantly, however, from the mid 1970s, citizens aggrieved with police conduct were 
increasingly resorting to police actions as a means of redress; the result of these made 
that official position difficult to sustain.  
In 1976 the house of a Jamaican family was raided by the police without a search warrant, 
and both residents, Mr and Mrs White, were brutally assaulted.  Instead of making an 
official complaint, the Whites brought a police action and were (eventually) awarded 
exemplary damages103 of £51,392, with the trial judge condemning the police conduct as 
“monstrous, wicked and shameful” (Hewitt, 1982: 15).104 Despite no official complaint 
having been made, the Metropolitan Police were fully aware of the allegations against the 
officers. However, it was not until the outcome of the civil action which resulted in public 
condemnation of the incident that an internal investigation was commenced and in the 
interim, one of the officers involved had been promoted (Hewitt, 1982:15).  
Transparency in the police handling of police discipline was also becoming an issue. As 
noted in section 3.2.1 above, the Police Act 1976 included double jeopardy provisions105 
such that no disciplinary action could be brought for charges which were “in substance 
the same” as criminal charges in respect of which an officer had been acquitted.  For 
incidents which did not result in criminal charges and for which the chief officer decided 
not to bring disciplinary charges, the PCB had power to direct him to do so.106 However, 
in making that determination, the PCB was to have regard to regulations made by the 
Home Secretary and the principles of double jeopardy.107 The regulations were drafted to 
suggest (and in any event interpreted by the PCB to mean) that in almost all cases, if the 
DPP had decided not to prefer a criminal charge, then the Board should not press for 
disciplinary action. 
 
103 The nature and role of exemplary damages are discussed at length in chapters 5 and 7. 
104 The civil case was not heard until 1982 because the Whites were first prosecuted for assault in relation 
to the incident (the charges for which were dismissed (1982: 15). 
105 S11. 
106 Police Act 1976, s. 3(2). 




In February 1978, Mr Rhone was arrested for being drunk and disorderly and alleged that 
he was assaulted during his detention. In October 1980, Errol Madden was arrested by 
police on suspicion of theft. He alleged that he was subject to racist abuse and threats 
which caused him to sign a confession, written by officers, agreeing that that he had stolen 
two items despite the receipt for one of them being in his bag at the time (Hewitt, 1982: 
19).  Both parties made complaints, and, for both, the investigation file was sent to the 
DPP who decided not to prosecute the officers. Subsequently, the PCB wrote to each party 
indicating that disciplinary action could not be taken in circumstances where the DPP had 
refused charges. These incidents resulted in the case of R v Police Complaints Board ex.p. 
Madden and Rhone108 which successfully challenged the PCB’s interpretation of the Home 
Office regulations regarding the double jeopardy rule. It was held to be an error of law 
that a decision by the DPP not to bring criminal charges should be interpreted as 
necessarily leading to a decision by the PCB  that no disciplinary action should be taken.109 
In commenting on this case at the time, the National Council for Civil Liberties argued 
strongly that the DPP’s decision not to prosecute “a decision taken in secret without a 
public trial and without any public testing of the evidence … should not be treated as an 
acquittal” (Hewitt, 1982: 21).   
The issue of transparency within the complaints and discipline process was also being 
brought to the fore by police actions. A significant element of the case of the Stockport 
factory workers, set out above (at 3.2.1), was that it was only in the context of the civil 
action that the claimants’ solicitor was able to obtain a copy of the complaint 
investigator’s report. Such reports were confidential at the time110 and the only way to 
access them was to bring a police action. In these circumstances, the question of the 
report’s disclosure could then be subject to the procedure in Conway v Rimmer,111 
whereby the public interest in the documents being disclosed would be weighed against 
the interest in them remaining confidential.  
Against a growing distrust in the commitment of the police to uncover and punish grave 
misconduct, the rules on disclosure of documents relating to the investigation of 
 
108 [1983] 1 W.L.R. 447. 
109 Ibid at 455C. 
110 See Home Office Circular 1972 No 108, para. 20. 




complaints also contributed to solicitors advising their clients not to make a complaint if 
they envisaged bringing a civil action (Hewitt, 1982: 15). Their concern was that in making 
a complaint the complainant would be expected to give a statement regarding their 
allegations and respond to police questions and this would give the police an advantage 
in civil proceedings because they would already have an assessment of the claimant’s 
evidence and how he or she might appear in court (Hewitt, 1982: 15).   
At the end of section 3.1 above, it was suggested that the issues which underpinned the 
public outcry over the settlement of the action in Garratt v Eastmond were not 
meaningfully addressed in the Royal Commission report of 1962. Twenty years later, and 
in the context of evident tensions concerning the interaction between police complaints 
and police actions, they were once again not addressed in the reforms that resulted in the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE). Instead debates were dominated by the 
level of independent oversight within the complaints process.112  
PACE established the Police Complaints Authority (PCA), which replaced the PCB and had 
greater powers than its predecessor, particularly in relation to the supervision of some 
complaints investigations. One division of the PCA undertook a similar role to the PCB in 
reviewing completed complaints files with the additional power to override the chief 
constable’s determination of a matter and direct that it be heard before a tribunal 
consisting of the chief constable and two PCA members. (Maguire, 1991: 184).  
A separate division of the PCA was required under s. 87 of PACE to supervise the 
investigation into incidents which resulted in serious injury to a member of the public.113 
The investigation could not be completed unless the supervising member of the PCA had 
issued an ‘interim statement’ confirming that the inquiries had been thorough and the 
PCA was satisfied with the report. This fell short of the full independence recommended 
by Lord Scarman and indeed the Police Federation,114 and consequently, “failed to halt 
 
112 The Report of the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure 1981, which “transmuted” into the Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act (Reiner 2010: 84) devotes just three paragraphs to civil actions (See Cmnd 8091: 
44).  
113 Maguire suggests that ‘serious’ was in practice defined as broken bones or wounds requiring three or 
more stitches (1991:183). 
114 The Federation had recommended a fully independent system for the investigation of complaints. 
However, Reiner suggests that this was a “devious ruse” because such a system would in fact be less 
effective (1991a: 217). The position of the Police Federation in relation to lack of police cooperation with 




the slide in public confidence with police investigation of complaints” (Smith, 2005:130). 
However, arguably police actions also played a significant role in fuelling this continuing 
disquiet by highlighting police officers’ misconduct and, more importantly, an apparent 
lack of commitment on the part of the police as an organisation to ensuring it was fully 
addressed.  
Before PACE was brought into force, television coverage of the policing of the miners’ 
strike had heightened concerns about policing practices. Smith describes how following 
extreme police violence at a mass picket near Sheffield, 95 men were arrested and 
charged with public order offences. However, after all the prosecutions collapsed, a class 
action brought by 39 of those arrested was settled for £425,000 (2005: 130). Epp suggests 
that this settlement “jumpstarted” (2009: 147) an era during which police actions were 
used extensively, arguably becoming the “defining feature” of the period which led to the 
Police Reform Act 2002 (Smith, 2005: 130). 
 
3.2.3 Police Complaints Authority to Independent Police Complaints Commission (PRA 
2002)  
 
Many police actions can be heard in front of a civil jury.115 The period 1984-1997 saw a 
stream of high profile police actions, in which civil juries (following the acquittal of 
defendants by criminal juries) were arriving at verdicts that pointed to officers having 
engaged in extreme forms of misconduct, from perjury to corruption and assault. In the 
civil cases, these juries were also awarding increasingly high levels of damages (including 
exemplary damages)116 but for many of these cases, little or no disciplinary action was 
being taken against the officers involved (Smith, 2004: 130-131; Epp, 2009: 155-164).  
The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice was established in March 1991 in the wake of 
several miscarriages of justice which came to light in the 1980s (see Young and Sanders 
1994). Its terms of reference did not specifically include the police complaints and 
discipline. However, in its report in 1993 (Cmnd 2263), the Royal Commission expressed:  
 
115 The role of the civil jury in police actions is discussed in detail in Chapters 5 and 7. 




…concern not only at the lack of prompt and visible disciplinary actions in cases 
where it has been publicly reported that police malpractice has contributed to a 
miscarriage of justice but also a lack of action against…officers where [the 
allegations extend to] more than a technical breach of PACE or its codes and the 
actions of the police have been publicly criticised by the judge. (Cmnd 2263: 
102).117 
Epp describes how in the late 1980s and early 1990s lawyers and activist groups began to 
recognise similarities between the cases they were dealing with (in the criminal courts) 
and created a database of police officers whose testimony in court had been found 
unreliable (Epp, 2009: 146).  One of the solicitors described developing a sense of outrage 
at the number of defendants he represented in criminal cases “when it was clear that the 
police had abused the defendant, but nothing was done to correct the problem…]” (Epp, 
2009: 148 fn61). Distrust of the police was so deep that campaigners joined with activist 
lawyers to form a support group, the Hackney Community Defence Association (HCDA).118 
The result was a campaign of police actions and, in case after case, substantial damages 
were awarded. Complaints against officers included “gratuitous violence, fabricated 
evidence, perjury, racism, racketeering and trafficking drugs” and the large levels of 
exemplary damages awarded by juries attracted mounting media attention (Epp, 2009: 
151). Despite this increase in cases and the content of the allegations, very few officers 
were being disciplined. In 1995, The Guardian Newspaper reported that in “58 cases 
where the Metropolitan Police had paid out £10,000 or more in damages 46 had resulted 
in no disciplinary action being taken against the officers” and this issue was taken up by 
other papers in the following months (Epp, 2009: 151).  
 
117 The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice was clear about the distinction between the function of the 
criminal law and the function of the police discipline system. It underlined that the latter was to decide 
whether officers were liable to punishment “for breaches of the standards and values of the disciplined 
force of which he or she is a member” and considered the that “double jeopardy rule had no valid 
application” (1993: 98). It also recommended that where a police action was brought and the facts “seem 
to the chief officer to justify” disciplinary action that should be pursued (even before the civil case was 
finalised) (1993: 103). However, the double jeopardy rule was not abolished until April 1999 (see Smith 
1999: 1223) and a statutory duty to identify and investigate ‘conduct issues’ revealed in police actions was 
finally included in the PRA 2002 Schedule 3 Para10(1). 




The police were unapologetic. Epp describes how the Commissioner of the Metropolitan 
Police, Sir Paul Condon, used his 1994 annual report to express concern that solicitors 
were starting to see the police as a ‘soft option’ and announced a new policy that the 
Metropolitan Police would be fighting many more of the actions against them (Epp, 2009: 
153).  One of the solicitors from the HCDA responded: “It’s disgraceful for the 
Commissioner to suggest that the problem is with the solicitors rather than with any 
misconduct in this police force and the machinery to deal with the misconduct” (Epp, 
2009: 153).  Despite this, the PCA appeared to support the Commissioner’s depiction of 
claimants and their solicitors. In his foreword to the 1994/5 PCA Annual report, the Chair 
of the PCA, Sir Leonard Peach, stated:   
But what are the specific criticisms which lawyers and others level at us? They 
are mainly founded on using the courts for civil actions against the police as 
an alternative to using the process which we offer for complaints.  Clearly 
lawyers earn fees from civil actions and their clients are frequently funded 
from the public purse, but they would argue, apparently from disinterested 
motives, that those who wish to complain are better served by the civil courts 
(PCA Annual Report 1994/5 :7). 
Here then we see an official denial of police actions as serving any positive function in 
relation to individual rights. However, the ability of police actions to cast doubt on the 
rigour and impartiality of internal complaints investigations continued. The 1995 case of 
Chief Constable of West Midlands Police ex parte Wiley119 resulted in claimants in police 
actions having access to the associated complaints files. One of the campaigning lawyers 
noted above remarked: 
 [w]e saw how weak the whole investigatory processes was. …We could show 
juries [in civil actions] that the investigations were, in fact, efforts at mitigation, 
not investigations. There were instances where investigators effectively told 
officers how they should answer the question in order not to substantiate the 
complaint (2009: 152 fn110). 
 




The ability of a police actions to expose not only poor officer conduct but also a wholly 
improper organisational response to such conduct was first raised by Garratt v Eastmond. 
It was not addressed in either the Royal Commission report in 1962 nor in the reforms 
which created PACE. This point in the mid-1990s is the juncture at which public and 
political debate concerning the proper constitutional role of police actions could have but 
did not occur. Instead the official response by the police and the PCA to the campaign of 
police actions was disparagement of claimants and their solicitors.  
The continuing crisis of public confidence in the police resulted in the establishment of 
the HAC on the Police Disciplinary and Complaints Procedures (the HAC).120 As noted 
above, the concern raised by the outcome of police actions was not centred on the 
machinery for disciplining officers but (as hinted at by the Royal Commission on Criminal 
Justice in 1993) on the willingness of the police to utilise that machinery in respect of 
certain breaches of PACE, and the bona fides of internal police investigations when they 
did occur.  However, (as noted at 3.2.1), at this time the standard of proof for disciplinary 
actions was still the criminal standard. This permitted the police to present (and the HAC 
in large part to accept) the standard of proof as the chief problem that needed addressing 
in relation to the internal investigation of police complaints. 
In evidence before the HAC, both the police and the claimants’ solicitors agreed that the 
standard of proof in police disciplinary proceedings should be reduced to the civil 
standard.  However, claimants’ solicitors’ evidence pointed to systemic failure and cause 
to doubt rather than trust the willingness of the police to address habitual abuses of 
power (for example 1997 Cmnd 258: 68). In contrast, police evidence presented a ‘bad 
apple’ conception of officer misconduct with the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police 
highlighting the “corrupt, dishonest and unethical conduct of a minority of officers” 
(Cmnd 258: v) and the commitment of the police to rooting out such bad apples. 
Interestingly, the HAC took the Commissioner’s position as its starting point, (quoting the 
Commissioner’s evidence in its introduction) and as setting the boundaries of its enquiry 
(see Cmnd 258: v). Consequently, the HAC concluded that “it is probably the case that the 
differing standard of proof accounts to some extent for the difference in the results in civil 
 




cases” (Cmnd 258 xiv) and recommended that the standard of proof for disciplinary 
proceedings be reduced to the civil standard. Importantly, this permitted the 
constitutional importance and regulatory potential of police actions to once again be 
sidestepped. 
The failure of the HAC to acknowledge the difference in the police and the claimant 
solicitors’ assessment of the underlying problem revealed by police actions is striking 
given the conflict in the evidence before it relating to the police complaints system. 
Evidence from ACPO was that "the quality of investigation we undertake is extremely 
thorough" (Cmnd 258: 67). Likewise, while the PCA conceded that “there were times 
when additional information might have been obtained and that sometimes interviewing 
methods were conducted too informally”, its evidence concluded that nonetheless, "the 
vast majority of [complaints] investigations…are thoroughly and objectively carried out" 
(Cmnd 258: 67). In contrast, Liberty’s evidence was that “all legal practitioners in this area 
are aware of cases where the investigating officer appointed to a complaint has conducted 
a less than full inquiry or a less than vigorous interview of the 'complained about' officers" 
(Cmnd 258: 68). Moreover, the evidence of the Police Action Lawyers Group was that: 
Investigating officers suppress, manipulate and invent evidence according to its 
relevance to the complainant's allegation. Independent witnesses favourable to 
a complainant are easily persuaded to make brief, uninformative statements and 
words supportive of the officers under investigation are inserted without 
witnesses ever being aware of their significance (Cmnd 258: 68). 
The HAC found itself unable to reach a conclusion on whether police investigations 
of complaints were being properly conducted and it is interesting that it was 
nevertheless prepared to offer the view that the majority of cases were:  
It may be that part of the reconciliation between the two different pictures 
described above is that, whereas the large majority of investigations are 
properly conducted some are not, including some serious ones. It does not take 
a great number of inadequately conducted investigations - whether the 
inadequacy arises from inefficiency or from corruption to undermine public 




This is suggestive of the occasional ‘bad apple’ in professional standards departments 
which, as noted above, is consistent with an official commitment to the bona fides of the 
internal police disciplinary process more generally. Once again, there is also an emphasis 
on public confidence rather than the veracity of investigations and it is coupled with an 
implicit suggestion that the public can be misguided in their lack of or reduced confidence.   
Despite its finding that the majority of investigations were properly conducted, the HAC 
recommended an element of independent investigation of police complaints “not least 
because of the boost this would give to public confidence in the system” (emphasis added) 
(Cmnd 258: 185). Here then, the large volume of credible evidence that the internal 
investigation of police complaints is substantively problematic is disregarded and, instead, 
the need for independent investigation is linked to a desire to shore up inappropriately 
dented public confidence. Further, and very significantly for this thesis, the public 
confidence considered to be in issue is not public confidence in the police but public 
confidence in the police complaints system.  
 In response to the HAC report, the Government commissioned a study into the feasibility 
of an independent body for the investigation of police complaints. Similar 
recommendations in the report of the MacPherson Inquiry121 into the police investigation 
of the murder of Stephen Lawrence made establishment of such a body politically 
unavoidable122  and, subsequently, the Police Reform Act 2002 created the IPCC, which is 
discussed at length in the Chapter 4.  
There was a second HAC report in the 1997/8 session (Cmnd 894 1997).  This was stated 
to have arisen as a result of evidence provided to the first enquiry suggesting that 
increased recourse to police actions stemmed from lack of confidence in the complaints 
system (and because civil actions had the potential to result in payments of compensation 
(Cmnd 894: 1). The HAC limited its discussion to confidentiality clauses in the settlement 
of police actions but notwithstanding this rather limited review, their recommendations 
embody the conception of police actions as serving a public role reminiscent of views 
expressed in the parliamentary debate in Garratt v Eastmond.  
 
121  1999 Report of the Stephen Lawrence inquiry Ref: Cm 4262. 




In discussing occasions when a case might have been settled on economic grounds, the 
HAC was clear that:   
In such cases the public, in our opinion, have a right to know what has happened 
so that they can come to their own view as to how their police force has acted; 
accordingly, we do not think that the non-admission of liability is a sufficient 
reason for confidentiality. (Cmnd 894: 22) 
The HAC also stressed that:  
It is a fundamental tenet of public life that sums paid out by public bodies—
particularly very large sums—should in principle be disclosable since they 
represent expenditure of public money. There must be a strong presumption 
towards openness in matters of this kind (Cmnd 894: 16). 
Consequently, the recommendation of the HAC in this second report was that the public 
interest demanded “whatever steps are necessary be taken to ensure that disclosure [of 
settlement figures] becomes standard practice” (Cmnd 894: 30). The Government 
responded in a one-page report that while it would “undoubtedly increase public 
confidence if forces did publish [settlement] figures…the way in which police forces and 
police authorities deal with civil claims is of course, a matter for them and their insurers” 
(emphasis added) Cmnd 80 1998). This presents the police as having the status of a private 
body in relation to the handling of police actions. It thereby significantly undermines the 
constitutional nature of police actions and the public interest in them. Together with the 
comments of the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police and the Chairman of the PCA, 
(noted above), this Government articulation of the role and status of police actions 
cements a significant official redefinition and limitation of their constitutional importance 
which should have been subject to political and public debate.  
In the same year, this undebated constitutional change was also supported by the 
judiciary in Thompson and Hsu v Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis (1997).123 
This judgment, which is analysed in detail in Chapters 5 and 6, resulted in the levels of 
aggravated and exemplary damages in police actions being capped. Epp argues that media 
 




attention surrounding police actions in the 1990s was fuelled by the high levels of 
damages juries were awarding and that the limitation on damages operated to reduce the 
power of police actions to highlight police misconduct (and lack of appropriate disciplinary 
outcomes) (Epp, 2009: 157). However, as explored in Chapter 5 (at 5.3.2), the more 
significant consequence of Thompson and Hsu was that it effectively granted police forces 
control over the settlement of police actions (and thereby the power to limit any media 
attention attendant on a public trial of the issues).  
The standard of proof for police disciplinary proceeding was finally reduced to the civil 
standard by the Police Reform Act 2002. The timing of the change is ironic. If the standard 
of proof for police actions and police complaints had been the same before the decision 
in Thompson and Hsu, the interaction between the two processes might have triggered 
the political and public debate that this chapter has argued should have occurred at the 
time of the Royal Commission of 1960.  Instead, the difference in standard of proof was 
presented as adequately accounting for the discrepancies in outcomes of police actions 
and police complaints during the 1980s and 1990s, and by the time the civil standard had 
been adopted for police complaints, the decision in Thompson and Hsu had granted the 
police largely unfettered control over the settlement of police actions (and thereby the 
ability to limit the information about police actions that might have fuelled such debate). 
  
Conclusion and Themes 
 
This Chapter has explored how public doubts about the commitment of the police to 
disciplining officers for misconduct resulted in increased recourse to the courts and calls 
for police accountability in the form of increased external oversight of the police 
complaints process. However, a necessary corollary of the official presumption of police 
institutional probity (noted in Chapter 2) is that such public disquiet is misplaced. 
Accordingly, the introduction of (and conferral of increasing powers on) police complaints 
oversight bodies was presented as a means of bolstering public confidence in the police 
rather than seeking to substantively address officer or organisational conduct. This 
resulted in debates focusing on the structure of the police complaints process (for 




substance of what that process might deliver in terms of individual officer and 
organisational accountability. This has now become a stage further removed, with a 
concern to ensure public confidence in the independent oversight body itself or indeed 
public confidence in the independence of the independent oversight body.124    
It has been argued that the emergence of external bodies whose function was to oversee 
the discipline practices, resulted in changes to the official position of ‘trust in the police’. 
The official preference for trusting the police requires that when acknowledgment of 
officer misconduct is unavoidable, it is found to be infrequent. The 1929 Royal 
Commission viewed it as “inevitable that in a Service comprising 56,000 men there should 
be some ‘black sheep’ and isolated instances of misconduct” (RC 1929 P99 para 162). 
Similarly, while as noted above, the Royal Commission of 1962 was alive to officers 
misusing their powers for organisational gain, it was nevertheless confident that such 
“criticisms applied…only to isolated cases (Cmnd, 3297 1962: 369). In contrast, by the time 
the HAC was considering police disciplinary procedures in 1997, the misuse of police 
powers for organisational gain was barely acknowledged. Instead there was an emphasis 
on officer misconduct, interpreted as corruption for personal non-organisational gain. It 
was in relation to these bad apples (or this type of bad apple) that senior officers were 
keen for increased disciplinary powers.  Implicit in this latter emphasis is the assumption 
that everything else in the orchard is fine.  
The analysis of discipline and public confidence has exposed a deep-rooted connection 
between public confidence and increased police autonomy over complaints and 
disciplinary processes. It has also resulted in a clearer articulation of organisational 
legitimacy. Specifically, it has been underlined that public confidence and organisational 
legitimacy are not coextensive because while the latter is an assessment of some quality 
of the police themselves (this is explored in Chapter 4 at section 4.1), the former is more 
open to manipulation and should therefore be treated with caution.  
The main theme that arises in this chapter is how police actions are conceived. It was 
noted at the end of Chapter 2 that parliamentary debate concerning Garratt v Eastmond 
demonstrated a clear understanding that police actions served a public function, i.e. that 
 




there is a public interest in the facts and outcome of the action. This public aspect of police 
actions also extended to transparency regarding both settlement and police discipline 
and, on this understanding, police actions were concerned with accountability and 
constitutional legitimacy. The period between 1964 and 2002 saw this conception of 
police actions challenged, but significantly there has been no public or political debate on 
this point. The complex constitutional role of police actions is discussed at length in 
Chapter 5. However, this chapter has highlighted their potential to provide increased 
scrutiny of the individual incidents that give rise to complaints and a constitutionally based 
mechanism against which the police complaints process as a whole might be judged. In 
contrast, official narratives surrounding police actions have emphasised their 
compensatory function and presented the police as akin to a private body in relation to 





Chapter 4.  The Police Complaints System and its Contribution to 




At the point of writing, the police complaints system is in flux, governed by the Police Act 
1996 and the Police Reform Act 2002 (the PRA), both amended most recently by the 
Policing and Crime Act 2017 (PACA), only some provisions of which have been brought 
into force.125 The police complaints system under the PRA (prior to the PACA) is briefly 
outlined in Chapter 1, and Chapter 3 charts the reforms to the police complaints process 
in the second half of the 20th Century. This chapter considers the key features of the 
current police complaints system and the recent reforms in greater depth. In preparation 
for this, Section 4.1 explores the difficulties in regulating police officer conduct and 
assessing the effectiveness of the police complaints process. In doing so, it highlights the 
strong motivation for the police to be resistant to external intrusion into the realm of 
officer discipline  
The theoretical idealisation concerning organisational legitimacy delineated in Chapter 1 
hypothesised a mapping between the organisational legitimacy of the police, the police 
complaints system and Black’s conception of thick proceduralisation. However, the Police 
Reform Act 2002 (PRA) arguably introduced some of the ideas associated with 
constitutional legitimacy into the police complaints process. Section 4.2 probes what is 
meant by independent or external oversight or review of the police complaints system.  It 
notes that the idea of the independent investigation of police complaints (embodied in 
the PRA) intimates that the police complaints process is an area which can be, and is, 
penetrated by a non-police body such that officers are strictly held to account for 
breaches of discipline codes. It argues, however, that in practical terms the extent to 
which this is achieved is limited not least by police resistance to the IPCC’s operations.  
 
125 At the point of submission PACA ss33 and 34 which address renaming the IPCC have been brought into 
force but the provisions that address the police complaints process (i.e. PACA ss13-27 and Schedule 6) 




Section 4.3 explores the ways in which the police complaints process (and the reforms 
introduced by the PACA) provides for citizens’ dissatisfaction with police conduct to be 
addressed by processes which include the potential for thick proceduralisation. It notes 
that, in most instances, these processes do not involve direct contact between the police 
and the public, and highlights how, instead, the system now includes the potential for 
translation (as conceived by Black and outlined in Chapter 1 (at 1.4.2)) by means of non-
police bodies acting as intermediaries.  
Section 4.4 considers the impact of the broader police regulatory framework on the 
operations of the IOPC.126 
 
4.1 Policing and Police Complaints  
 
4.1.1 The Nature of Policing and Police Organisational Legitimacy  
 
The role of the public police is conflict ridden and inevitably political (Bittner 1970, 
Lustgarten 1986, Reiner 2010, Crawford 2013). As noted in Chapter 1, the police are 
tasked with maintaining both the ‘general order’ and ‘specific dominations’ (Marenin 
1982: 258-259). In addition, they must negotiate the use of coercive force to achieve just 
ends (Muir 1977: 2-3). In line with this there are two distinct lenses through which policing 
may be viewed: the ‘official paradigm’ and the ‘operational code’. The former sees the 
police as a disciplined force of predominantly law abiding and trustworthy officers 
committed to public service (and thereby aligns with what has, in previous chapters, been 
referred to as the official commitment to police conduct being impeccable). The official 
paradigm code represents the “public face” of the police as reflected in the oath of office 
and operates to bolster institutional values (Punch 2011: 3). In contrast, the operational 
code is the “negotiated reality of internal institutional and operational practices which 
 
126 As noted in the Introduction to Part One, the IPCC was renamed the IOPC in January 2018. In this 
chapter the body is referred to as the IPCC for most of the analysis and by its new name IOPC when the 




deviate from the paradigm” and designates how things “really get done” (Punch 2011: 
3).127  
The regulation of officer conduct is made particularly problematic by the manner in which 
the official paradigm and the operational code coexist. Goldsmith (1991a) notes how the 
police are effectively forced to create policy at “street level” (Lipsky, 1980) and that many 
complaints arise in circumstances where there may not be full consensus as to what the 
officer should have done (Goldsmith, 1991a: 14). As discussed in Chapter 1, the 
organisational legitimacy of the police is premised on the idea that police organisational 
‘connectedness’ to the community will guide the decision-making process in these 
contexts (and, importantly, the police response to any resultant disquiet about the 
choices the officer makes).128  However, it is also recognised that police operational 
culture may limit that connectedness such that apparent instances of misconduct are “not 
wilful misconduct at all but rather a reflection of systemic biases and assumptions about 
race, class and gender” (Martin 1993: 138).129 There are also deeper systemic issues that 
operate as drivers of certain forms of (mis)conduct. Punch highlights how “[t]he friction 
between the criminal law and criminal procedure and the messy reality of police work 
leads to various adaptations by police officers. Under certain circumstances this becomes 
more than simple ‘creativity’ and escalates into serious if not systemic rule bending and 
rule breaking” (Punch 2003: 193).  
There is thus a duality at the core of policing. Punch describes how:  
the often messy, confusing and frustrating reality of policing becomes a 
constantly shifting kaleidoscope of personal and institutional performances, of 
impression management and the construction of accounts for internal and 
external consumption. The actors at all levels have multiple personalities and 
 
127 The extensive literature on police operational culture is beyond the scope of this work.  For an 
oversight of the complexities of this area, see Loftus 2009, and more recently in terms of its impact on 
whistleblowing, see Rowe et al 2016. 
128 The historical analysis in Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrated how police organisational identity was forged 
in line with a fissure in constables’ ancient connectedness to the community. However, the police as an 
organisation retains a connectedness to the community which is more than the sum of the individual 
officers’ membership of the milieu and vests also in police community engagement strategies and police 
organisational engagement with, for example, local authorities, social housing providers and youth justice 
workers (see Crawford and Cunningham, 2015). 




identities and slip continually between them, espousing the official paradigm at 
one moment while acknowledging the operational code at another (Punch 2011: 
3). 
Newman’s review of the literature on police corruption carried out for the Home Office 
adopted Kleinig’s view of police corruption which includes “exercising or failing to exercise 
authority with the primary intention of furthering private or departmental advantage” 
(Newburn 1999: 7, 2015: 3) (emphasis added).130 This definition therefore includes 
elements of ‘noble cause’ corruption (which epitomises aspects of the operation code) 
and there is general acceptance that, on this definition, police corruption is “pervasive, 
continuing and not bound by rank” (Newburn, 1999: v). Goldschmidt et al found that 
officers’ “passionate, consistent response” in interviews was a “shared belief that police 
work, and the criminal justice process itself would be totally ineffective without [police] 
dishonesty” (Goldschmidt and Anonymous, 2008: 130).131 In addition, seemingly low 
levels of officer misconduct can be catalysts for ‘process’ corruption where “beating leads 
to cheating by cover up or by charging the victim with assaulting the police” (Punch, 2011: 
31). There is considerable literature (to which Chapter 7 of this thesis adds) indicating that 
this is a frequent if not routine practice (Box and Russell, 1975; Choongh, 1998; Smith, 
2001, 2003) and that a degree of managerial complicity exists in both rule bending and 
rule breaking at this level (Newburn, 1999: 18, 2015: 9).  
If (as appears unquestionable) corruption is endemic in police work, then a core and 
arguably defining aspect of policing lies in the regulation of that corruption. Not 
surprisingly, research into the complaints and discipline systems confirms that such 
systems do not rise above the ’messy realities’ of policing but are infused by them. Not 
only, that it is commonplace for officers to lie in order to prevent their colleagues from 
being disciplined, but senior professional standards officers are well aware of the practice 
(Goldsmith, 1991a: 25; Savage, 2013b: 895-896). Additionally, if officers perceive the 
complaints system as weighted unfairly against them, they are more likely to falsify their 
 
130 This should be contrasted with the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, s. 26, which defines the criminal 
offence of “police corruption” narrowly and in terms of action or inaction on the part of officers (or threats 
thereof) for personal gain. There is of course a grey area if achieving departmental advantage may lead to 
indirect personal gain in the form of promotion.   
131 Punch states that these were British officers; however, while the article itself is silent as to jurisdiction 




accounts of the event leading to the complaint (DeAngelis and Kupchik, 2007: 654). This 
is compounded by “an attitude of police mind which is affronted by the impertinence of 
the civilian in making a complaint at all and which then, in a defensive reflex, classifies him 
as a trouble-maker, or as being anti-police, or motivated by malice or ill-will” (Goldsmith, 
1991a: 23). 
Interestingly, instead of bolstering calls for greater external involvement in police 
discipline, the polarity between the operational code and the official paradigm leads to a 
paradox whereby the lens of the official paradigm and the lens of the operational code 
both point to complaints and discipline being undertaken internally. The official paradigm 
maintains that, subject to a few bad apples, officers are committed to operating within 
the law. This lens requires recognition that the potentially violent nature of the situations 
officers face results in the need for them to take decisive action (Herbert, 2006: 482) and, 
in order to do so, they need to know that they will be supported by senior officers who 
understand the complexities of the situations in which they are forced to act (Hudson, 
1971: 521).  A corollary to this argument is that a system of regulation which is too 
rigorous or unforgiving will have a negative impact on police decision-making. 
Consequently, any discipline system must strike “a delicate balance between suitable 
impartiality toward the force and understanding of the policeman’s difficult task” 
(Hudsen, 1971: 538). This view is reflected in the Police Federation’s concern that 
lowering the standard of proof in disciplinary proceedings to the civil rather than the 
criminal standard may make officers “think twice and play safe” (“Police” February 
1998:7, quoted in Waters and Brown, 2000:619). It is also expressly recognised in the first 
PCB annual report: “The case for action against a police officer for breach of a provision 
of the discipline code may have to be balanced against consideration of force morale and 
the effect of the decision on the police in general” (quoted in Smith, 2001: 379). More 
recently a longitudinal study of officers in the US found that severity of disciplinary 
outcome was associated with increased likelihood of future deviant behaviour and 
hypothesised that a perception of the system as unfair might lead to greater delinquency 
(Harris and Worden, 2014).132 
 




While ‘good police decision making’ and force morale are conceptually distinct, they are 
difficult to separate in practice because in order to function as an organisation the police 
must recruit and retain a workforce willing and able to go out and ‘do’ policing.  The most 
recent Home Office Guidance on Police Officer Misconduct, Unsatisfactory Performance 
and Attendance Management Procedures, reflects this concern: “managers, supervisors, 
professional standards departments and appropriate authorities will be expected to 
exercise sound professional judgement and take into account the principle of 
proportionality in determining how to deal effectively with relatively minor shortcomings 
in behaviour” (Home Office Guidance 2015: 11).133 In sum, since according to the official 
paradigm we ‘prefer to trust the police’, that trust must extend to allowing the police to 
be tasked with keeping their house in order. This accords with the theme of trust and 
internal police discipline developed in Chapters 2 and 3. 
In contrast, recognition that officer conduct is governed by an unwritten operational code 
which operates on a continuum between both low and high levels of corruption134 
ironically leads to the same conclusion. The view that officers’ conduct can only be fairly 
judged by those who have experience of the situational difficulties they face morphs into 
the assertion that it is only those who understand the operational code who can decode 
the officers’ ‘creative’ account of events.  One of Reiner’s chief constables in 1991 
explained the position:  
Policemen are human beings and there’s a self-protect factor, but they wouldn’t 
pull the wool over my eyes. The bad guys will get away with it far easier than 
they appear to be doing at the moment if it was an independent investigation 
(1991a: 288).  
Over twenty years later, and in very different structural circumstances, the same view 
persists.  Ex-police investigators at the IPCC stress how operational experience makes 
them uniquely able to ‘read between the lines’ and recognise what officers omit from 
 
133 Available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/434377/misconduct-
perform-attendance_v4__1__1_.pdf. 
134 Punch draws a distinction between relatively minor incidents (which are not criminal misconduct), 
more serious offences deemed corrupt and which are formally criminal, and those that are “deeply 




their accounts of events (Savage, 2013b: 896). They sum up the importance of their role 
as “you set a thief to catch a thief” and “you can’t bullshit a bullshitter” (2013b: 896): 
You need somebody who understands how the system works internally. Until 
you know how the system works internally and how it should work it’s very 
difficult without that knowledge to then know if you’re doing the investigation, 
how people have short-cutted [sic] or bent the system or abused the system. 
(2013b: 895). 
… only a police officer really knows what police officers can do and how they 
can skew the records if they’re maliciously motivated to make it look like 
everything was ticketyboo, when it wasn’t (2013b: 896). 
So, two images exist side by side. In one, the police should be trusted to oversee 
complaints and discipline because it will provide the morale-boosting support that is 
required for good officer decision-making. In the other, not only is rule-bending and rule-
breaking endemic, but the way those practices are covered up is so specific to police 
operations that only officers, or ex-officers can recognise when it has happened. This 
duality provides a high degree of police autonomy concerning how incidents of 
misconduct are interpreted (or presented) by the police. On one hand, it permits 
individual officer misconduct to be explained or excused as resulting from systemic issues. 
On the other hand, if any accusation is such that implicating the system might be too 
damaging, individual officers can be condemned. Arguably therefore, a selectively 
rigorous internal investigation process may be combined with this dual reasoning to 
create an internal regulatory process that is deeply beyond scrutiny. Furthermore, this 
understanding of the complaints and discipline system provides explanatory insights into 
why the police resist external oversight and has implications for our understanding of 
police organisational legitimacy. 
To summarise, recognition of the official paradigm and the operational code reveals a 
tension at the core of policing between the perceived efficiency and effectiveness of the 
organisation and the image of the police as bound by the rule of law. This tension extends 
to the complaints and discipline process, where it can be understood in terms of balancing 




to remain convincing. Here any distinction between the perception and the practice of 
policing breaks down. Maintaining the balance between the official paradigm and the 
operational code (and thereby securing the legitimating practices of appeal to either) 
becomes what policing is.135  
On this understanding, organisational legitimacy becomes a rather fluid concept. 
Connectedness to the public can represent a respectful and responsive identification with 
individual members of the public and common societal goals.  Alternatively, that 
connection may be seen in a second way as facilitating a detached assessment of how far 
the operational code can deviate from the official paradigm without a damaging loss of 
public support. A third and even more cynical view might understand this connectedness 
as permitting a calculation of how far authority can be exceeded with impunity (with any 
assessment of impunity including an assessment of how far or how easily complainants 
may be disregarded or their complaints or claims suppressed).136  
It has been maintained that a core distinction between police organisational legitimacy 
and public confidence in the police is that the former can be subject to normative debate. 
The three manifestations set out above of how and, on what motivation, the connection 
between police and public is employed, outline an aspect of the normative debate that is 
envisaged. For example, the above discussion deepens our understanding of police 
resistance to external involvement in the discipline system.137 Hudson points to the very 
existence of external review and oversight as presupposing “a polarization between the 
complainant and the police and operates as a symbol of disunity” (Hudson, 1971: 522). It 
therefore undermines the authority of the police, which is based on their connectedness 
 
135 Some support for this is found in HMIC concerns expressed in the first report of the HAC in 1997 (at p 
xxviii para 79) that removal of the complaints investigation role from the police was the “too easy answer” 
and that “the most careful consideration is needed that steps are not taken that will undermine the very 
nature of an envied policing system” (emphasis added). 
136 See the discussion in Chapter 7 at 7.1. 
137 The resistance to the introduction of the PCB was discussed in Chapter 3 at section 3.  Subsequently, 
senior officers have expressed the view that enhanced external involvement was necessary to increase 
public confidence in the police complaints process even though they maintained the belief that this would 
not be as effective as police investigation of complaints (Reiner 1991a: 223). More recent research has 
suggested that police officers are more receptive to independent investigation of complaints (and this 
stems particularly from the success of the Police Ombudsman of Northern Ireland) (See Prenzler, 2016). 





to the community and the first manifestation of organisational legitimacy outlined in the 
previous paragraph. 
The police are increasingly asserting professional status, a key feature of which is a claim 
to a level of specialism which demands that the professional body be internally regulated 
(Conaghan and Torrible, 2017). This appeal to police professionalism accords with the 
second detached assessment of how to balance the official paradigm and the operational 
code and, on this basis, external interference operates to “undermine the authority of 
command” (Hudsen, 1971: 521).  
Finally, a core difficulty with external oversight of the police complaints system is that 
inherent in it is an acceptance (albeit unarticulated) that the police cannot in fact be 
trusted, which suggests a view more aligned with the third and cynical manifestation 
outlined above, and which Hudson argues operates to undermine the authority of officers 
at street level (Hudsen, 1971: 521).  
Chapter 3 argued that a commitment to a bad apple perception of officer misconduct 
(when recognition of particular incidents was unavoidable) was a necessary corollary to 
the official commitment to ‘trust the police’ (here now articulated as the ‘official 
paradigm’). However, the more fluid depiction of organisational legitimacy outlined 
above, reveals that there is no clear one-to-one mapping between trust and the official 
paradigm on one hand, and distrust and the operational code on the other. Instead, trust 
and distrust in this context extend to confidence that the police can be trusted effectively 
to ‘police’ the extent to which the operational code diverges from the official paradigm. 
Importantly therefore it is this trust that the police seek.138 
Policing is a necessarily contested activity. Therefore, officers do need authority at street 
level; there does need to be a strong line of command, and disunity between officers and 
the public is not beneficial. The tension between these truths and the concerns outlined 
above regarding internal police discipline should feature in normative debates concerning 
organisational legitimacy. The concern of this thesis is that discussions in terms of ‘public 
confidence’ are normatively oblique and do not easily permit this form of deliberation. 
This highlights the importance of the police complaints system to the organisational 
 




legitimacy of the police, not only in providing a mechanism for thick proceduralisation 
during the handling of complaints, but also in facilitating a sufficiently well-informed 
context in which such proceduralisation might occur. The following section explores how 
the function of the police complaints system is conceived, and discusses whether it 
achieves this end. 
 
4.1.2 Public Confidence and the Effectiveness of the Police Complaints Process  
 
Maguire and Corbett identify four functions of police complaints systems, namely: the 
satisfaction of complainants; the enforcement of discipline in the ranks; feedback to 
police managers; and the maintenance of public confidence in the police (Maguire and 
Corbett, 1991: 13).139 It is interesting that in 1991 the maintenance of public confidence 
in the police was placed last. At that time commenters were clear that the stated primary 
purpose of the police complaints system was not (and never had been) the ‘satisfaction 
of complainants’ but with whether officers should be disciplined for misconduct (Maguire 
and Corbett, 1991: 11–12; Reiner, 1991b: 211; Smith 2004 :16). In contrast, the IPCC is 
under a statutory duty to ensure ‘public confidence’ in the police complaints system.140 
This reflects a more general emphasis on public confidence above the other elements 
noted by Maguire and Corbett and embodies the shift from a focus on public confidence 
in the police to a focus on public confidence in the police complaints system, as noted in 
Chapter 3 (at 3.2.3).  
Maguire and Corbett’s delineation of the functions of the police complaints process do 
not assist with the question of how to assess its effectiveness. The discussion of 
substantiation rates for police complaints in Chapter 1 (at section 1.3) outlines why direct 
quantitative measures of ‘effectiveness’ are too complex and interrelated to be of value.  
For this reason, Prenzler and Ronken argue that any assessment of the effectiveness of a 
police complaints process must focus on indirect indicators such as complainant 
 
139 These align with four functions suggested and labelled by Smith as “managerial, liability, restorative 
and accountability” (Smith 2004: 20). However, notwithstanding the choice of label, it is clear that the 
functions are both interconnected (2004: 16) and potentially contradictory (Maguire and Corbett, 1991: 
182). 




satisfaction and public confidence (Prenzler and Ronken, 2001: 156). It is submitted 
however that both these measures are themselves problematic (see Torrible, 2016: 2-3).  
Research repeatedly shows that what the majority of complainants want from the police 
complaints system is not for officers to be disciplined, but to receive “an apology or for 
the subject officer to receive training to improve his/her behaviour” (Porter and Prenzler, 
2016: 75). For example, Waters and Brown found that most of the complainants they 
interviewed had modest aims such as seeking “an apology or simply wanting to blow off 
steam” (Waters and Brown, 2000: 629). Similarly, the main aim of complainants in 
Strudwick’s study was “to have their say or get their point across and receive an 
explanation from the police service” (Strudwick, 2003: 40). Thus, a significant proportion 
of complainants are seeking to restore their good opinion of the police and thereby 
address what might be conceived as a relational harm.141 Arguably they are also seeking 
the form of thick proceduralisation espoused by Black and discussed in Chapter 1 (at 
1.4.2). 
As noted in Chapter 1 (at 1.3), it is recognised that if the police (or any figures of authority) 
treat people fairly and with respect, this will lead to an inference that they (the police) are 
motivated by trustworthy aims such as overall community-spiritedness. This will, in turn, 
result in greater general compliance with police requests and conformity to laws and 
social norms (even when the police are not present) (Tyler and Huo, 2002; Tyler 2004; 
Sunshine and Tyler 2003; Tyler 2013; Hough et al, 2010; Jackson et al, 2013). Similarly, 
complainants’ perceptions of bias within the police complaints process are affected both 
by the process and the outcome (Porter and Prenzler, 2016: 89). Hence Waddington et 
al’s insight that “it is not only right to treat people fairly, and respectfully, but it is also 
prudent to do so since it facilitates policing” (Waddington et al, 2015: 213). This highlights 
the broad potential for a well-functioning police complaints process to benefit policing at 
many levels (see Prenzler and Porter, 2017). It is therefore, remarkable that the police so 
repeatedly fail to maximise the restorative potential of the complaints process.  When 
 
141 This is an important observation in the context of the discussion in Chapter 5 of the types of harms 




asked how the police might improve the system, comments from the complainants in 
Waters and Brown’s study included: 
“Stop being so bloody arrogant.” 
“They treat everyone as big, no good criminals, and when you talk to them calm and level-
headed they put you down as smarmy. So you can’t win.” 
“I was made to feel worthless and I’ll never have confidence in any police person ever 
again.” (Waters and Brown 2000: 629). 
Moreover, these responses are illustrative of a significant body of research which confirms 
that complainants’ experience of police-dominated complaints systems are consistently 
negative (Waters and Brown 2000, De Angelis 2009, Grace and Bucke, Strudwick 2003, 
Porter and Prenzler 2016: 78-81).142 
However, recent research highlights the potential reciprocity in the link between 
procedural justice and police legitimacy and indicates that people’s perceptions of 
whether the police are indeed acting fairly or respectfully towards them are extremely 
subjective. Waddington et al showed video clips of real police encounters with members 
of the public to a diverse range of focus groups. Their findings reveal that responses varied 
according to whether the respondent took the position of the police or the other party in 
the encounter (Waddington et al, 2015: 232) but that overall ratings of favourability could 
not be accounted for by factors such as age, gender, class or ethnicity (Waddington et al, 
2015: 221). Additionally, while those who held positive views of the police were more 
likely to tolerate mistaken police action, other respondents’ ambivalence was so deep that 
the researchers concluded there was “little prospect that if the officers had acted 
differently…they would have secured greater approval” (Waddington et al, 2015: 232).    
Waddington et al’s research suggests that if someone starts with an extremely negative 
view of the police, they may remain dissatisfied no matter how well conducted the 
complaints process or courteous the officers handling it. This indicates that ‘confidence in 
 
142 The figures compiled by Porter and Prenzler compare a police-dominated system with ‘mixed’ systems 
that contain some internal and external elements. This should be contrasted with the positive 
complainants’ responses in relation to the fully independent Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland 




the police’ may be a driver of complainant satisfaction and highlights the extent to which 
complainant satisfaction and public confidence cannot be considered as distinct 
measures. Furthermore, rather than confidence in the police complaints system operating 
to bolster confidence in the police, it appears that people’s views of the police have an 
impact on their propensity to even engage with the complaints process.  
The IPCC publishes biennial public confidence surveys which reveal that those who have 
recently had what they perceived to be negative contact with the police are considerably 
less likely to make a complaint about any new incident with which they are unhappy, than 
those who had not had contact with the police (or had contact and were happy with the 
outcome of it) (IPCC: PC 2016: 14/15).  There is therefore an element of self-selection in 
the group of people prepared to make a complaint against the police which results, 
ironically, in that group containing a reduced proportion of those who hold the police in 
lowest regard. Importantly, only 19% of the respondents in the IPCC 2016 Public 
Confidence Survey, had had any contact with the police.143 This underscores how 
measures of public confidence are measures of general public confidence and can 
therefore undermine the significance of the responses of those whose views stem from 
contact with the police rather than from media portrayals of policing. 
The above discussion indicates that public confidence in the police is a key driver of 
people’s initial interpretation of officers’ conduct as offensive or otherwise, and of their 
propensity to complain, and satisfaction with the complaints process. In particular, it 
suggests that increasing public confidence in the police should increase not only the 
proportion of those who are willing to engage with the complaints process but also result 
in those that do engage being more readily satisfied by less punitive measures against 
officers.  While it is difficult to argue with the suggestion that increasing public confidence 
in the police is a good thing, the motivating concern of this research is that the system in 
place to do that must ensure that such confidence is ‘well-founded’.144 Procedural justice 
is important. Treating citizens with respect is important. But the process by which the 
 
143 (IPCC: PC 2016: 3). 
144 The research therefore mirrors the concern expressed by MacCoun (2005) and more recently 




substance of their disquiet is assessed and addressed must also be central to any claim to 
legitimacy in the context of democratic policing.   
In discussing the official paradigm and the operational code, Punch observes how “police 
officers learn to become shrewd and crafty chameleons, opportunistically and 
instinctively changing colour to fit the area, audience and shifting occupation roles”. He 
adds that this, in fact, makes them “no different from actors in other institutional 
settings”’. However, what does set them apart from other actors is that “they are law 
enforcers who have sworn an oath to abide by the law” (Punch, 2011: 3). Importantly, 
they have coercive powers. Furthermore, there is ample evidence that the operational 
code differentiates between various sectors of society, such that some groups are more 
frequently in receipt of those coercive powers than others (Bradford and Loader, 2016; 
Reiner, 2010: 123-4, Hillyard and Gordon, 1999; Brown and Ellis, 1994). 
To be clear, the concern in this thesis is that the measure of ‘public confidence’ (in either 
the police or the police complaints process) specifically ignores this group. Likewise, to 
the extent that members of this group are not inclined to engage with the police 
complaints process, the thick proceduralisation envisaged by Black’s interpretation of 
deliberative democracy cannot occur.145 An important element of the argument being 
made here is that in the 1980s and 1990s high profile police actions served an important 
regulatory role in highlighting the ways in which the police complaints system was failing, 
particularly in relation to those groups (which Reiner refers to as ‘police property’ (Reiner, 
2010: 123-4)). Chapter 5 below details how the ability of police actions to perform that 
function has been diminished by, inter alia, the decision in Thompson and Hsu.146  
The discussion above also underscores the importance of combined processes of officer 
and police organisational regulation providing sufficient data to the public realm to 
facilitate meaningful normative debate about how the operational code and the official 
paradigm interact, specifically in relation to the way in which the less powerful and 
disenfranchised sections of society are policed. As discussed in Chapter 5, the decision in 
 
145 In relation to this aspect, see the discussion of PCCs in section 4.2 below. 




Thompson and Hsu has also limited the availability of claims data that would contribute 
to such debate.   
This section has explored the complexities of policing and the regulation of officer 
conduct. The following subsection draws on this discussion in extending the brief outline 
of the current police complaints process provided in Chapter 1. 
 
4.2 The Current Police Complaints Process and Recent Reforms   
 
This section probes what is meant by ‘independent’ in the context of the current police 
complaints system and considers the impact of the recent reforms. It argues that the 
notion of ‘independence’ in the context of the IPCC is complex and that while the idea and 
rhetoric of independence is potentially powerful in securing greater public confidence in 
the system, the system may not in fact deliver the degree of independence the rhetoric 
suggests.  
The Police Act 1976 created the PCB, which was ‘independent’ of the police in that its 
members could not be ex-officers.147 However, as discussed in Chapter 3 (at 3.2.1), the 
powers of the PCB were limited to the review of police internal investigations into 
complaints. Similarly, s.1(4) of Schedule 4 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (as 
originally enacted) barred members of the successor to the PCB, the Police Complaints 
Authority (PCA), from being ex-officers. While the PCA had greater powers than the PCB 
and was able to exercise some supervisory control over the internal police investigation 
of more serious complaints, it did not have a prescribed statutory role in relation to the 
police complaints process as a whole.  
In the context of the limited powers of the PCB and the PCA and the requirement that 
none of their members be ex-officers, the words ‘independent’ and ‘external’ are 
relatively uncomplicated and largely interchangeable.  The distinction between these two 
words has however attracted more attention in the context of the IPCC. Following the PCB 
and the PCA, the IPCC could easily have been named the Police Complaints Commission.  
 




It is perhaps significant therefore that instead its ‘independence’ is stressed and that this 
coincided, not only with the conferral of powers to conduct ‘independent’ investigations 
of some police complaints, but also with being statutorily tasked to ensure public 
confidence in the police complaints process is maintained.148  
The idea of ‘independence’ carries normative implications aligned with impartiality. On 
this understanding it is an “overarching principle of the criminal justice process [which] 
aims to protect the rule of law against political, economic or cultural interference” and is 
“fundamental to the administration of fair and effective criminal justice” (Smith, 2009b: 
256).  Conceived this ‘functional’ way the notion of independent investigation of 
complaints against the police embodies some of the key ideas associated with 
constitutional legitimacy in seeking to enforce the boundaries of how police coercive 
powers are exercised.    
However, ‘independence’ can also be used in an explanatory sense (Smith, 2009b: 256) to 
describe the disaggregation of various bodies’ responsibilities and the degree of 
autonomy they enjoy in relation to how those responsibilities are exercised. Smith refers 
to this form of independence as ‘organisational independence’ and notes that while it 
may increase the likelihood of functional independence – it is no guarantee of such (Smith 
2009b: 257). In line with this observation, the following subsection argues that the idea 
of ‘independence’ in the context of the IPCC is infused with normative ideals associated 
with impartiality in both the assessment of evidence and the application of discipline 
codes which broadly mirror the legal provisions surrounding the police mandate to use 
state-sanctioned force. There is consequently a common perception that the independent 
oversight and, in particular, the independent investigation, of complaints provided by the 
IPCC, is aligned with the delivery of constitutional legitimacy. In contrast, while the IPCC 
may provide this in some serious incidents of officer misconduct the discussion below 








4.2.1 The IPCC and Independent Investigation of Police Complaints  
 
Research concerning complainants’ experiences of police complaints systems (in several 
jurisdictions) indicates that systems which manifest greater external or independent 
oversight enjoy greater public confidence (Maguire and Corbett, 1991; Landau, 1996; 
Lersch, 1998; Strudwick, 2003; Waters and Brown, 2000; Prenzler, 2016a). In a vein 
prescient of Waddington’s research outlined above, McLaughlin and Johansen argue that 
“marginalised, disenfranchised communities and discriminated against social groups 
suffer such deep distrust of the police that ‘certain forms of seemingly ‘minor’ police 
misconduct, rather than being diverted into restorative justice, will have to be subject to 
the full rigour of independent investigation and adjudication” (McLaughlin and Johansen, 
2002: 651) (emphasis added). This supports the contention that the rhetoric surrounding 
the IPCC sees its ‘independence’ as embodying the normative principles articulated in the 
previous subsection and an understanding that the ‘full rigour’ of investigation will have, 
as its key concern, the question of whether there was a breach of the rules which govern 
the grant of the mandate to interfere with personal liberties. 
The results of IPCC public confidence surveys suggest that, for England and Wales, the 
IPCC is understood (to some extent at least) to be delivering ‘full rigour’ in that sense. In 
the 2014 and 2016 public confidence surveys, only 58% and 62% respectively, of 
respondents considered that police handling of complaints would be fair or very fair (IPCC 
PC 2014: 22, 2016: 22). The same figures for the IPCC handling of complaints were 77% 
and 80% respectively (IPCC 2014: 32, 2016: 31). While there is consensus that complaints 
concerning stop and search powers, or incivility should be handled by the forces in 
question, the majority of respondents regard independent involvement as necessary for 
those matters that would align with the intentional torts that are of primary concern to 
this research, i.e. assault, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution (IPCC PC 2014: 
25 and IPCC PC 2016: 24). This suggests a sense that, for those types of allegations, 
‘fairness’ is more important and/or may be harder for the police to deliver.  
Importantly, approximately 40% of respondents believe the IPCC deals with all complaints 
(IPCC PC  2014: 32, 2016: 32), whereas in fact, for the types of alleged misconduct with 




resulted in ‘serious injury’.149 Thus, it appears that, in popular understanding, the IPCC 
provides a mechanism whereby complaints in relation to, for example, allegations of 
assault, are subject to ‘fair’, clear, independent arbitration in accordance with discipline 
codes (that effectively reflect the legal provisions of the mandate to use force).  By this 
means, the idea of independent investigation of complaints appears to be instrumental in 
increasing public confidence that the police are held to account in a way that reflects the 
ideas of constitutional legitimacy (i.e., that the focus is on breaches of individuals’ rights 
not to be subject of arbitrary or unconstitutional intrusion by embedded state actors).  
This again points to a difficulty with ‘public confidence’ as a measure of police legitimacy. 
The idea that independent investigation exists and is effective in securing constitutional 
legitimacy (understood normatively as embodying rigour and lack of bias) may bolster 
‘public confidence’ in the police complaints process (or the police) quite independently of 
the extent to which the system itself is delivering investigations that comply with the 
normative ideals of functional independence. In addition, as discussed below, there are 
several ways in which the conception of the IPCC as delivering independent investigation 
of complaints is questionable.  
Contrary to the understandings inherent in the IPCC statistics and commentators’ views 
set out above, the “IPCC is not an independent body investigating police complaints” and 
is “simply unable to do what it says on the tin” (Glass, 2014: 8).  Under the terms of the 
PRA, matters involving death or serious injury following arrest or contact with the police 
(DSI matters) must be referred to the IPCC. However, the IPCC’s involvement in the 
majority of such matters does not stem from complaints but is a result of direct referral 
from forces (Glass, 2014: 6). Moreover, when a matter is referred to the IPCC it can decide 
to conduct its own investigation, permit the force in question to investigate it (either 
under the management or supervision of the IPCC), or refer it back to the force to deal 
with as they see fit.150 In 2014, 94% of all referrals were sent back to the police and, 
overall, very few referrals are actually subject to investigation by the IPCC itself (Glass, 
2014: 8).  
 
149 “Serious injury” means a fracture, a deep cut, a deep laceration or an injury causing damage to an 
internal organ or the impairment of any bodily function (PRA 2002, s29). 




Smith highlights the importance of a non-police body having sufficient resources to 
“perform its functions fairly, effectively and independently of the police” (Smith 2009b: 
257). In 2012, the HAC produced a further report which pointed to significant failings in 
IPCC investigations including a “propensity to uncritically accept police explanations for 
missing evidence”; a “lack of investigatory rigour” and a “failure to critically analyse 
competing accounts, even with inconsistencies between officers’ accounts or an (sic) 
compelling account from a complainant” (HAC 2012 494: 5–6).151 In the wake of these 
concerns, the Government announced a major change programme for the IPCC, 
increasing its capacity and funding, to enable it to investigate “all serious and sensitive” 
matters itself (Home Office 2015a: 3). In 2015/16, the IPCC commenced 519 investigations 
in response to 3900 referrals (IPCC 2014/15). This was double the number they started 
during 2014/15 but suggests that a significant number of all matters that reach the 
referral criteria are still passed back to forces for investigation. The change programme is 
now near completion and the figures for 2016/17 reveal a similar proportion of cases 
being referred back to forces, with the IPCC opening 590 investigations from 3880 
referrals (IPCC 2016/17). In addition, IPCC research suggests that forces fail to refer 22% 
of cases which meet the referral criteria (IPCC R 2015: 2). Consequently, despite the 
change programme, the IPCC in fact continues to investigate only a minority of 
complaints. 
It is therefore particularly noteworthy, that in respect of that small proportion of 
complaints which the IPCC does investigate, its organisational and functional 
independence from the police is contested. The 2012 HAC referred to above, noted that 
approximately 11% of staff and 33% of IPCC investigators were former police officers (HAC 
2012 494: 24).152 The proportion of investigators being former police officers has 
subsequently been reduced to 20% and there are calls that this should be reduced further 
(Angiolini, 2017:121-138). 
 
151 This followed a HAC report in 2010, (HC 366) which also raised a series of concerns about the ability of 
the IPCC to perform its statutory role. 
152 The Committee recommended that the percentage of ex-police IPCC investigators be reduced to 20% 
and the most recent published statistics suggest this has been achieved. The current figures indicate that 




The independence of the IPCC is also limited by its reliance on police resources such as 
expert forensic services (Savage, 2013a: 106-107) and because IPCC investigations can be 
delayed or restricted by the police refusal to cooperate. Savage concluded that, personnel 
and resources aside, a substantial factor hampering the performance of the IPCC has been 
a significant purposeful lack of police cooperation with IPCC investigations in relation to 
both access to police witnesses and other evidence relating to investigations (Savage, 
2013a: 106–107).153 Therefore, for those cases which the IPCC determines sufficiently 
serious for ‘independent’ IPCC investigation to be necessary, the investigation is 
conducted in the context of a complex negotiated relationship between the police and 
the IPCC which reduces  the ability of the IPCC to deliver the rigour and lack of bias that 
the idea of ‘independent investigation’ purportedly promises.   
At an organisational level, the IPCC has been criticised for failing to maintain its 
independence from the police in the context of some high-profile incidents. It was very 
slow to commence an independent inquiry into the death of Ian Tomlinson following the 
G20 Summit protests in 2009 and it is accused of making misleading statements to the 
public in respect of this incident (Smith, 2009b: 433-444). Most notably, after the fatal 
shooting of Mark Duggan on 4th August 2011, the IPCC made a public statement that he 
had fired shots at police officers and thereby appeared to have accepted the police 
account of events prior to any investigation having taken place (Dodd and Taylor, 2012). 
In contrast, more recently the IPCC has been openly critical of the police. In early 2017, 
Sir Bernard Hogan Howe, the retiring Metropolitan Police Commissioner, used his final 
speech to criticise the IPCC for the length of time it took to investigate shootings and 
accused the IPCC of being too ready to treat firearms officers as suspects.154 In an article 
in reply in The Times, Dame Anne Owers, the then chair of the IPCC, was unrepentant, 
stating that the facts simply did not support Sir Bernard’s suggestions and pointing to 
officers’ refusal to cooperate with the IPCC as the reason for delays:  
 
153 For example, one senior IPCC investigator said it took a year for him to be given access to interview an 
officer who had discharged a firearm (2013:107). 





Sir Bernard also complained about the lengthy time it takes to 
investigate shootings. Timeliness of investigations is something about 
which both the police and the public are rightly concerned. But it is too 
easy to lay blame for delays solely at the door of the IPCC.  It is very clear 
that where police witnesses cooperate fully and early, we can complete 
our investigations much more quickly. By contrast, where they don’t – 
for example giving statements that simply say when they came on and 
off duty or refusing to answer questions at interview - it takes much 
longer. No-one benefits - whether they are police officers or bereaved 
families. (The Times 16 Feb 2017).155 
The lack of cooperation by the police with IPCC investigations is not recent and was 
confronted by Theresa May, the then Home Secretary, in her speech to the Police 
Federation in 2014. This speech is significant because Mrs May departed from a stance of 
uncritical support for the police, which Chapters 2 and 3 noted as the common 
government position. In criticising the Police Federation for its encouragement of officers 
to be uncooperative with the IPCC, May also came very close to breaking with the tradition 
of presenting police malpractice as a matter of a few bad apples. She listed a catalogue of 
misconduct by high ranking officers and scandals that had a systemic flavour:  
Allegations of rigged recorded crime statistics. The sacking of PCs Keith Wallis, 
James Glanville and Gillian Weatherley after ‘Plebgate’. Worrying reports by the 
inspectorate about stop and search and domestic violence. The Herne Review 
into the conduct of the Metropolitan Police Special Demonstration Squad. The 
Ellison Review into allegations of corruption during the investigation of the 
murder of Stephen Lawrence. Further allegations that the police sought to smear 
Stephen’s family.  
She then proceeded: 
I know that the vast majority of police officers are dedicated, honourable men 
and women who want to serve their communities and bring criminals to justice. 
 





But when you remember the list of recent revelations about police misconduct, 
it is not enough to mouth platitudes about ‘a few bad apples’; The problem 
might lie with a minority of officers, but it is still a significant problem, and a 
problem that needs to be addressed (emphasis added)  
Ultimately, however, she reverted to bad apple reasoning:  
[I]it cannot be right when officers under investigation by the IPCC comply 
with the rules by turning up for interview but then refuse to cooperate 
and decline to answer questions.  Such behaviour – which I am told is 
often encouraged by the Federation – reveals an attitude that is far 
removed from the principles of public service felt by the majority of police 
officers (emphasis added). 
Despite this official rhetoric of support for the bad apple view of officer misconduct, and 
lack of cooperation with IPCC investigatory processes, May confirmed in the speech that 
she was “willing to grant the IPCC more powers and reform the organisation further if that 
is what is needed”.  As regards some aspects of the police complaints system it appears 
that this is what the PACA has done.  
Most notably, section 20(1) of the PACA gives the IPCC significant powers in relation to 
the seizure and retention of evidence. In addition, Schedule 5 of the PACA reduces the 
police ability to delay IPCC involvement in cases by increasing IPCC powers to investigate 
any matter that comes to its attention without needing to wait for a referral by the police. 
The PACA also simplifies the mechanisms for handling mandatory referrals to the IPCC 
which it decides not to investigate itself and grants the IPCC greater control over these 
cases.156 It does however stop short of placing officers under a duty to answer IPCC 
questions concerning investigations, which the Home Secretary had indicated she might 
deliver and which the IPCC had specifically requested (IPCC briefing note 2016: 6).157   
 
156 PACA Schedule 5, paras 15(7) 19(4) and 26(2).  
157Chapter 3 of the PACA introduces measures permitting the IOPC to investigate concerns raised by 
whistleblowers within the police. While aspects of this reform are relevant to the investigation of police 
complaints and the police discipline process more generally, analysis of its impact would require extensive 
consideration of the literature on police occupational culture which is beyond the scope of this research. 




As the final part of the Change Programme designed to permit the IPCC to undertake more 
investigations into the most serious and sensitive cases,158 the PACA introduced reforms 
to the management structure of the IPCC and renamed it the Independent Office of Police 
Conduct (IOPC). As originally established, the IPCC comprised ten Commissioners all of 
whom were statutorily barred from having held “the office as a constable in any part of 
the United Kingdom” or having been “under the direction and control of a chief officer or 
of any person holding an equivalent office in Scotland or Northern Ireland”.159  The  
Commissioners formed the governing board of the IPCC, were responsible for the 
promotion of public confidence in the complaints system, and also oversaw some IPCC 
investigations,160 although, as noted above, several members of the investigation teams 
are ex-police officers.   
The new IOPC has a single Director General supported by a board with six members who 
comprise the Office of the Director General (the Office).161 Significantly, the statutory 
prohibition on previous involvement with the police only applies to the new Director 
General and it is possible the Office may include former police officers.162 Section 34(2) of 
PACA transfers all the current investigatory and other functions of the IPCC to the Director 
General and s34(4) directs that in carrying out his functions the Director General must 
have regard to any advice provided by the Office.  The functions of the Office include: 
ensuring that it has in place appropriate arrangements for good governance and financial 
management; determining and promoting the organisation’s strategic aims and values; 
providing support and advice to the Director General in carrying out his or her functions; 
and monitoring and reviewing the carrying out of the Director General’s functions.163 It 
remains to be seen whether this change in the organisational structure and limits placed 
on the involvement of ex-police personnel therein will impact on the functional 
independence the IOPC is able to achieve in its investigations. Interestingly, despite the 
additional powers granted to the IOPC as outlined above, this may to a large extent 
depend on how the IOPC is able to negotiate its on-going relation with the police 
 
158 See Home Office 2015 and Drew Smith 2015. 
159 PRA 2002, s9(3). 
160 https://www.ipcc.gov.uk/page/chair-and-commissioners (accessed 16.12.2017) 
161 PCA 2013, s33(5). 
162 PCA 2013, s33(6).  




themselves and the other bodies concerned with police regulation (and discussed in 
section 4.4).   
 
4.2.2 The IPCC and Internal Police Investigation/Handling of complaints. 
 
4.2.2.1 Substantiated/Upheld Police Investigated Complaints 
 
Chapter 1 pointed to the difficulty in drawing conclusions from the number of complaints 
received or the proportion upheld, and this was supported by the discussion in section 
4.1. Notwithstanding this, there has been a recurring concern that substantiation rates 
for complaints investigated by the police (in particular those involving assault and false 
arrest) are inappropriately low (Leiderbach et al, 2007:354; McLaughlin and Johansen, 
2002: 638; Saunders and Young, 2008: 302; Smith 2009: 251). A frequently quoted figure 
for substantiation rates for England and Wales for the late 20th and early 21st centuries 
is 5% (Home Office, 2004: 5; Smith, 2009a: 251; Glass, 2014: 12). It is commonly 
acknowledged that there are evidential difficulties, particularly in cases of alleged assault 
and false arrest, because the incidents which give rise to such complaints frequently arise 
in low visibility settings with few witnesses (Martin, 1993; Goldsmith, 1991a; Reiner, 1991, 
2010). Nonetheless, it is difficult to imagine that 95% of complaints are without merit and 
widescale reporting of such low substantiation rates casts doubt on the process of internal 
investigation and increases distrust in the police. 
Until 2010, complaints were not treated as substantiated unless any associated 
disciplinary proceedings concluded that the officers should receive a disciplinary sanction 
(Glass, 2014: 12).  Despite this, and notwithstanding the widely quoted figure of 5% noted 
above, according to the IPCC annual statistics, the substantiation rate started to increase 
in the early part of this century, peaking at 13% in 2004/5 and reducing to 10% in 2008/9 
(IPCC 2008/9 :27). However, in 2014, a departing IPCC commissioner, Deborah Glass, 
indicated that the 5% figure persisted until 2010, when the IPCC introduced a different 
measure such that it was sufficient for a complaint to be ‘upheld’ if it was found that any 
of the officers complained against had a case to answer (rather than substantiation which 




purportedly to overcome the impression given by low substantiation rates that 
complainants’ accounts of events were not given credence and the implication in Glass’s 
report is that the change in measure resulted in a significant increase from 5% to 14% 
(Glass, 2014: 12)164 which is misleading according to the IPCC’s own data.  
Significantly, the change from ‘substantiated’ to ‘upheld’ has had other ramifications. 
Most importantly, it has resulted in no statistics now being available on either measure 
so figures for the proportion of complaints substantiated or upheld is not now available 
to public scrutiny.  This is discussed in greater detail below.  
The change from ‘substantiated’ to ‘upheld’ has also revealed a further tension between 
the police and the IPCC.  In its 2015/6 Annual Report, the IPCC states that the change is as 
a result of a decision of the court in R (on the application of Chief Constable of West 
Yorkshire) v IPCC.165 In this case, the IPCC was found to have acted ultra vires by including 
in its investigation report a conclusion that an officer had acted unlawfully, rather than 
limiting itself to a recommendation that disciplinary proceedings should be brought (on 
the basis that their view of the evidence was that his actions were unlawful). As the IPCC 
explain:  
Data about investigation outcomes is not included in this report as it does not 
fully reflect a legal judgment which ruled that, in certain circumstances, an 
investigation into a complaint cannot conclude that an allegation is upheld or 
not upheld. The IPCC is working with police forces to ensure that when they 
record the outcome of allegations they have investigated, they do so in line with 
this judgment so that we can resume reporting this data in the future (IPCC 
annual complaints statistics 2015/16:5). 
This reasoning does not make sense in the context of the judgment, which was concerned 
with the IPCC’s reports of investigations.166 However, extracts from the IPCC statutory 
guidance of 2010 and 2015 potentially cast some light on the IPCC’s approach. It has been 
 
164 The time taken to finalise complaints resulted in it being impossible to achieve accurate records for 
comparison for a few years; however, in 2013/14 and 2014/15 an average of 14% of complaints were 
upheld. (IPCC 2014/15: 5). 
165 [2014] EWCA Civ 1367. 
166 In particular, it raises the question of why the IPCC has not reverted to publishing substantiation rates 




argued elsewhere that internal investigators in professional standards departments seek 
to preserve police autonomy over the discipline process (here articulated as autonomy 
over the balance between the official paradigm and the operational code) by adopting a 
purposely legalistic approach to complaints investigations, such that any conflict of 
evidence results in a finding that the complaint cannot be upheld (Torrible: 2016: 9). With 
this insight, the IPCC move towards a focus on whether there is a case to answer (and 
importantly, that internal investigators produce a reasoned decision for that) represents 
a clear attempt at intrusion on that ‘hallowed’ police territory. The 2010 statutory 
guidance urged investigators to adopt a professional response to conflicts of evidence:  
Where there are conflicting accounts and no other witness evidence, the 
investigator should use his or her professional judgement to consider whether 
there are any other factors which make one account more credible than the 
other and so whether the complaint is proven on the balance of probabilities. 
(IPCC SG 2010: 112).  
It is not clear what is meant by ‘professional’ in this context but following R (on the 
application of Chief Constable of West Yorkshire) v IPCC,167 the 2015 Statutory Guidance 
is decidedly more direct:  
Often investigators are faced with conflicting accounts of the facts from, for 
example, a police officer and the complainant. Sometimes an account is 
inherently implausible or is undermined by other evidence (such as CCTV or 
documentary evidence). In other cases that may not be so and therefore, at the 
time the report is being prepared, it is a case of one person’s word against the 
other. This is often the case in court proceedings and does not mean that there 
is no case to answer (IPCC SG 2015: 76). 
This suggests that the IPCC is specifically inviting the form of reasoning associated with 
the impartial normative qualities of ‘independence’ noted above. The change in wording 
from 2010 to 2015 also indicates some frustration on the part of the IPCC that internal 
 




police investigation of complaints appears not to include a sufficient weighing of the 
conflicting evidence of complainants and officers.168 
As noted in section 4.1, statistical data concerning outcomes of police internal 
investigation of complaints should be viewed with some caution. Notwithstanding this, it 
is unfortunate that there are now no centrally published figures concerning those 
occasions when officers are (or are not) held to account, either by being subject to 
disciplinary proceedings or being found guilty of a disciplinary offence. This is because the 
figures had previously been a source of public debate concerning the level of upheld or 
substantiated complaints and this debate had necessarily included consideration of 
(among other things) the ‘satisfaction of complainants’ and ‘discipline in the ranks’. The 
lack of published figures therefore draws the focus of debate away from these issues and 
permits a further shift towards ‘public confidence’ as the primary concern.  
 
4.2.2.2 Appeals against the Police Handling of Complaints  
 
Chapter 1 (at 1.1.1) pointed to IPCC statistics which reveal that in 2015/16 the IPCC upheld 
40% of appeals concerning the way the police had recorded complaints (or their failure to 
record them)(IPCC 2015/16: 7-8). The non-recording of appeals had been a concern prior 
to this and, in their 2013/14 Annual Report, the IPCC discussed the results of a sampling 
exercise they had carried out in relation to non-recording:  
We found that 36 per cent of cases sampled had been incorrectly categorised as 
fanciful, vexatious, oppressive or an abuse of procedure. In a further 10 per cent 
of cases, there was insufficient information or rationale to decide whether the 
decision was correct or not. Of particular concern, only two of the 18 cases 
sampled where the fanciful criteria was used were correctly classified and half 
of the allegedly vexatious cases were wrong (IPCC 2013/14: 33). 
This suggests a significant difference between how the IPCC and the police interpret the 
motivations of complainants and the severity of complaints, and it is valuable to reiterate 
 




here that in the same period 22% of cases which met the mandatory referral criterial to 
be passed to the IPCC were not referred (IPCC R 2015: 2). It is noteworthy then that s14 
of PACA has changed the definition of complaint so that now all expressions of 
dissatisfaction with the police are to be recorded. 
As discussed in Chapter 1 (at 1.1.1), the IPCC also upholds a very high proportion of 
appeals in relation to the police handling of complaints and IPCC research has revealed 
that the majority of appeals stemming from internal police investigation of complaints 
were upheld because insufficient evidence had been gathered or the conclusions reached 
were not sustainable on the basis of that evidence (Hagger-Johnson and Hipkin-
Chastagnol, 2011: 11). This suggests at the very least a great disparity between the police 
and the IPPC ‘s view concerning the appropriate approach to complaints investigations 
(which may of course be linked to the police assessment of the gravity of the complaints 
as noted above). 
More recent statistics reveal a continuing disparity. It is of note, given the high level of 
appeals the IPCC was upholding at the time, that, in 2012, that responsibility for some 
lower level appeals was transferred to chief officers.169 In 2015/16, the chief constables 
on average upheld just 19% of the appeals they handled. In contrast, for the same period, 
the IPCC upheld 81% of local resolution appeals and, of those, 80% were upheld because, 
in the IPCC’s view, the allegation was not suitable for local resolution and should have 
been subject to an internal investigation. It is important to underline here that this means 
that, in 80% of those appeals, the IPCC differed from the police on whether the allegation, 
if proved, could have resulted in disciplinary action against the officer (IPCC Annual 
Complaints Statistics 2015/16: 13).  
Further, in 2015/16, the IPCC upheld 41% of local investigations appeals, 86% of which 
were because the IPCC disagreed with findings of the police investigation and 56% of 
which were because it considered further investigation was necessary (IPCC 2015/16: 13). 
The 2016/17 IPCC annual report is structured very differently to previous reports and does 
not summarise the statistical data in an easily accessible format. Interestingly, in this 
 
169 Schedule 14 para 22 of the PRSRA gave the Home Secretary power to make regulations making the 
Chief Constable the relevant review body in relation some lower level complaints. Schedule 5 para 39 of 




report, the IPCC gives an account of its own performance concerning the time taken to 
complete local resolution appeals (but does not give a figure for the proportion of local 
resolution appeals upheld). The report does however confirm that the proportion of local 
investigation appeals upheld by the IPCC remains steady at 40% (IPCC 2016/17: 14). 
The continuing high level of local investigation appeals significant. As noted in section 4.1, 
policing is a complex and necessarily contested practice and police regulation is no less 
problematic. Therefore, at one level, the disparity in police and IPCC views concerning the 
gravity of complaints and what is an appropriate level of investigation is valuable in being 
able to foster meaningful deliberation about these issues. However, at another level, the 
IPCC figures and research cast official and authoritative doubt on the quality of internal 
complaints investigations that is widespread enough to preclude explanation by the 
suggestion of the occasional bad apple within professional standards departments.  
Chapter 1 explained that prior to the enactment of the PACA, the police complaints 
process operated under a three-tier system, with lower level complaints being handled by 
local resolution; intermediate complaints being subject to local investigation; and more 
serious incidents (and particularly those which concerned DSI) being referred to the IPCC. 
Given the discussion above, it is of particular note that under the PACA, the distinction 
between local resolution and local investigation has been abandoned and instead the 
‘appropriate authority’170 is required to “handle the complaint in such reasonable and 
proportionate manner as the authority determines” (emphasis added).171  
This does not give entirely unfettered discretion since the PACA stipulates that an 
investigation is deemed the appropriate response for complaints which indicate that (a) a 
person serving with the police may have committed a criminal offence or behaved in a 
manner that would justify the bringing of disciplinary proceedings; or (b) there may have 
been the infringement of a person’s rights under Article 2 or 3 of the ECHR (within the 
meaning of the Human Rights Act 1998).  Notwithstanding this, there is ample evidence 
within the current appeal statistics (discussed above) that the police view of whether a 
matter might fit into these categories is potentially different to that of the IPCC. 
 
170i.e. the body tasked with handling the complaint in accordance with the statutory procedures which in 
most instances will be the Professional Standards Officers.  




Under the PACA the newly named IOPC may review whether the outcome of a complaint 
is ‘reasonable or proportionate’ and in doing so may ‘review the findings of the 
investigation’ in respect of those complaints which were dealt with by way of an internal 
police investigation.172 The Act is poorly drafted, and it is not clear whether the review of 
the findings extends to whether the extent of the investigation was ‘reasonable and 
proportionate’ (in the IOPC’s view). However, the appropriate authority is only required 
to handle the matter in a way that it determines is reasonable so, logically, if the findings 
are consistent with what the investigating officers considered a reasonable and 
proportionate level of investigation, no further review will be possible.  
In brief, to find fault with the original finding or to determine that the extent of the original 
investigation was inadequate, is not the same as to suggest that either was unreasonable 
or disproportionate. The latter is a much narrower question which potentially 
incorporates an element of Wednesbury unreasonableness. This change therefore shifts 
the focus of the review away from the substance of the allegation against the officer(s) to 
a concern regarding the reasonableness (or otherwise) of the professional standards 
department’s response. Therefore while, in principle, review by an independent body still 
exists, the fact of independent review has been undermined and the degree of autonomy 
granted to professional standards departments commensurately increased. Further, the 
requirement that complaints be handled in ‘such reasonable and proportionate manner 
as the authority determines’ not only limits the form of review now available but will also 
limit the appeals statistics and qualitative data available regarding how internal 
investigations are conducted. This will not only suppress the opportunity for public debate 
about the internal police handling of complaints but will also substantially limit the IOPC’s 
regulatory role as discussed below. 
 
4.2.3 The IPCC’s Regulatory Role 
 
The discussion above has centred on the IPCC’s direct role in relation to either its own 
investigation of complaints or oversight of the internal handling of complaints by forces. 
However, section 10(1)(e) of the PRA also grants the IPCC a significant regulatory role 
 




which extends beyond the handling of complaints and touches on police operational 
practices. Under section 10(1)(e), the IPCC has a duty to “make such recommendations, 
and to give such advice” in relation to any “police practice, as appear, from the carrying 
out by the Commission of its other functions, to be necessary or desirable” (emphasis 
added). 
The IPCC has been proactive in the exercise of this duty. Section 4.2.2.1 noted that 
complaints statistics are no longer published. The IPCC does, however, produce and 
publish a considerable amount of qualitative and quantitative data concerning its findings 
in appeals cases. It also extracts and collates the complaints and DSI data it receives and, 
together with the appeals data, uses these to produce recommendations relating to police 
practice in accordance with s10(1)(e).  Further s139 of the Antisocial Behaviour, Crime and 
Policing Act 2014 requires forces to formally respond to the IPCC recommendations, 
outlining what action they will take in relation to IPCC recommendations and, importantly, 
if they are proposing to take no action, to explain why not. It also requires the IPCC to 
publish both the recommendations and the police response.  
The ability of the IPCC to make recommendations, and the requirement for forces to 
produce written responses to those recommendations, is a significant intrusion into police 
autonomy over operational practices. Further, the requirement for publication of both 
the recommendations and the responses adds transparency to this aspect of police 
regulation.  PRA, s10(1)(e) therefore permits the police complaints process to contribute 
to the legitimacy of the police in a way that spans both organisational and constitutional 
legitimacy by creating channels through which information that would inform deliberative 
debate can pass into the public sphere. This would be greatly enhanced by publication of 
fuller complaints statistics and (as discussed in detail in chapters 5 and 8) data concerning 
police actions. It is also important to reiterate, as set out above, that the PACA will reduce 
the IOPC’s capacity to produce recommendations by limiting its de facto role in relation 
to appeals and thereby reducing the data to which it has access in preparing them.   
Given the analysis in the preceding subsections, it of note that the PACA is described as 
injecting increased independence into the police complaints process.173 This is largely 
 




because it has extended PCCs’ duties to include oversight of how their force handles 
complaints and given them the option to take responsibility for some aspects of 
complaints handling. The extended role of PCCs is discussed in section 4.3 below. 
 
4.3 Independence, Police and Crime Commissioners, the PACA and Thick 
Proceduralisation  
 
In 2010, the Coalition Government proposed some fundamental reforms to police 
governance which would later form part of the PRSRA. Significantly, the consultation 
document was entitled Policing in the 21st Century: Reconnecting Police and the People 
(Cm 7925 2010).  
This paper signals the most radical change to policing in 50 years. We will 
transfer power in policing – replacing bureaucratic accountability with 
democratic accountability (Cm 7925 2010: 2). 
There was a perception that police authorities were ineffective in holding the police to 
account and had become “remote and invisible” (Cm 7925 2010: 2). The PRSRA therefore 
replaced them with locally elected Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs). While chief 
constables retain operational independence,174 it is for the PCCs to secure the 
“maintenance of the police force for that area” (s1(6)(a)) and “secure that the police force 
is efficient and effective” (s1(6)(b)).  Home Office targets have been abolished and instead 
local targets can now be determined by PCCs who are tasked with creating local policing 
plans responsive to local concerns.175  
This reform was controversial. While, as noted above, the Home Office heralded PCCs as 
a breakthrough for the democratic accountability of policing, commentators have 
highlighted the narrow ‘criminal catching’ conception of the police function inherent in 
PCCs’ powers (Crawford, 2013; Loader, 2013; Reiner 2013).  Further, in a way which aligns 
with the concerns raised in this thesis about the instrumental impact of an emphasis on 
‘public confidence’ in the context of police complaints, Crawford warns of the idea of 
 
174 As noted in chapter 1, the extent to which chief constables’ operational independence is truly 
preserved is contested (see Crawford, 2013; Lister 2013).     




‘democratic policing’ becoming reinterpreted in a “consumerist” sense as “concerned 
with giving the majority what it wants” (Crawford, 2013:14). 
The complex broader role of PCCs in policing and police governance is beyond the scope 
of this research.176 It is relevant however to note that while under the PRSRA PCCs had a 
general duty to hold chief officers to account (which implicitly included the internal 
handling of complaints), the PACA makes this duty explicit.177 It also makes PCCs 
responsible for lower level appeals178 and grants them the power to deal with lower level 
service delivery complaints or elect to become the single point of contact for complainants 
for those matters which are not investigated independently by the IOPC.179 This latter 
power is particularly significant because undertaking that function will potentially give 
PCCs insights into the police internal investigation process. This may, in turn, provide data 
upon which they can exercise their overarching new express duties in relation to the way 
chief officers handle complaints.180  
It is necessary to explore how the involvement of PCCs with the police complaints process 
might sit within the framework of organisational and constitutional legitimacy developed 
for this research. That PCCs are democratically elected resonates with notions of 
constitutional values, and the requirement that they liaise with various groups in society 
aligns with the ideal of a properly functioning communicative sphere. The success of PCCs 
in this regard is, of course, difficult to measure, but some observations can be made.  
It is valuable to consider how representative PCCs are of local communities and the extent 
to which the democratic accountability they purportedly bring to policing is meaningful in 
practice. There have now been two rounds of local PCC elections, one in 2012 and he 
second more recently in 2016. The legitimacy of PCCs was significantly undermined by 
extremely low voter turn-out (14.7% overall) in the 2012 elections (Crawford, 2013: 7). In 
addition, in 2012 approximately 19% of potential voters did not believe police officials 
should be elected; 45% felt they lacked sufficient information to decide between 
 
176 For an interesting discussion of PCCs’ impact on the ‘contracting out’ of policing services, see Crawford 
2014a. 
177 PACA, s22. 
178Schedule 5, para 39.  
179 PACA, s13. 




candidates; and 18% were not interested (Crawford, 2013: 7). Further, in 2012 only 14.6% 
and in 2016 only 17.5% of elected PCCs were women and the figures for non-white 
candidates were 0% in 2012 and 2.5% in 2016. (Johnson and Pattie, 2014: 218). These 
figures suggest that overall PCCs are not representative of the communities they serve 
(Mawby and Smith, 2013: 28). Further, analysis of election manifestos and public 
statements in the run up to the first round of PCC elections also revealed a focus on “apple 
pie populist” issues and did not suggest a “well informed and constructive debate about 
policing and community safety” (Crawford, 2013: 6).  
It is of course possible that the electoral turnout and the background of PCCs is not 
indicative of the extent to which they are able to forge close links with community groups 
and act as representatives of community concerns when forming the policing plans of 
which chief constables must take account. Figures for the 2016 elections potentially 
support this contention with an increase in the overall turnout at the May 2016 PCC 
elections to 27.3% (Electoral Commission, 2016: 6). However, Electoral Commission 
Research in relation to the 2016 poll also found that the majority of their respondents did 
not understand the role of PCCs, despite the fact that they had been in operation for a full 
four-year term (Electoral Commission, 2016: 7). People also reported finding it hard to 
access information relating to local PCC candidates, and PCC candidates who responded 
to the Electoral Commissions’ research were “overwhelmingly negative” about the 
arrangements put in place by the Government for candidates to communicate their views 
to voters (Electoral Commission, 2016:7). 
Another important observation is that while PCCs’ role is to operate as a democratically 
accountable check on how forces are run, there is no bar on former police officers 
standing. In 2012 19.5% and currently 12.5% of PCCs are former police officers with a very 
high proportion (65.8% in 2012 and 52.5% in 2016) having some criminal justice 
background (Mawby and Smith, 2016: 26-28). This is significant at two levels.  
The hypothetical idealisation delineated in Chapter 1 suggested a mapping between the 
organisational legitimacy of the police, the police complaints process, and the idea of 
administrative action legitimated by thick proceduralisation. It is not clear what 
proportion of PCCs will elect to take on the optional additional roles concerning police 




electorates, that engagement may include some of the elements of translation and thick 
proceduralisation that Black envisages. The organisational legitimacy of the police may 
thus be advanced by, for example, PCCs operating as a conduit between the police and 
complainants. Such a mechanism (when working well) may also increase transparency and 
thereby facilitate nuanced normative debate around how the complaints and discipline 
process should operate.181 However, notwithstanding the democratic process by which 
PCCs are appointed, an ex-police officer may seem considerably less approachable than a 
local representative with a non–police background, particularly to those sectors of the 
community who have least trust in the police.  
In any event, a PCC who is an ex police officer will (almost inevitably) have a similar habitus 
to that of the chief constable and other senior officers, and therefore, may find it difficult 
to offer the form of translation envisaged by Black as an aspect of thick proceduralisation 
(as discussed in Chapter 1 at 1.5). In addition, a central facet of organisational legitimacy 
as delineated in Chapter 1 is that the police as an organisation must demonstrate that 
they continue to be worthy of the mandate to use coercive powers against citizens. The 
role envisaged for PCCs has the potential to operate well but at the same time it separates 
the police from the public, making them more remote and less accessible.  
The police complaints system provides other mechanisms which create the potential for 
thick proceduralisation. The IPCC has undertaken an extensive programme of community 
and stakeholder engagement. It has held public meetings regionally and developed one-
to-one engagement with key stakeholders in relation to critical incidents. These include, 
for example, groups representing victims of domestic violence, and BME and LBGT 
members of the community. It has also established an external stakeholder group 
(including representatives from bodies such as Inquest and Refuge), which meets 
quarterly to identify and discuss “key strategic issues that have an impact on public 
confidence in the police complaints system” (IPCC 2015/16: 14). These engagement 
processes provide feedback to the IPCC concerning its own operations. They also 
potentially include forums for thick proceduralisation as between the IPCC and the 
 
181 Loader contends that PCCs are “no substitute for mechanism of continuous public engagement with 
and deliberation about local crime and policing issues” (Loader, 2013: 47) and argues that the mark of a 




representatives or members of the groups themselves. However, as discussed in this 
chapter (and borne out in the empirical data discussed in Chapter 9) the relationship 
between the police and the IPCC makes it extremely unlikely that the IPCC could act as 
the sort of conduit between the police and the public that Black envisages. 
The PACA also provides that charities and advocacy groups, for example, Liberty or 
Inquest etc might apply to be designated as capable of making ‘Super-Complaints’182 and 
this may provide a further structure for translation and thick proceduralisation. Super-
complaints would, in the first instance, be made to the head of HMICFRS183 for matters 
concerning “a feature, or combination of features, of policing in England and Wales by 
one or more than one police force [that] is, or appears to be, significantly harming the 
interests of the public”.184  This mechanism is a potentially powerful way of bringing to 
light the police practices with which this research is chiefly concerned.  However, as noted 
above, a facet of police organisational legitimacy is that the police are connected to the 
community they serve and for that reason would strive to learn lessons from the 
complaints process. In contrast, the role of the PCCs, the IOPC, and super-complaints 
collectively point to a recognition that the police as an organisation does not have the 
ability or inclination to learn lessons from complaints in that way.  
A recurring theme in this Chapter is the concern that recourse to the idea of increased 
‘independence’ within the police complaints process may be used to (or in any event 
result in) increased public confidence in the police in circumstances where it is not clear 
what practical difference the purported increased independence might make. Importantly 
therefore, how ‘independence’ is conceived and how it is anticipated it will contribute 
positively to the complaints and discipline process, is an important point to consider in 
the empirical analysis in Part Two.  
 
4.4 Ethics, Integrity and Legitimacy 
 
 
182 PACA, s26. 
183 Discussed below. Under PACA, s25 the Home Secretary is empowered to make regulations concerning 
the operation of the Super-Complaints system which may confer powers or duties onto the College of 
Policing, the HMICFRS, or the IOPC. 




The reforms brought about by the PACA must be understood in the context of the broader 
police regulatory framework. Significantly the consultation exercise for the PACA was 
conducted under the title “Improving police Integrity: reforming the police complaints and 
disciplinary systems”.185 It is therefore important to recognise the other bodies concerned 
with what ‘police integrity’ entails and how it might be enforced. 
The College of Policing (COP) was established in 2012 to act as the professional body for 
policing, with responsibility for overseeing entry qualifications and overall ‘professional 
development’.186 The Police Conduct Regulations187 require officers to act with honesty 
and integrity and the COP has issued a Code of Ethics188 (the Code) detailing the standards 
of professional behaviour which should be used to “inform any assessment or judgment 
of conduct when deciding if any formal action is to be taken under the Conduct 
Regulations” (Home Office, 2015b: 11). The COP therefore has considerable control over 
standard-setting for officer conduct and it remains to be seen whether this may conflict 
with recommendations of the IOPC under s10(1)(e) of the PRA (as discussed above) and, 
if so, how any conflict might be resolved. 
Importantly (in the context of the findings in Chapter 8), the Code details what the COP 
means by ‘integrity’. In general terms, at the start of the Code ‘integrity’ is defined as “you 
always do the right thing” (COP, 2014: 3). This is followed by several examples which 
include not “knowingly ma[king] false, misleading or inaccurate oral or written statements 
in any professional context”, “neither solicit[ing] nor accept[ing] the offer of any gift, 
gratuity or hospitality that could compromise your impartiality” and “ensur[ing] your 
decisions are not influenced by improper considerations of personal gain” (COP, 2014: 5). 
(emphasis added). These criteria therefore include both corruption for personal gain and 





186 See Anti-Social Behaviour and Crime Act 2014, s123. The College of Policing’s role overlapped 
considerably with the statement of purpose of the Association of Chief Police Officers which was 
subsequently replaced by the considerably less powerful National Police Chiefs Council. 
187 Police (Conduct) Regulations 2012. 




It is important to note however that ‘integrity’ is given narrower meaning by Her Majesty’s 
Inspectorate of the Constabulary (HMIC)(recently renamed the HMICFRS).189 Since 2014 
the HMIC has been conducting inspections of police forces by reference to the ‘PEEL 
assessment’ with ‘PEEL’ denoting ‘Police Effectiveness, Efficiency and Legitimacy’.190 As 
noted in Chapter 1, legitimacy is a complex and contested concept. Therefore, the 
supposition that the HMIC can declare that the police are legitimate requires some 
justification. The HMIC has stated that ‘legitimacy’ will be assessed “in relation to whether 
the force operates fairly, ethically and within the law”191 and the focus of the assessment 
will be on: public perceptions of the force; the force’s response to calls for service; the 
quality of the data provided by the force; and the extent to which it ensures its workforce 
acts with integrity.192 The ordering of the questions is interesting and while ‘integrity’ does 
feature, albeit in fourth place, it is narrowly construed and measured by reference to the 
HMIC’s own report, Integrity Matters. Importantly, this report adopted a working 
definition which equated ‘lack of integrity’ with abuse of authority or corruption for 
personal gain (HMIC 2015: 32). Therefore, HMIC assessments of ‘legitimate’ police 
conduct specifically excludes precisely those abuses of police power with which this 
research is concerned and in relation to which the PACA has given the police increased 
autonomy. Moreover, the claim to legitimacy is a powerful tool in the quest to secure 
public confidence in the police. As the body which is deemed able to determine force 
legitimacy, the HMICFRS is granted a specific form of authority which ultimately may also 
come into tension with IOPC findings concerning police performance.   
 
Conclusion and Themes 
 
 
189 Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary Fire and Rescue Services. The HMICFRS has its origins in the 
County and Borough Police Act 1856. Its role was formalised under s38 of the Police Act 1964 which 
required inspectors to report to the Home Secretary concerning forces’ efficiency and effectiveness. Its 
role has subsequently been clarified and amended by the Police Act 1996 and the PRA, and it has a broad 
remit to inspect constabularies efficiency and effectiveness. 
190 See the HMIC Announcement at https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/our-work/peel-
assessments/ 
191 Ibid. 
192 HMIC 2014 PEEL Methodology available at 
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Chapter 3 raised a concern that measures which have ‘increasing public confidence in the 
police’ as their primary aim, may ironically operate to permit decreased scrutiny of 
discipline processes and thereby increase police autonomy over them.  This Chapter has 
probed the relationship between public confidence in the police and independent or 
external oversight of, (or involvement in) the police complaints process. Section 4.1 
argued that a core element of ‘policing’ (of how the police as an organisation operates) 
lies in balancing the official paradigm and the operational code. This explains police 
resistance to independent oversight mechanisms that may interfere with police 
autonomy over the balancing process.193 Importantly, it also deepens our understanding 
of the ‘public confidence’ the police seek, which is public confidence that they will 
undertake that balancing process ‘appropriately’ and in a well-motivated way. This 
underscores the important distinction between organisational legitimacy and public 
confidence. Both are fluid and nebulous ideas. However, to frame the issues in terms of 
organisational legitimacy is to invite normative debate concerning what is meant by 
‘appropriate’ and ‘well motivated’ in the above context. By comparison, a measure of 
public confidence is relatively vacuous. An important element of this thesis (as elaborated 
in the following chapters) is that the publication of claims data from police actions would 
make this distinction publicly clearer and thereby promote the ongoing deliberation that 
police legitimacy requires.   
This chapter has also extended the observation made in Chapter 3 that commitment to 
the official paradigm leads to a focus on the form of external oversight mechanisms rather 
than the substance of what they achieve. It has noted how the notion of an oversight and 
investigatory body that is independent may increase public confidence in the police 
complaints system (or indeed the police) when what is meant by ‘independent’ in this 
context is not clear. Drawing a distinction between functional and organisational 
independence, it noted that the former is suggestive of impartial reasoning and 
consequently a system that is supporting the constitutional legitimacy of the police (at 
some levels). However, this chapter also explored several ways in which the IPCC does not 
fully enjoy either form of independence from the police. In particular, it has noted how 
 
193 It is valuable to recognise how this resonates with descriptions of the role of constable (set out in 
Chapter 2) and the autonomy constables exercised in negotiation of a hierarchical line between the 




the IPCC’s investigations may be limited by reliance on police ancillary services (forensic 
services etc) and by lack of police cooperation in relation to access to police witnesses. 
Likewise, the proportion of ex-police officers servicing as IPCC investigators has caused 
disquiet. The proportion of ex officers has been reduced and the IOPC will have increased 
powers in relation to its own investigations, which does increase its own organisational 
independence and potentially therefore also its functional independence. However, it is 
not clear that this is sufficient to secure the impartiality and rigour that the label 
‘independent’ implies. In addition, the IOPC’s increased investigatory powers must to be 
viewed in the context other reforms introduced by the PACA which reduce its oversight 
and regulatory capacities.  
The ‘independence’ of the police complaints system as whole is potentially increased by 
provisions in the PACA for democratically elected PCCs to have express responsibility for 
their forces’ handling of complaints and the possibility of charities and advocacy groups 
being able to bring super-complaints concerning policing practices (particularly among 
marginalised groups in society). This chapter has however questioned the independence 
of many PCCs and the degree to which they are representative of the communities they 
serve and drawn attention to the need to focus on what ‘independence’ in the context of 
the police complaints process is conceived as seeking to achieve.  
This Chapter has added to the themes in earlier chapters by suggesting that the empirical 
analysis in Part 2 should include an assessment of how ‘independence’ is conceived to 
contribute to the police complaints and discipline process. It has also honed the argument 
in earlier chapters concerning public confidence and thereby invited a specific enquiry 
regarding how public confidence is conceived as related to independence (however 
viewed).  The ability of the police complaints system as a whole to ensure sufficient data 
is in the public sphere for meaningful debate concerning the police complaints and 
discipline process is also highlighted. 
The following chapter considers the role and function of police actions and discusses their 
potential to contribute to the regulation of officer conduct and or police organisational 













This chapter outlines the ways in which police actions are distinct from other tortious 
claims, particularly actions founded in negligence and defamation. It argues that failure 
to recognise these differences has permitted the constitutional importance of police 
actions to be undermined in several ways. Section 5.1 explores the unique and public 
nature of police actions. Section 5.2 highlights how the use of juries and the availability of 
aggravated and exemplary damages combine further to distinguish police actions from 
other tortious claims. Section 5.3 focuses on the practical constraints which limit the 
contribution police actions can make to the constitutional legitimacy of the police, 
pointing particularly to the settlement of police actions, and how little is known about this 
process.  
5.1 Intentional Torts, Negligence and the Public Nature of Police Actions  
 
The English tort system was originally formulary in the sense that it was dominated by 
procedural concerns which only permitted claims that could be presented as particular 
forms of action (Cane, 1997: 4). This restrictive approach was gradually replaced during 
the 19th Century by concerns about the substance of the complaint and whether the 
claimant had a good cause of action (Cane, 1997: 4).  At this stage however, tort (in terms 
of a duty of care) only existed in “isolated pockets”, for example in the context of specific 
relationships or where one party had control over a dangerous item (Horsey and Rackley, 
2016: 32). The tendency for tort to be seen in more holistic terms was given further 
impetus by the social and economic changes in the 19th and 20th Centuries and the 
growth of actions founded in negligence (Cane, 1997: 21). The development of the tort of 
negligence in the 20th Century coincided with the growth of large commercial enterprises 
which were able to bear the cost of litigation. The expansion of the law of negligence was 
therefore linked to the growth of commercial interests carrying an ‘enterprise’ duty of 




but also because of their “organisational capacity to manage the risk of injury” (Deakin 
2012: 254). Ibbetson argues that these economic changes coincided with an intellectual 
shift whereby the ideology of tort built on moral principle and based on an assessment of 
actors’ shortcomings, was replaced with the sense that liability should attach for failure 
to take reasonable care for others in the course of pursuing one’s own economic self-
interest (Ibettson, 2001).194  
However, the formulary origins of tort law are arguably preserved in the context of police 
actions. The three intentional torts that feature most prominently in police actions are 
assault (and/or battery), false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution (Smith, 2003: 
414). This distinguishes police actions from actions in negligence. Most importantly, proof 
of damage is of fundamental (definitional) importance to an action in negligence (Horsey 
and Rackley, 2016: 30). In contrast assault, battery and false imprisonment are a species 
of trespass to the person and actionable per se. Their function is vindicatory, and damages 
are awarded in recognition of the right that has been infringed.195  
It is important to underscore this difference between police actions and negligence 
actions for three key reasons. First, there are elements of tort law reasoning which are 
connected to the development of negligence and which are consequently of little 
relevance to police actions. Most importantly, the ‘intellectual shift’ from moral principle 
to reasonable care (noted above) may be apt in relation to the management of avoidable 
risks but does not easily translate into the infliction of intentional torts. Arguably, this shift 
is reflected to some extent in the distinction between constitutional legitimacy (as a set 
of moral principles) and organisational legitimacy (as a series of practical concerns). 
However, it is contended that specific arguments need to be advanced as to where the 
balance between constitutional and organisational legitimacy should lie and it is 
inappropriate for such arguments to be based on the same rationales that underpin the 
law of negligence.  
 
194 For a discussion of the political and ideological underpinnings of the fault principle, see Horsey and 
Rackley 2016: 37-39, and, for a more detailed critique, see Conaghan and Mansell, 1999: 81-104.  




The increasing availability of insurance is significant in the development and perception 
of tort law as being dominated by negligence actions.196 At the same time, vicarious 
liability and the availability of insurance combine to undermine the deterrence rationales 
for negligence.197 This has shifted debate towards the essentially political question of how 
best to provide compensation for injury resulting from the carelessness of others, 
producing too a concern about the existence (or otherwise) of a ‘compensation culture’ 
(Lewis et al 2006; Morris 2007, 2012). The outcome is a focus on compensation as the 
primary aim of any tortious action. However, political arguments concerning loss 
distribution do not easily translate into a police context and in any event, as discussed 
below, the available evidence suggests that claimants in police actions are not primarily 
concerned with compensation (Smith, 2003: 419, McCulloch and Palmer, 2005: 90-94). 
Second, (and relatedly) the ‘harm’ to which awards of damages are directed in police 
actions is of a fundamentally different character than the harm in negligence actions or 
indeed actions in defamation.198 In personal injury claims, basic damages may be awarded 
in respect of the calculable pecuniary losses suffered by the claimant and can include sums 
for non-pecuniary losses which aim to compensate for ‘pain, suffering and loss of amenity’ 
(Horsey and Rackley, 2016: 618-619).  Pain and suffering are assessed subjectively with 
pain being understood as the “immediately felt effect on the nerves and brain of some 
injury” while ‘suffering’  represents “the distress which is not felt as being directly 
connected with any bodily condition” and would include “fright at the time of the injury, 
fear of future incapacity, either as to health or possible death, to sanity or to the ability to 
make a living and humiliation, sadness and embarrassment caused by disfigurement” 
(McGregor, 2009: 57-58). The sums awarded for intangible elements of personal injury 
are “arbitrary” in that there is no demonstrably correct answer to the question of how 
much the claimant should be awarded. The only way justice can be achieved is by seeking 
consistency of approach (McBride and Bagshaw, 2012: 758-9). For general personal injury 
cases, basic damages are assessed by judges alone and consistency of approach in the 
 
196 It is significant that the majority of tort actions are brought in respect of workplace and motor injuries 
where insurance is compulsory (Lewis and Morris 2012).      
197 For a general discussion see Giliker, 2010: 241-247. 
198 This point is made here because, as discussed below, Lord Woolf conflates police actions and 




non-pecuniary element of awards is achieved by reference to directories of previous 
awards given in similar circumstances, such as the Judicial Studies Board Guidelines.  
The function of basic damages in defamation actions is vindication of reputation 
(McGregor 2009: 1527).199 The courts’ task is to determine whether the purportedly 
defamatory material was indeed defamatory at law, but no damage automatically follows. 
Damages in defamation actions function as indicators that the claimant did not behave in 
the way suggested in the defamatory material and a claimant of low repute might receive 
nominal damages with higher rewards reflecting damage to the esteem in which the 
claimant was held. In Sutcliffe v Pressdram,200 the judge described “what the lawyers call 
vindication” as the ability of Ms. Sutcliffe to later be able to say, “I was awarded X pounds 
by a jury” as a way of showing that she “was untruthfully accused of the matters she was 
accused of”.201    
In contrast, in trespass to the person cases, it is the fact of the finding of the court that 
vindicates the right. This is seen most starkly in the finding in Ashley v Chief Constable of 
Sussex202 that an action in battery could proceed, even though it could not result in any 
greater pecuniary gain for the claimants. Hence, while in defamation actions damages are 
awarded to vindicate the claimant’s reputation, in assault, battery and false imprisonment 
it is the bringing of the action that serves to vindicate the right not to be subject to the 
trespass.   
On McGregor’s understanding, basic damages in defamation actions operate to “show 
publicly that the claimants’ reputation has been wrongly attacked” (McGregor, 2009: 5), 
while in claims for false imprisonment, the damages are “to show publicly that the 
imprisonment was unjustified” (McGregor, 2009: 5). There is a subtle but significant 
difference between these formulations. In the first, the vindication is of reputation alone; 
 
199 In Mosley v New Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] E.M.L.R. 20, p 679, 13 Eady J appeared to include a 
measure of damages for vindication of Mr Mosley’s right not to have been subject to the unlawful 
intrusion. However, this was in the context of a claim for breach of confidence and the right to privacy, 
and it is not clear that this potentially vindicatory award was given in relation to the common law claim or 
the breach of Article 8 of the ECHR. In addition, while damages for vindication of a right have been given 
by the Privy Council in cases brought in Caribbean countries, these are in respect of breaches of specific 
constitutional rights and were not awarded at common law (McGregor, 2009: 430 and 1715-1716).    
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in the second the vindication is both of reputation and is related in some way to the fact 
of imprisonment. In Thompson and Hsu, Lord Woolf referred to the role of the jury in 
police actions as important to “safeguard of the liberty of the individual citizen”.203 This 
suggests that damages in police actions are in respect of a harm which is qualitatively 
different to the harm in a defamation action because it is a harm relating to the 
relationship between the individual and the state.204   
The harm to which the non-vindicatory element of basic damages in police actions is 
addressed is therefore, relational. If an officer detains me for five minutes in a doorway, I 
have a right to nominal damages. If I am held for two hours in a cell I suffer some 
additional harm and that harm is greater again if I am detained overnight. It may be 
argued that this is because my right has been more seriously interfered with. The nominal 
damages which appear acceptable for the detention in the doorway do not seem so 
appropriate in relation to the greater infringement caused by the longer period of 
detention205. However, that is to bring compensation reasoning into the vindicatory role 
of these actions and, in any event, this does not appear to be the position at law. The on-
going damage is temporal in nature and consequently relational in character.  
Further, in the context of police actions, the nature of the parties is key to the nature of 
the harm which is all the greater because it is inflicted by parties with a state mandate so 
to do.  This is illustrated by the following remarks made by a young man from an ethnic 
minority background, commenting on his response to being stopped and searched by 
police: 
I felt alright before I was stopped, I felt like this is my country, I was born here 
and there are so many parts of me that are all London… After the second time I 
was stopped, I started to feel like people see what they want to see. The police 
see me as a terrorist and then I’m invisible… How would you feel? (Parmer, 2001: 
377).  
 
203 1998] Q.B. 498 at 513F. 
204 The Law Commission (Cmnd 247 2015:5) was robust in its suggestion that this role for the jury should 
be abandoned but they did not address the constitutional importance of juries in the context of police 
actions.  




Commenting on interviews with claimants in police actions, Smith notes how they not 
only “expressed fear at the fact that they had suffered at the hands of members of the 
public institution responsible for their personal safety. Their fears extended beyond the 
dread of a repeat experience to a deep-rooted sense of insecurity and more general 
feelings of alienation” (Smith, 2003: 416). Hence the harm is not limited to the claimant’s 
relationship with the police but extends to the way the claimant self-identifies within 
society more generally.   
This point can be underscored by reference to Glanville Williams’ analysis of the aims of 
tort damages. Williams distinguishes between compensation per se (which can justify the 
imposition of strict liability) and ethical compensation.206 In contrast to simple 
compensation, ethical compensation has a social function in the sense of being the right 
thing to do (Williams 1939: 142). Williams draws on the following example: 
If a State commits an international delict, it will, if law abiding, pay 
damages to the injured party. That it makes this payment is due to the 
sentiment of justice and to the realisation that since the rules of 
international law serve a useful purpose, their violations must be 
followed by an effort to make amends (Williams, 1939: 143). (emphasis 
added) 
In this example, the award not only seeks to repair the relationship between the two 
parties to the dispute. It also represents an acknowledgement of the importance of the 
structure within which that relationship exists and the value of the relationship between 
the parties in the context of their respective relationships with all the other players in the 
system.207 
Williams suggests appeasement as an alternative potential function of tortious damages. 
On this view damages are directed towards preventing any continuance of the disruption 
 
206 Williams suggests that a difficulty with ethical compensation as a theory for the aims of tort is that if 
the motivation is moral, amends must be made voluntarily (1939: 143). However, the fact of litigation 
does not necessarily mean that subsequent payment is not voluntary. In the context of police actions, for 
example, it might be appropriate for the matter to be pursued to trial (rather than being settled) to obtain 
a determination of the facts. It does not follow that if it is held that officers’ actions were unlawful, the 
resulting payment is involuntary. 
207 This interpretation of the role of police actions accords with the arguments in the parliamentary debate 




to relationships as a result of the infliction of harm on one party by another (Williams, 
1939: 138). The logic here is that the victim is consequently less likely to exact other forms 
of unlawful revenge on the party that caused the injury. Importantly, in these 
circumstances, the damages are not serving a compensatory function, but are again 
relational and restorative in nature, albeit that the restorative aim is motivated by a desire 
to discourage breaches of the peace or of the criminal law.   
The relational nature of the harm (and the consequent public nature of police actions) is 
further underscored by claimants’ motivations in bringing a police action. The available 
evidence suggests that the primary motivation of claimants in police actions is not 
compensation but the desire to achieve personal vindication and a public-spirited concern 
to bring the matter to light and thereby prevent similar incidents in the future (Smith 
2003: 417-420).208 It is particularly significant, therefore, that they are also driven by 
distrust in the police complaints system to perform that function (Smith, 2003: 419, 
McCulloch and Palmer, 2005: 90-94). 
Felstiner’s ideas concerning naming, blaming and claiming were discussed in the 
Introduction to Part One. There, attention was drawn to the complex social practices 
whereby ‘naming’ an incident as injurious or wrongful may transform into assigning blame 
and ultimately bringing a claim. Many people do not make complaints against the police 
despite perceived mistreatment (Maguire and Corbett, 1991: 53) and the process of 
bringing a complaint may be particularly daunting for some members of the community 
for a variety of reasons (Maguire and Corbett, 1991: 55; Smith, 2009). The additional step 
of taking matters to a formal legal forum represents a significant additional filter. Most 
people are “lumpers” in that they rarely pursue their sense of grievance to a public legal 
forum (Halliday et al, 2012: 348) and the types of problems most likely to be ‘lumped’ 
include unfair treatment by the police (Genn, 1999: 250).  
It is noteworthy therefore that the police complaints system can play an important role in 
the transformative processes leading to the bringing of a claim. Moreover, it is relevant 
that while complaints will generally be made against the officers involved in the incident, 
 
208 In addition, claimants’ lawyers evidence to the 1997 HAC was that the vast majority of claimants in 
police actions were not motivated purely by fiscal concerns but were seeking recognition of the 




claims are made against the chief constable and paid out of the police fund. Therefore, 
they have the character of a claim against the police as an organisation. 
The potentially transformational impact of the complaints system raises an issue which is 
of considerable importance to this thesis. There is a presumption that police actions are 
individualistic in the sense of being concerned with officers’ conduct (subject to the 
vicarious liability of the chief constable).  However, if the complaints system is significant 
in the transformation of a dispute from blaming the officers to claiming against the chief 
constable, that transformation in fact operates in two dimensions. By this it is meant that 
as well as the aggrieved party gaining the additional motivation to invoke formal legal 
procedures in relation to the incident, there is also a qualitative transformation as to the 
nature of the claim. It is a claim against ‘the police’ – not against the officer. 
Third, while actions in negligence can be brought against public authorities, they are 
essentially private in nature (because of the emphasis on individual compensation). In 
contrast, police actions relate to intentional torts and because of the unique nature of the 
public police (as holders of the state mandate to use coercive force) they have an 
essentially public character. The ability to raise questions before the courts concerning 
whether the police mandate to use coercive powers against citizens has been exceeded is 
fundamental to that mandate being a controlled rather than arbitrary exercise of state or 
governmental power. Viewed through this lens, police actions are the linchpin of 
democratic states. The ability to hold the police effectively to account is often cited as 
being fundamental to democracy in the context of discussions concerning police 
complaints systems (Smith, 2010, 2013). However, the argument here is that police 
actions operate at a more significant level because a formal legal determination of the 
operation of the mandate concerning police powers must necessarily come prior to any 
system for internal assessment of officers’ conduct in the context of a disciplinary process. 
Indeed, the theoretical idealisation that links constitutional legitimacy to Habermas’s 
conception of deliberative democracy would require that this is articulated a little more 
carefully. For the idealisation it would be necessary to stress that the formal legal 
determination needs to be made in accordance with the legally proscribed procedures for 
that determination and that those procedures should be agreed in the context of 




in Chapter 7. For now, it is sufficient to note that on that most fundamental level, it is 
inappropriate to classify police actions as on a par with private actions between motorists 
or the claims of injured employees. These are not private claims in that sense. They have 
an underlying public quality. 
 
5.2 The Procedural Aspects of Police Actions 
 
Police actions can be distinguished from actions in negligence in two further ways; they 
may be tried in front of a jury209 and the jury may award aggravated and exemplary 
damages. The same is true of actions in defamation. However, the reasoning underpinning 
the use of juries and the availability of aggravated and exemplary damages in defamation 
cases is fundamentally different to that of police actions where they are significant 
elements in the contribution of police actions to the constitutional legitimacy of the 
police.  
 
5.2.1 Juries    
 
The roles of the jury in police actions and defamation actions share similar historical roots 
in seeking to protect citizens from oppressive state power. Fox’s Libel Act of 1792 was 
aimed at securing the freedom of the press by ensuring that questions of libel were not 
left to judges who may be “favorably disposed towards the Crown” (Nourse, 1990: 185). 
However, Nourse LJ notes that “whereas the jury was originally the means by which the 
press was protected against the Crown, it is now seen by many, not least by juries 
themselves, as the means by which the private citizen is protected against the press” 
(Nourse, 1990: 185). Hence, the public interest in libel actions, insofar as they related to 
protection from government suppression, has diminished. Importantly therefore, in 
modern day defamation actions, juries are important because of the nature of the 
allegedly injurious act. In contrast, the importance of juries in police actions remains 
rooted in the nature of the parties.  
 
209 Supreme Courts Act 1981, s69(1)(b) (for police actions this section applies to claims in malicious 





In Lister v Perryman,210  the House of Lords refined the jury’s role in deciding whether a 
constable had reasonable or probable cause to effect an arrest and limited it to finding 
the facts upon which the judge would then determine whether reasonable and probable 
cause existed. Consequently, Clayton and Tomlinson suggest that while the power for 
actions against state officials to be heard before a jury had previously been a “bulwark of 
liberty”, their role has diminished over the last century “almost to vanishing point” 
(Clayton and Tomlinson, 2004: 9). It is submitted that is an over-statement. In an action 
for malicious prosecution, for example, once there is sufficient evidence to raise the issue 
of honesty as a fact, that fact will be left to the jury.211 Since, by definition, claims for 
malicious prosecution require the claimant to establish that the defendant was acting 
maliciously, the jury will have a significant role in many such cases. Similarly, claims for 
false imprisonment will frequently be coupled with a claim for unlawful arrest which will 
involve the jury in making determinations regarding the surrounding circumstances and 
hence the competing evidence of officer and claimant. Moreover, the importance of the 
role of the jury in this context was underlined by Lord Woolf in Thompson and Hsu, where 
he stated that “very difficult issues of credibility will often have to be resolved” in such 
cases and that “it is desirable for these to be determined by the plaintiff’s fellow citizens 
rather than judges who like the police are concerned in maintaining law and order”.212   
 
5.2.2 Damages  
 
5.2.2.1 Aggravated Damages  
 
 Lord Devlin clarified the role of aggravated damages in Rookes v Barnard.213 Aggravated 
damages are available as additional compensation in circumstances where “malevolence 
or spite in the manner of committing the wrong may [have] injure[d] the plaintiff's proper 
feelings of dignity and pride”.214  
 
210 (1869) L.R. 4 HL 521. 
211  Dallison v Caffery [1965] 1 Q.B. 348 @372. 
212 [1998] Q.B. 498 at 513E –this obiter is discussed in chapter 7 (at 7.3). 
213 [1964] A.C.1129. 




The Law Commission interpreted Lord Devlin’s formulation of the circumstances when 
aggravated damages will be justified as compensation for the claimant’s “mental distress” 
(LC 247 2015: 3). Murphy argues that this is an incomplete assessment of the position. He 
points to cases where the insentient and indeed the dead have been awarded aggravated 
damages and suggests that the better view is that aggravated damages are available to 
compensate for injury to the claimant’s dignity (Murphy, 2010: 362). Similarly, Beever 
suggests that aggravated damages are available for “an injury to the victim’s moral dignity 
that results from the defendant’s denial that the victim is entitled to respect as a moral 
person” (Beever, 2003: 89).  
Significantly, this points to the nature of the dignitary interest which is protected by 
aggravated damages being different in respect of a defamation claim than in police 
actions. As Murphy correctly points out, in a defamation action the damage is not damage 
to the claimant’s self-esteem but a “diminution to the esteem in which others hold the 
claimant” (Murphy, 2010: 367). However, as noted above, arbitrary and oppressive 
treatment at the hands of state actors has the ability to injure one’s general sense of 
security and the way one self-identifies within society. This is a qualitatively different form 
of dignitary harm.  
Importantly for this discussion, aggravated damages are available not only for the initial 
tortious incident but also in relation to the conduct of the litigation concerning that 
incident.215 The chief constable is vicariously liable for the actions of his officers.216 For 
aggravated damages, however, this liability extends to the instructions given to the legal 
personnel who act for the chief constable in relation to the claim. This creates a further 
subtle difference between police actions and actions in defamation. In claims against a 
newspaper, for example, the defendant is the corporate entity responsible for publishing 
the offending material. However, with police actions, the extension of aggravated 
damages to permit additional compensation in relation to the conduct of the litigation has 
implications for how police actions are perceived more generally.217  
 
215 Thompson and Hsu [1998] C.A 498 at 516. 
216 Police Act 1964, s48,see now Police Act 1996, s88. 
217 See also the discussion in section 4.1 regarding the transformational process by which potential 




For police actions then, there is an ill-defined hybrid form of damages whereby, in 
addition to any award of damages for the initial tort, the jury also has to take account of 
how the police as an organisation has responded to the allegations concerning the 
individual officers. This again highlights the public nature of police actions. Once the claim 
has an organisational element, i.e. once there is potential for it to include a claim that, in 
addition to the original interaction between the claimant and the officers, the police as 
an organisation has been high-handed in the way the litigation is conducted, it necessarily 
has a more public flavour.  
This raises the following question. What does the way the dignitary interest that is 
protected by this organisational aspect of awards of aggravated damages in police actions 
tell us about the potential aims of these actions? The dignitary interest inheres in the right 
not to be treated in a high-handed manner by the police as an organisation, which is itself 
an embedded state actor. The harm is therefore relational in a similar manner to the 
primary right upon which the claim to basic damages is founded. Aggravated damages in 
police actions are, therefore, not purely compensatory in the way they may be perceived 
in relation to an action for defamation. Instead, like basic damages in police actions they 
are also better understood in terms of ethical compensation or appeasement. 
Furthermore, because, they also operate at an organisational level (and are awarded by a 
jury), they correspondingly operate as some acknowledgment of how the harm caused by 
oppressive or high-handed conduct on the part of the police towards one member of 
society impacts on the police-public relationship more generally.  
 
 5.2.2.2 Exemplary Damages 
 
In Rookes v Barnard,218 Lord Devlin distinguished two distinct categories of case for which 
exemplary damages may be awarded. The first is “oppressive, arbitrary or 
unconstitutional action by the servants of government”.  The second is where “the 
defendant’s conduct has been calculated by him to make a profit for himself which may 
well exceed the compensation payable to the plaintiff.”219 This second restitutionary class 
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of exemplary damages is appropriate for claims in defamation and can serve as a clear 
deterrent in ensuring that, in the classic scenario, newspapers cannot profit from 
concocting salacious stories about celebrities.  
The situation is different for exemplary damages in police actions.220 In Kuddus v Chief 
Constable of Leicestershire, Lord Nicholls suggests that the labels 'exemplary' and 
'punitive’ are synonymous.221 However, Williams delineates three functions of non-
compensatory awards of damages; vindictive, punitive and exemplary (Williams, 1939: 
148). Similarly, in Rookes v Barnard, Lord Devlin is careful to describe exemplary damages 
as suitable to “punish the defendant for his outrageous conduct, to mark [the juries’] 
disapproval of such conduct and to deter him from repeating it”.222 This tryptic of reasons 
reflects Williams’ three aims of non–compensatory awards (outlined above), which relate 
respectively to satisfaction of vengeance (and hence appeasement as an aim of tort), 
ethical retribution, and deterrence.  
Ethical retribution is purely punitive. It stems from the mere “postulate” (Williams, 1939: 
141) that wrong should be punished and cannot be referred to any other principle and 
exists on its own as a position that payment of damages is an “evil for the offender” 
(Williams, 1939: 141). However, conceiving of exemplary awards in police actions in this 
narrow punitive way fails to recognise the relational role of the torts in this type of action 
(as discussed above).  
This conception of exemplary awards as disassociated from any deterrent or restorative 
rationales also fails to recognise their essentially public nature. In discussing the head of 
oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional action by the servants of government, Lord 
Devlin cites Huckle v Money223 with approval:  
 
220 It is recognised the Lord Devlin’s first head covers oppressive and arbitrary behaviour by state actors 
and would therefore extend to prison staff etc. The argument here simply seeks to distinguish police 
actions from defamation claims at a doctrinal level.  
221 [2002] 2 A.C. 122 at 141. See Beever (2003) for a discussion of the inappropriate use of punishment 
based on the civil standard of proof. 
222 In this, Lord Devlin is following Pratt CJ in Wilkes v Wood (1763) Loft 1: “Damages are designed not only 
as a satisfaction to the injured person, but likewise as a punishment to the guilty, to deter from any such 
proceeding for the future, and as a proof of the detestation of the jury to the action itself.” 




…but the small injury done to the plaintiff, or the inconsiderableness of his 
station and rank in life did not appear to the jury in that striking light in which 
the great point of law touching the liberty of the subject appeared to them at 
the trial; they saw a magistrate over all the King's subjects, exercising arbitrary 
power, violating the Magna Carta, and attempting to destroy the liberty of the 
kingdom, by insisting upon the legality of this general warrant before them; they 
heard the King's Counsel, and saw the solicitor of the Treasury endeavouring to 
support and maintain the legality of the warrant in a tyrannical and severe 
manner. These are the ideas which struck the jury on the trial; and I think they 
have done right in giving exemplary damages. 
This is authority, approved by the House of Lords in Rookes v Barnard, that exemplary 
damages for executive abuse extend beyond the immediate circumstances of the alleged 
tort, to the broader context in which the action is brought.224  Arguably, this point is 
exemplified by the high levels of exemplary damages awarded by juries in the campaign 
of police actions described near the close of Chapter 3.  
In Rookes v Barnard, Lord Devlin refers to Huckle v Money as authority which clearly 
justifies “the use of the exemplary principle” as serving a “valuable purpose in restraining 
the arbitrary and outrageous use of executive power” (emphasis added).225 It is therefore 
valuable to consider how exemplary awards may function as a mechanism of restraint.  
For a publicly funded body, the payment of damages alone may potentially be an empty 
punishment with little deterrent effect (particularly if the claims may be covered by 
insurance).226 In addition, the effect of the decision in Thompson is to reduce the financial 
burden police actions place on police forces and the reasoning in Thompson does not 
stress deterrence as a feature of exemplary awards (see Chapter 7 at 6.4.2). 
There are two other ways in which exemplary damages may ‘restrain’ the use of arbitrary 
or oppressive state power. In Wilkes v Wood (again quoted in Rookes v Barnard) 
exemplary damages are described as “a punishment of the guilty, to deter from any such 
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proceeding for the future and as proof of the detestation of the jury to the action itself”.227 
This suggests that, in addition to appeasement or deterrence, exemplary awards may 
operate to restrain the police and vindicate the law by preserving the sense of outrage at 
the unlawful and unconstitutional conduct of the police. This is also implicitly accepted by 
Lord Nicholls in Kuddus v Chief Constable of Leicestershire: 
The availability of exemplary damages has played a significant role in 
buttressing civil liberties, in claims for false imprisonment and wrongful 
arrest. From time to time cases do arise where awards of compensatory 
damages are perceived as inadequate to achieve a just result between 
the parties. The nature of the defendant's conduct calls for a further 
response from the courts. On occasion, conscious wrongdoing by a 
defendant is so outrageous, his disregard of the plaintiff's rights so 
contumelious, that something more is needed to show that the law will 
not tolerate such behaviour. Without an award of exemplary damages, 
justice will not have been done.228  
Thus, the expression of outrage in an award of exemplary damages is not passive but plays 
an active and important role in delineating the relationship between the police (as an 
organisation) and the public, and crucially may counter the ‘necessary evil’ narrative 
about which Reiner warns.  
The expression of outrage may also have a more directly instrumental effect on police 
practices which hinges on the police requirement for public confidence. Chapter 1 (at 1.3 
and 1.4) noted how the police require public support and therefore public approval in 
order to operate. Consequently, the police may be motivated to avoid the sorts of conduct 
that might lead to police actions, not necessarily because they believe that they should, 
(and the discussion in Chapter 4 at 4.1 questions their beliefs in this regards) but because 
the scrutiny of police (individual and organisational) conduct provided by police actions 
may undermine the public confidence the police need to operate. The point here then is 
that police actions may have an impact on how the police as an organisation view the 
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appropriate balance between the official paradigm and the operational code (as discussed 
in Chapter 4 at 4.1).229 
The importance of public outrage underscores the extent to which police actions are 
fundamentally different to negligence actions (and indeed actions in defamation). This in 
turn makes plain that the settlement of police actions and the rationale by which this is 
permitted or encouraged is also fundamentally different to the rationale underpinning 
settlement of negligence actions. The settlement of police actions should therefore be 
subject to scrutiny and debate, which includes consideration of the constitutional 
importance of the performative aspects of the trial process. 
 
 




5.3 Limits on the Ability of Police Actions to Contribute to the Constitutional 
Legitimacy of the Police  
 
The previous two sections highlighted the legal (doctrinal and procedural) features of 
police actions which equip them (theoretically at least) to safeguard the constitutional 
legitimacy of the police. This section explores two key ways in which the ability of police 
actions to deliver such safeguarding is undermined in practice: funding and settlement.  
 
5.3.1 Funding  
 
The Legal Aid Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (LASPO) dramatically 
restructured and limited the availability of legal aid in England and Wales.  Legal Aid is still 
available for legal services relating to abuse by a public authority of its position (see Sched 
1, Part 1, s.21). However, s. 21(4) states that:  
(4) For the purposes of this paragraph, an act or omission by a public authority 
does not constitute an abuse of its position or powers unless the act or omission— 
(a) is deliberate or dishonest, and 
(b) results in harm to a person or property that was reasonably foreseeable. 
In R v Director of Legal Aid Casework (exp Sisangia),230 the Court of Appeal held that the 
words “abuse of its position or powers” had to be interpreted in the context of the 
Schedule as a whole. Accordingly, it held “that something more than mere unlawfulness” 
was required and that “some cases of false imprisonment would not amount to an “abuse 
of power” and, therefore, legal aid would not be available”.231  
In Huckle v Money,232 the very fact of infringement on liberty was sufficient to bring a 
claim. This accords with the roots of the torts of assault and false imprisonment which lie 
in trespass. In most cases the availability of funding is determinative of whether a claim is 
brought and the judgment in Sisangia, therefore, in effect produces a change in the legal 
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rights of citizens to challenge the police use of coercive powers. This is particularly 
important in circumstances where making a complaint in relation to an alleged abuse of 
police powers will only result in what the police determine a ‘reasonable and 
proportionate’ investigation (the review of which is limited to an assessment of whether 
the outcome was ‘reasonable and proportionate’).233  
More subtly the decision in Sisangia leaves the decision as to whether there is ‘sufficient 
abuse to bring an action’ in the hands of legal aid caseworkers. Those cases for which 
further legal enquiries are necessary before it is possible to establish if there was 
‘something more than mere unlawfulness’ may therefore be filtered out. This is a 
significant change. It arguably invites an assessment, (at the point of the funding decision) 
of whether the infringement - the committing of the tort - was a practical response to the 
surrounding circumstances and thereby may usher in the necessary evil discourse about 
police abuse of their powers. 
Alternative means of funding are similarly constraining. Some solicitors handle police 
actions on a ‘No-Win No-Fee’ basis. However, the Bar Council’s Final Report on LASPO (Bar 
Council 2013) indicates a growing reluctance by both solicitors and barristers to take on 
“complex, low-value litigation” (Bar Council, 2013: 2). This is of particular concern in 
relation to police actions, because the forms of action that might be categorised as 
‘complex and low value’ are the sorts of allegations that remain subject to internal police 
investigation under limited external scrutiny. They also arise from the sort of 
unconstitutional discrediting conduct on the part of officers that was noted by Box and 
Russell as long ago as 1975, and for which the analysis in Chapter 7 (at 7.1) provides 




Another significant limitation on the potential for police actions to enhance police 
constitutional legitimacy is the fact that the vast majority settle.234 Section 5.1 argued that 
the rationales underpinning debates about negligence are not apposite to police actions. 
 
233 As discussed in chapter 4 at 4.2.2.2. 




Similarly, this section highlights how different rationales are necessary to justify the 
promotion of settlement of police actions.  
The settlement of civil actions is seen as a public good. In 1996, the then Master of the 
Rolls, Lord Woolf, undertook a review of the civil justice system and his report, Access to 
Justice, paved the way for a series of reforms which were designed to encourage the 
settlement of civil actions.235 Of course, significant public goods may well be realised by 
encouraging compromise, and an emphasis on settlement also promotes economic 
efficiency in dispute resolution. However, an overly reductionist stance in promoting 
settlement is challenged by those who hold that disputes serve important social functions 
(Fiss, 1983) and, even in the context of disputes between private parties, the privileging 
of settlement is contested (Fiss, 1983; Galanter and Cahill, M. 1994; Luban 1994; Menkel-
Meadow 1994; Mulcahy 2012).  
The potential for the court to mitigate the unequal resources of the parties in its search 
for the most reliable version of the facts and the correct application of the law to those 
facts is seen as important (Fiss, 1984: 1078). Similarly, while there may be private benefits 
to parties in being free to enter negotiated settlements (which are not primarily driven by 
legal rules) there is a collective public interest in those rules which have been promulgated 
through the appropriate constitutional channels being adhered to (Menkel-Meadow, 
1994: 2637). Arguably this collective public interest is more important when those rules 
concern the state’s use of coercive powers against citizens.  
Commentators also stress the value of adjudication in engaging public participation in the 
development of the law (Luban, 1994; Mulcahy, 2012). Specifically, settlement suppresses 
not only the information concerning the result of the dispute, but also public access to the 
surrounding disputed facts (Luban, 1994: 2646). These concerns are considerably 
amplified in the context of police actions. As has been argued throughout this chapter 
police actions have a substantial public element. The public interest in the devolvement 
of the law, the adjudication of the disputes, the enforcement of the existing legal norms, 
and access to the disputed facts in each case is therefore more pronounced than in private 
 
235 Access to Justice Final Report, by The Right Honourable the Lord Woolf, Master of the Rolls, July 1996, 




actions. Furthermore, the structures by which police actions proceed grant the police 
considerable control over each of these issues.  
Galanter distinguishes between ‘repeat players’ and ‘one-shotters’ in the civil justice 
process, noting how the former enjoy certain structural advantages (Galanter, 1974: 6). 
In particular, the one-shotters’ stakes in the case in which they are involved are very high, 
but they have little interest in the broader ramifications of the outcome. In contrast, the 
repeat player is interested at multiple levels. One of these is a greater motivation and 
ability to conduct the litigation with a view to developing the legal rules in a way that 
favours the repeat player over all potential future claimants (Galanter, 1974: 6).  
 
In addition to the roles discussed in sections 5.1 and 5.2, police actions also serve the 
important constitutional function of ensuring the development of the law in an area which 
is necessarily political and therefore sensitive to changing societal circumstances. Chief 
constables are classic ‘repeat players’ and there is therefore potential for those cases 
which might nudge the law in a direction that is contrary to police interests to be settled, 
leaving contentious areas to be decided in the context of cases which are more likely to 
give an outcome favorable to police interests. This raises the importance of having 
sufficiently rigorous mechanisms in place to ensure that cases with a public interest 
element are heard before the courts. Unfortunately, however, Mulcahy points to systemic 
failures in the identification of the collective interest in certain types of litigation which 
“impact disproportionately on ‘one-shotters’ with low value claims” (Mulcahy, 2013: 67).  
 
Chief constables might also be motivated to settle police actions to avoid facts about 
police abuses of power which are conceived as harmful to police interests from reaching 
the public domain. However, the rules which govern how civil litigation is conducted, the 
Civil Procedure Rules (CPR),236 increase repeat players’ power over the settlement 
process. An important tool in encouraging settlement is what is referred to under the CPR 
as a “Part 36 Offer”.237 By this means, one party can make an offer in settlement (either 
the sum the defendant is willing to pay or the sum the claimant is willing to accept) and if 
 
236 See  https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil.     




the other party rejects this but then fails to match it in the damages awarded at trial, they 
will be liable for the other party’s costs from the point the offer was made. Consequently, 
while a well-pitched Part 36 offer by claimants may cause the police to review their 
prospects of success at trial, the potential to evoke this procedure permits the police to 
effectively force a legally aided claimant to settle when the latter’s motivation for bringing 
the action may have been to see the officers’ account of events tested in cross 
examination. Similarly, where a ‘no win no fee’ agreement is in place, the claimant’s 
solicitor will be incentivised to agree to a settlement package that covers their costs. Here, 
the very stark imbalance in the relative power of the parties permits the police to force 
settlement of cases which it may prefer not to see subject to the sort of external review 
that disclosure of witness statements or cross examination in open court would provide. 
Settlement in such circumstances also permits claimants to be presented as motivated 
purely by fiscal concerns rather than pressing ahead with a public-spirited battle for the 
truth. 
 
This last point is important and is linked to the discussion about negligence claims in 
Section 5.1. above. Chapter 3 noted an official depiction of claimants in police actions as 
primarily concerned with compensation and of claimants’ solicitors as motivated by profit.  
This has continued in an era of increasing public and political concern regarding the civil 
litigation system and a perceived compensation culture (Lewis et al, 2006; Morris, 2007, 
2012). In 2010, the then Commissioner of  the Metropolitan Police, Sir Paul Stephenson, 
lobbied the Home Secretary with proposals aimed at making it harder for people to bring 
police actions (Dodd, 2010). In Sir Paul’s view, money was “being wasted on speculative 
claims with lawyers gaining large fees that would be better spent fighting crime”(Dodd, 
2010). However, a claim cannot both be vital to the vindication of the strength of the law 
and at the same time an inappropriate draw on police funds, and an emphasis on the 
compensation element of police actions permits the infringement of civil liberty to be 





It is also important to consider the process of settlement in police actions.238 On one 
understanding, an idealised form of settlement would involve the legal personnel for each 
side taking a quasi-judicial approach; examining the available evidence, reaching a 
conclusion concerning which party is liable (or would be found liable at trial), and 
negotiating a fair level of damages on that basis. However, settlement may also be sought 
on an administrative basis to avoid the costs of prolonged litigation.  The bargaining 
surrounding settlement of an action does not therefore take place in the ‘shadow of the 
law’ alone, but also in the shadow of the overarching legal process and the relative power 
positions of the parties (Mnookin and Kornhauser 1979; Lewis and Morris 2012).  
 
It is increasingly recognised that many settlement processes should be conceived as 
subject to distinct sets of norms which are not seeking to reflect predictions of trial 
outcomes, but in themselves form a system of bureaucratic justice (Halliday at al 2012; 
Morris and Lewis 2012). Halliday et al suggest that once claims handling is understood as 
a highly significant and entirely unavoidable “aspect of civil justice” (Halliday et al 2012: 
353), then “an assessment of that bureaucratic process by way of comparison with judicial 
processes is too heavy handed” (Haliday et al, 2012: 348).  
 
Arguably the conception of police actions as primarily concerned with compensation 
makes the application of a system of bureaucratic justice to their settlement seem easily 
justifiable on economic grounds. However, while organisational imperatives, including 
concerns of economic efficiency, might make an administrative approach to claims 
handling legitimate in some circumstances, (for example in road negligence actions, as 
was the case in Halliday et al’s research), it is much harder to justify such an approach in 
actions involving assault, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution on the part of 
state actors. The application of a ‘bureaucratic justice’ approach to police actions is 
something that should only occur after careful public deliberation. 
 
A very significant element of this thesis is that the narrow construction of police actions 
which permits the infringement of civil liberty to be conceived only in terms of fiscal 
 




recompense, coupled with the application of bureaucratic justice techniques to the 
settlement of police actions, changes (and arguably at some levels commodifies) the 
nature of citizenship. Importantly, once the infringement of liberties is conceived in 
monetary terms, it can be weighed against other ends and the logic of a necessary evil 
discourse is rendered relatively benign.  
 
Chief constables’ control over the conduct of police actions also results in their having 
control of the data relating to settlement. As noted at the end of Chapter 3 the second 
report of the HAC in 1997/8239 recommended that forces should be required to publish 
statistical data concerning police actions, but the Government’s response indicated that 
the settlement of police actions was a private matter for forces. In fact, the Metropolitan 
Police stopped publishing police actions settlement figures from 1997 onwards. Attempts 
during this research to obtain statistical data relating to police actions from all forces in 
England and Wales are discussed in Chapter 9.  
 
 
5.4 Police Actions, Police Complaints and Lesson Learning   
 
So far, this chapter has explored police actions from a legal perspective, considering both 
the doctrinal and procedural framework within which they operate This final subsection 
seeks to site police actions within the intuitional settings in which they are handled and 
to consider the interaction between police actions and police complaints in this context.  
Chapter 4 (at 4.1.1) noted the view that only those with experience of service with the 
police have the investigatory skills and exposure to police operational culture necessary 
to properly handle a police complaint or allegation of officer misconduct. This position is 
not, however borne out by the available research. In 1991 Goldsmith observed that 
“evidence of wide scale police misconduct challenging directly and indirectly the 
credibility of police internal investigation is obtainable for virtually any jurisdiction one 
chooses” (Goldsmith, 1991a :24) and the limited research that exists concerning the 
 




interaction between police complaints and police actions supports the view that police 
internal investigations of complaints are inadequate.  
In the United States Schwartz found that reviews of closed litigation files identified 
weaknesses in evidence-gathering and interview techniques during the internal 
complaints investigation (Schwartz, 2009, 2011).  For example, in a case of a death in 
custody, there was a videotape of the officers involved describing their confrontation with 
the deceased which had very poor sound quality. The internal investigation did not extend 
to enhancing that tape. However, during the litigation process, the claimant’s counsel did 
enhance the tape which revealed that the officers had lied during their police interview 
(Schwartz, 2011: 845). Overall the study suggests that internal police investigations were 
“consistently shoddy and incomplete, violating virtually every canon of professional 
investigation” (Schwartz, 2011: 871).  
There are of course significant cultural and structural differences between the litigation 
practices and delivery of policing services in the United States and the United Kingdom 
and so comparisons should be undertaken with caution (Jackson et al, 2013: 34).  
However, Schwartz’ work does suggest that police actions may attract a deeper or more 
thorough level of investigation than police complaints. In addition, the results mirror 
observations concerning a lack of investigatory rigour in police complaints investigations 
made by the PCB as long ago as 1973 (as noted in section 3.2.2), the claimants’ solicitors 
in the campaign of civil actions referred to in Chapter 3 (at 3.2.3), and the IPCC appeals 
statistics discussed in Chapter 4 at (4.2.2.2). They therefore highlight the importance of 
close scrutiny and public and political debate concerning what amounts to a ‘reasonable 
and proportionate’ investigation of police complaints and suggest that comparison with 
the outcomes of police actions would make an important contribution to such debate.240  
Schwartz’s study is also interesting in relation to police lesson-learning from police actions 
data.  In one police department a review of litigation files had revealed that a high 
 
240 Debate is consistently concerned with what the outcome of police complaints reveals about the 
standard of internal police complaints investigations. But public confidence in the police may be 
considerably undermined if that debate shifted to question whether the suggested lack of rigour in 
complaints investigations is reflective of police standards of investigation more generally. See in particular 
the catalogue of errors that led to the litigation in DSD v Commissioner of Metropolitan Police [2014] 




proportion of all police misconduct litigation stemmed from two stations. These stations 
had a correspondingly high level of civilian complaints (Schwartz, 2011: 855). As a result, 
a detailed assessment of the practices was undertaken and, at one of the stations, several 
changes were implemented in relation to structure, management and training. A further 
review two years later revealed that the number of shootings at the station had dropped 
dramatically241 (Schwartz, 2011: 856). Importantly, however, once the internal focus on 
risk management lessened, a later review revealed that these improvements were 
reversed (Schwartz, 2011: 856).  This suggests a police organisational response to police 
actions that is limited to the immediate fiscal impact of litigation rather than police actions 
being conceived as having a standard setting status that results in an internalised 
preference to avoid unnecessary violence towards citizens. 
Again, it would be a mistake to extrapolate too much from this American study.  However, 
the results of reviews by the HMIC (now HMICFRS) of all professional standards 
departments in England and Wales in 2005/6 are revealing. One aspect of the HMIC’s 
enquiry involved the existence of mechanisms for learning lessons from police actions. 
The results of this aspect of the survey were generally restricted to one short paragraph 
in each report and indicate varying levels of internal analysis and feedback. While several 
forces appeared to have a clear system in place for identifying conduct matters and 
undertaking trend analysis in relation to such actions,242 others had no effective feedback 
mechanisms in place.243 More interesting, however, is the occasions when the HMIC 
specifically highlighted (as good practice) forces’ responses to police actions data. These 
included the circulation to all staff of “Top Ten Tips” on how to avoid claims for 
compensation,244 specific advice about not admitting liability when officers had executed 
warrants on the wrong address,245 and training courses for officers on how to give 
evidence at civil trials.246 Arguably these responses point to an organisational 
 
241 The implication is that these were shootings of civilians by police officers. 
242 For example, in Cleveland there were “comprehensive systems in place to assess and analyse all 
incoming public complaints and civil claims” ((HMIC Inspection of Cleveland Police Professional Standards 
2006: 9).  
243 In Hampshire, there was noted to be a “lack of close working cooperation and sharing information 
between PDS, Personnel dept and legal services” (HMIC, Inspection of Hampshire Constabulary 
Professional Standards Department 2006: 9). 
244 HMIC Inspection of the West Mercia Constabulary Professional Standard Department 2006: 11) 
245 HMIC Inspection of Suffolk Constabulary Professional Standards 2006:7).  




defensiveness concerning police actions rather than the information they provide being 
embraced in the spirit of a desire to improve policing services.  
It is apparent that data from police actions can be used as a management tool to highlight 
training and supervision needs. There is some evidence from the United States that 
insurers are enforcing this kind of management response to police actions by offering 
incentives in terms of premium reductions if certain changes are made to police practices 
(Rappaport, 2016). However, the above discussion suggests that the extent to which 
lesson-learning from police actions is enforced in the US is at best patchy and that the 
position in the UK is unclear. Of course, the question of whether police actions are viewed 
by forces as capable of providing data that could be used in lesson-learning will depend 
on how the actions themselves are conceived. The empirical analysis in Part Two seeks to 
address this issue.  
 




Section 5.1 maintained that police actions are distinct from other tort actions. By focusing 
on the rationale for damages in police actions, it demonstrated that police actions 
promote the constitutional legitimacy of the police in a complex and nuanced way. It was 
contended that there is a non-pecuniary, non-vindicatory element of basic damages which 
goes to a relational harm as between the claimant and the police. Consequently, it is 
argued that the aims of tort law in this area may be viewed in terms of appeasement and 
restoration by means of ethical compensation, and the conception of police actions as 
forming the bedrock of police constitutional legitimacy must be understood accordingly. 
Building on this perception of police actions, the role of aggravated damages can be seen 
as similarly linked to relational harms. However, the harms for these awards may extend 
to the response of the police as an organisation to the initial tortious conduct of the 
officers. Similarly, it is misplaced (and an error of law) to view exemplary damages as 
purely punitive. Instead they serve a broader function in restraining police power by 




failure to respond meaningfully to it. This is a significant and an important element of their 
contribution to police constitutional legitimacy.  
For this thesis, the preservation of outrage at police misconduct is of particular 
importance in countering narratives which prioritise public confidence in the police and 
may thereby promote a necessary evil discourse in relation to unlawful police practices. 
Significantly, while the media might express outrage in response to a particular incident, 
what makes jury participation in the assessment and award of aggravated and exemplary 
damages important is the very fact that it is done in a legal setting – to borrow Habermas’s 
phrase, it is outrage that has passed through the ‘sluices’ of the deliberatively proscribed 
processes for its expression. Its status is different. It is outrage with a constitutionally 
important role.   
It is therefore of concern that considerable structural constraints inhibit the bringing of 
police actions. Funding is substantially limited both by restrictive judicial interpretation of 
the relevant sections of LASPO and by the structuring of other funding possibilities. Even 
when police actions are brought, the majority are settled.  Chapter 3 (at 3.1) noted how 
the decision to make chief constables vicariously liable for officer torts was made contrary 
to the recommendations of the 1962 Royal Commission on Policing and without any 
meaningful parliamentary debate. This not only gives chief constables control over the 
litigation it also accords them a large measure of control over the settlement of police 
actions and their impact on the constitutional legitimacy of the police at several levels.247   
The constitutional importance of police actions is also undermined by their official 
portrayal as primarily concerned with compensation. This has several ramifications. To 
depict police actions as largely concerned with compensation permits claimants and their 
solicitors to be presented as primarily motivated by monetary recompense, rather than 
as citizens who have been subject to a misuse of state coercive powers and legal 
representatives who are seeking to ensure their clients’ best interests. Worse, claimants 
and their solicitors can be presented as selfishly depleting police funds and thereby 
reducing policing services for the majority.  
 
247 As noted above, the police authorities and now PCCs ultimately control the police fund, out of which 
damages and costs are paid, but without control over the conduct of the litigation, this is of little impact. 




It was argued above that the harm that damages in police actions addresses is relational. 
To focus on damages alone changes the process from a claim for vindication in relation to 
a right that has been infringed (a right to a relational remedy) and reduces it to a right to 
a sum paid in recompense when the state interferes with liberties. This fundamentally 
changes the relationship between citizens and state. It impacts directly on the macro-level 
relationship between people and the police. Citizenship vests not only in the link between 
the individual and the state but also in enjoying shared membership of a citizenry. Hence, 
as noted in section 5.1, the relational harms that police actions address is both individual 
and collective.  If this important constitutional function is to be changed, it should only be 
done through the proper constitutional channels and after appropriate public 
deliberation. 
 
Finally, there is some reciprocity here, but a subtle corollary to a focus on the 
compensatory element of police actions is that it implicitly reinforces a perception of the 
police as more aligned with private organisations.248 This permits a shift toward 
organisational as opposed to constitutional legitimacy as the primary lens though which 
policing is conceived. It is submitted that together with all the issues noted above, this will 
inevitably impact on the complex social practices that surround both the naming of 
unlawful police conduct and the manner in which blame for it is assigned. Hence, the 
presentation of police actions as serving only individualistic aims may have the self-
perpetuating effect of denuding them of their ability to support the constitutional 
legitimacy of the police.  
A recurring theme in previous chapters is that many changes that have had significant 
substantive limiting effect on the way in which police actions contribute to police 
constitutional legitimacy have occurred in the absence of any (or any meaningful) public 
debate. This is, of course, linked with transparency. However, it also invites analyses of 
the forms of deliberation that have occurred (political and judicial) and these are explored 
in the empirical analysis in Chapters 6 and 7 respectively.   
 
 
























This research is concerned with the interaction between police complaints and police 
actions and what this reveals about police legitimacy. Chapter 1 developed the ideas of 
organisational and constitutional legitimacy and extended them by reference to 
Habermas’s conception of deliberative democracy and Black’s critique of his work. As 
outlined in that chapter, for Habermas, political legislators can use normative, pragmatic 
and empirical reasoning and the judiciary is constrained by the need to use reasons 
“inherent in the law” (Habermas, 1996: 439). However, the administration is shielded 
from having to justify its decisions by reference to the normative and empirical, and, 
instead, uses the outputs of the legislators’ and judiciary’s decision-making processes to 
engage in its own “empirically informed purpose rational decision making” (Habermas, 
1996: 192). Black questions Habermas’s presumptions about the limits of administrative 
activity (Black, 2000a: 613-614). She contends that the administration is considerably 
more complex than Habermas posits, and its legitimacy must also be drawn from some 
forms of direct link between it and general communicative power (Black 2000a: 599).  
The initial analysis conducted in Chapter 1 combined these theorists’ ideas to delineate 
two theoretical idealisations; a mapping between police actions, the constitutional 
legitimacy of the police, and police action legitimated via Habermas’s conception of 
deliberative democracy; and a second mapping between the police complaints system, 
the organisational legitimacy of the police, and thick proceduralisation of administrative 
processes via direct links between them and the communicative sphere. Secondary 
questions were devised to assist in probing any disparities between the theoretical 
idealisations and the empirical findings concerning police complaints and police actions: 
What are the broader functions of this process? How is police legitimacy conceived within 
it? What is it seen to contribute to police legitimacy?  The remaining chapters in Part One 
explored the historical development of police actions and police complaints and advanced 
several analytic themes (which are summarised at the end of each chapter). Part Two 




aim of addressing the primary research question.249  Chapter 6 gives an overview and 
justification of the choices made in the selection of the research methods and data 
collection. Chapter 7 and 8 discuss the findings and address the secondary questions 
(noted above) in relation to police actions and police complaints respectively.  Chapter 9 
draws on the findings in Chapters 7 and 8 to extend analysis to data generated for this 
research concerning the practical interaction between police complaints and police 
actions and in particular the settlement of police actions. Chapter 10 reflects on the 
findings of the previous three chapters to address the main research question and sets 
out recommendations concerning the ways in which settlement of police actions might 
contribute to the legitimacy of the police. 
  
 








Chapter 6  Methodology  
 
There are numerous ways of approaching qualitative social research and an equally broad 
range of methods for conducting it (Gilbert 2008, Silverman 2014, 2016). Further, many 
aspects of the potential approaches and the analytical processes exist on continuums. For 
example, grounded theory seeks to theorise from close analysis of the data and the 
researcher will attempt to eschew any prior assumptions about the research area or the 
data sets250. Alternatively, data may be subject to various forms of analysis in 
circumstances where the themes or forms of enquiry are not understood as emerging 
from the data but are “driven by the researchers’ theoretical or analytic interest in the 
area” (Boyatzis 1998: 4, Braun and Clarke 2006: 84, Attride-Sterling 2001: 390). Whichever 
methodology is adopted, the validity of the research findings is dependent on clarity 
regarding the analytical assumptions that are being made and what is being claimed in 
respect of the results (Braun and Clarke 2006: 78-79, Hollaway and Todres 2003: 347). The 
following sections therefore set out the methodological approaches taken in respect of 
each aspect of the research process discussed in Part Two, noting their value and 
limitations, and reflecting on the implications of the choices made.  
 
6.1 The approach taken and the claims made in respect of the outputs 
 
The research questions for this project stem from the writer’s previous professional 
experience in the handling and settling of police actions and the implications of this for 
the research findings are discussed in detail at 6.2 and 6. 5.2. The settlement of police 
actions is one of the issues that is problematised in this research. A key assumption 
underpinning the approach adopted is that the way in which settlement of police actions 
is understood will be dependent on underlying assumptions concerning the processes of 
police complaints and police actions (and the broader roles these processes may 
perform). Consequently, this research is invoking a two-stage mixed methods approach. 
The first stage of the empirical enquiry comprises analysis of the theoretical idealisations 
 




(developed in Chapter 1) in relation to police complaints and the police actions. While 
theoretical idealisations facilitate exploration of the disparity between the idealisation 
and ‘the real’, the broadly constructionist epistemological position adopted for this 
research results in the empirical enquiry focusing on the disparity between the theoretical 
idealisations and the way in which the empirical data suggests each of the processes 
(police complaints and police actions) is understood. The enquiry is seeking to identify and 
examine the underlying ideas, assumptions and conceptualizations shaping or informing 
the semantic content of the data for which makes the broad and flexible methodological 
approach offered by latent thematic attractive (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 84). The second 
stage of the empirical enquiry employs the results of the findings of the first stage to 
structure analysis of the empirical data relating to the settlement of police actions. The 
broad two stage form of enquiry makes thematic analysis additionally attractive as a 
qualitative method because it facilitates a search for themes across an entire data set 
rather than within a specific data item (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 79-81).   
For the first part of the empirical research a thematic textual analysis was conducted on 
official documents relating to the passing of PACA and on court judgements relating to 
police actions251. Textual analysis was adopted because the data sets were specifically 
relevant to the research questions and were relatively easily available (in circumstances 
where considerable time and effort had been directed towards attempts to gather data 
in relation to the settlement of police actions with limited success). The selection of texts 
is discussed in detail at 6.3.1 and 6.4.1. respectively. The detailed historical analysis 
conducted in Part One generated several themes which will be employed in the first stage 
of the empirical enquiry. Consequently, the thematic analysis of the selected texts is 
inevitably more deductive than inductive in that the specific queries outlined in Chapter 
one and the themes generated in Part One form the basis of the coding and analysis 










6.2. The Impact of the Researcher’s Previous Experience on the Research Process  
 
Qualitative research is particularly susceptible the choice of research question, the 
research design and the gathering and analysis of empirical data being influenced by the 
researchers’ experience and motivations (Becker, 1967, Merton, 1972). It is therefore 
important to reflect upon the researcher’s professional legal experience in handling police 
actions prior to entering academia and the  extent to which it  impacted on the research 
design, the development of the themes in Part 1 and (in a conceptually distinct but 
nonetheless linked way) the manner in which the empirical data was gathered, 
interpreted and analysed.  For this research the issue of researcher influence in relation 
to the gathering and analysis of data is particularly relevant to how the interviews were 
conducted; the potential impact of interviewer effect on the responses and the way 
responses were subsequently interpreted and analysed. These issues are discussed in 
section 6.5.2 and 6.5.3 below. This subsection addresses the impact of the researcher’s 
previous experience on the development of the research question and the overall 
approach(s) adopted.  
The researcher’s professional experience handling police actions for a medium-sized force 
undoubtedly motivated the research and informed the research question and 
perspectives. The police actions with which the researcher was professionally engaged 
were frequently also the subject of an official police complaint. Furthermore, there were 
several occasions when complaints were unsubstantiated in circumstances where the civil 
process would result in the claim being settled. This inevitably invited an interest in the 
intersection of the two processes and a comparison of the values underlying each regime. 
When handling police actions, the researcher was employed by the Local Police Authority 
(which at that time was statutorily empowered to oversee252 the force). This produced a 
status that was never fully ‘insider’ in relation to the police. Nevertheless, working closely 
with professional standards officers for several years (who operated as the de facto client) 
conferred a status (and an overall perspective) that was (and remains to varying degrees) 
 
252 Police Authorities were replaced by Police and Crime Commissioners in 2012 as noted below and 




considerably less ‘outsider’ than many other researchers (Merton, 1972). This status 
provides a potentially unique position from which not only to conceive the research 
question but also assess the empirical data. However, it also may operate to create 
research bias and thereby limit the researcher’s perspectives (Becker 1967).  Research 
bias may manifest in distortion of the findings or (more subtly) in failure to explore 
particular avenues that may produce results which conflict with the researcher’s views 
(Becker 1967: 246). It can be alleviated by adopting a critically reflective stance when 
formulating and refining the research question and research design. It is therefore 
valuable to engage in such reflection in relation to the researcher’s unusual 
insider/outsider status and in particular the extent to which it may have resulted in bias 
in favour of or against the police (Green 2008: 47).  
At the outset it is important to query how such bias may manifest itself in the context of 
a research which is focusing on the operation of two competing police accountability 
mechanisms. Becker introduces the idea of a ‘hierarchy of credibility’ whereby those with 
the greatest status or power “have the right to define the way things really are” (Becker 
1967: 241). ““Everyone knows” that police are more respectable and their word ought to 
be taken more seriously than those of the deviants and criminals with whom they deal” 
(Becker, 1967: 242). Consequently, researchers may be accused of bias when their work 
gives equal voice to subordinate groups and thereby challenges the hierarchy of 
credibility. It is noteworthy that this idea of police ‘respectability’ correlates with the 
‘official paradigm’ discussed in Chapter 4. In the context of this research ‘bias toward the 
police’ might therefore result in a failure to take sufficient account of the police position 
in the hierarchy of credibility and a resulting inclination to disregard data that confirms 
the extent to which the official paradigm is not always adhered to.  
In contrast Becker also observes how superordinate ‘officials’ whose role is to ‘do 
something’ when ‘something’ needs to be done eg doctors, police, schools etc “usually 
have to lie”. “Hospital do not cure people, prisons do not rehabilitate prisoners and 
schools do not educate students. Since they are supposed to, officials develop ways both 
of denying the failure of the institution to perform as it should and explaining those 
failures which cannot be hidden” (1967: 242-243). Aligned with the comments above 




to which Becker refers correlates with the ‘operational code’ as discussed in Chapter 4. 
Bias toward the police might therefore also manifest in a sympathy for their 
‘predicament’, a propensity to support officers’ adherence to the operational code on the 
basis of it being a rational and justifiable (and necessary) response to the ‘impossible 
mandate’ (Manning  1970)  the police are given. Thus ‘bias’ may operate in two distinct 
and contradictory ways. Moreover, as noted above, the research is not concerned with 
the police per se, but with the operation of police accountability mechanisms and 
therefore ‘bias’ in relation to the police is potentially a misleading concern.  
Merton observes how the social identity of insider will include ‘assumptions and foci of 
thought’ (Merton 1972: 11) which may both augment the depth and empathetical 
understanding with which research is conducted but may equally prevent an objective 
assessment of the empirical position. This research is concerned with a comparison 
between two accountability mechanisms which the researcher had noted could 
frequently produce apparently contradictory outcomes; the civil legal system and the 
police complaints and discipline system. Consequently, a key potential area of ‘bias’ is not 
between a ‘police’ or a ‘non-police’ perspective but between a ‘foci of thought’ that is 
directed towards legal rather than non-legal solutions. The idea that the outcomes of the 
legal process (in particular the outcome of civil trials) are more credible than the outcomes 
of internal police investigations and might therefore offer a comparatively neutral ‘truth’ 
about the incidents upon which claims and complaints are founded is implicit in how the 
research is conceived.  
However, as Merton also observes the idea that “human beings in socially differentiated 
societies can be sufficiently located in terms of a single social status, category or group 
affiliation” is erroneous (Merton, 1972: 22)(emphasis added). The researcher is a lawyer 
and brings to the research an affinity to the ideal of a police that adheres to the rule of 
law. The experience handling police actions has provided additional and unusual insights 
into the multivariate ways in which that ideal is not representative of reality. However, as 
with any other member of society, the researcher also has multiple and varied 
experiences of the police either directly or indirectly which are also formative of views on 
both policing and on how officers might be made meaningfully accountable. Drawing 




Merton is able to elucidate how the task of the researcher is to move beyond 
‘acquaintance’ with to “empirically confirmable  comprehension of the conditions and 
often complex  processes  in which people are caught up without much awareness of what 
is going on” (Merton, 1972:44). It is submitted that the theoretical framework adopted 
for this research enabled to researcher to move beyond the confines of the multiple life 
experiences that will have informed the interpretive exercise carried out in Part 1. In 
particular, the distinction between operational and constitutional legitimacy also 
embodies the tension between legal and regulatory approaches and therefore enables 
any impact of the researcher’s insider status as a lawyer to be visible. This point is 
reflected upon further at 6.5 below  
 
6.3 The theoretical idealisation involving constitutional legitimacy, police actions and 
Habermas’ conception of deliberative democracy – Textual analysis of Judgments  
 
Chapter 7 focuses on the theoretical idealisation involving constitutional legitimacy, police 
actions and Habermas’ conception of deliberative democracy. Textual analyses of 
judgments was chosen as an appropriate method for this element of the research for 
several reasons. The courts provide the constitutional safeguard against abuse of police 
powers and the legal judgments are readily available published texts. In addition, while 
giving rulings about specific issues the courts draw on and betray judicial 
orientationstowards institutions and the social arrangements between them (Herman 
2011: 22)253. For example, Lord Wolfe states in the case of Thompson and Hsu254 
(discussed in Chapter 5 and at length in Chapter 7) “judges … like the police are concerned 
in maintaining law and order”. That sense of affiliation is important in the context of 
research which is concerned with the role of police actions in supporting and promoting 
police legitimacy.  
 
 
253 As with Herman research ‘orientations’ is not here being used as a term of art (see Herman 2011: 22)   




6.3.1 Selection of Judgments  
The selection of judgements to be included in the analysis involved consideration of 
several approaches. There are cases which make reference to the interaction between the 
police complaints process and the ability to bring a police action255. Similarly, there are 
cases in which courts are extremely critical of the IPCC256. These were considered for 
inclusion in the data set. However, each of these is directed towards specific legal issues 
relating to police failure to act (the operation of tort law or the application of Article 3 
respectively). They are not, therefore, directly relevant to the courts’ view of the 
interactions between police complaints and the type of police action with which this 
research is concerned.  
There is also a line of cases which address the admissibility of similar fact evidence in 
unsubstantiated complaints against officers in police actions which was also considered 
for analysis.257 However, perusal of these cases revealed that they are argued in an 
extremely legalistic manner, limiting themselves narrowly to procedural issues258. There 
is no critique of, or judicial concern expressed, in relation to the police complaints process. 
Hence, while forming an interesting example of judicial conservativism or deference to 
the internal complaints investigatory machinery (and a potentially interesting further line 
of analyses) it was determined that these cases would not assist directly with the 
questions raised by this research.  
Chapter 5 highlighted the importance of the procedural elements of police actions, 
pointing to the role of the jury in both fact finding and the determination of damages. It 
argued that these procedural rules should not be seen as ‘soft law’ but, rather, as 
significant substantive aspects of the rights the courts are purporting to determine and 
protect.  For those cases that go to trial, but do not reach the higher courts, the civil justice 
system is not acting as an adjunct to the parliamentary process. These police actions are 
important to the constitutional legitimacy of the police because the public engagement 
 
255 For examples Brookes v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2005] 1 W.L.R. 1495   
256 and DSD and NVD v   Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2005] 1 W.L.R. 1495which are both 
part of the line of cases that relate to action relating to inadequate police investigations. 
257 See for example, O’Brien v Chief Constable of South Wales [2016] EWHC 1367 (QB) 
258 In O’Brian referred to directly above the context of a claimant who had suffered a miscarriage of justice 
seeking vindication in relation to officers who it appears had followed a pattern of behaviour in relation to 
falsifying evidence was not discussed. This observation accords with some of the findings in Chapter 7 and 




they involve creates lines of communication upon which the more formal deliberative 
machinery depends. On this understanding, the legal procedural rules which structure the 
performative elements of police actions are part of the deliberatively agreed framework 
upon which the constitutional legitimacy of the police (seen as embedded state actors) 
depends.  
Chapter 5 also highlighted the Thompson and Hsu case (hereinafter referred to as 
Thompson), which laid down guidelines for how juries should be directed to approach 
awards of damages and put a cap on maximum awards for aggravated and exemplary 
damages (the Guidelines).259 The Guidelines limit juries’ role in police actions in two ways.  
By encouraging the settlement of police actions, they reduce the opportunities for jury 
involvement and thereby preclude the operation of the procedural legitimating factors 
outlined above. Further, for those cases that do still proceed to trial, any expression of 
outrage by a jury is muted by the ceiling on the level of exemplary damages that can be 
awarded. Consequently, the decision in Thompson constitutes a dramatic reform to the 
deliberative machinery that functioned to legitimate the police mandate to use state 
sanctioned force.  This judgment is therefore the primary text for consideration of the 
hypothetical idealisation relating to constitutional legitimacy. The operation of the 
Guidelines is also a relevant consideration. A search of the Westlaw database revealed six 
subsequent reported cases involving the police in which the Guidelines have been either 
challenged or applied and these are included in the dataset for this empirical enquiry.260 
Since each of the cases concerns a similar legal point, underlying assumptions can be 
looked for across the whole data set. In contrast, Ashley v e Chief Constable of Sussex261  
(Ashley) is an important case concerning vindication as an element of police actions, but 
there is not a long line of cases against the police on this point. Thus, while Ashley is 
significant in discussions regarding the function of police actions it was decided that 
inclusion of it in the data set may limit the validity of analysis of themes across the data 
set.  
 
259 These are reproduced in Appendix 2. 
260 A list of the judgments together with a summary of the facts of each case is at Appendix 1. 




It is accepted that despite the selected cases constituting all the currently available judicial 
deliberation on the application of the Guidelines it is nonetheless a relatively small 
sample. Notwithstanding this the findings discussed in Chapter 7 do show sufficient 
consistency across each of the judgements to be valuable and invite further detailed 




Higher Court judgments operate at several levels. Lawyers become familiar with legal 
analysis of such texts and inculcated with an appreciation for the intricate threads of 
rhetoric and reasoning that judges employ. Further, legal analysis seeks to make sense of 
the reasoning adopted in judgments and its starting point is that this will be coherent. In 
contrast, the judgments selected for this research were subject to thematic analysis which 
drew on the work of critical legal theorists. Critical legal theory encompasses a wide 
variety of approaches to legal phenomena, each of which is concerned to look beyond 
legal reasoning or the justifications for specific legal positions, in order to expose the 
underlying values and assumptions which underpin them (Thompson, 1992: 3-7). The 
analysis of the judgments adopted in this research shares that aim. It is in some respects 
akin to the work of Herman which explored judicial conceptions of Jewishness (Herman, 
2011) and Barmes’ work on the construction of workplace disputes (Barmes, 2016). Each 
of these extensive studies drew on multiple judgments and developed themes from the 
judgments themselves. In contrast, in this research themes have already been developed 
in Part One and the sample of judgments in this analysis is considerably narrower. 
Nonetheless, just as Herman’s overarching aim was to consider judicial conceptions of 
Jewishness (Herman, 2011: 2), the aim of the analysis here is to explore what the 
judgments reveal about judicial (and, indeed, to some extent police) conceptions of the 
role of police actions in promoting or protecting the constitutional legitimacy of the 
police.  
Consequently, the judgments in this research were subject thematic analysis of a different 




below (and in detail in Chapter 8).  It was determined that Nvivo was unhelpful for coding 
the judgments because of the critical nature of the analysis. For example, themes 
developed in Part One are specific to policing whereas much of the judgment in 
Thompson, makes comparison between police actions and cases involving defamation. 
This provides a valuable example of how the interpretive elements of Part One of this 
research feed into the analysis undertaken in Part 2. It is argued in Chapter 7 that the 
comparison between defamation actions and police actions is legally flawed. However 
that comparison does accord (both in general and in specific instances) with the theme of 
the police being conceived/equated with private bodies developed in Part One (see 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 5).  
It is not claimed that the findings from this process can represent an uncontested 
statement of the status of police actions. They do, however, provide a snapshot of how 
police actions are considered judicially (and, as will be seen, to some extent how they are 
viewed by the police). Moreover, elements of the findings are sufficiently consistent 
across the data set to provide valid comparison with the findings from the empirical 
enquiry concerning police complaints system. Furthermore, the findings concerning the 
judicial (and police) approach to police actions also provide important context for the 
second stage of the empirical enquiry focussing on settlement (and discussed in Chapter 
9).  
 
6.4 The theoretical idealisation involving organisational legitimacy police complaints and 
Black’s conception of thick proceduralisation 
 
Textual analysis of the government texts generated in the process of the passing of the 
PACA were selected as an appropriate method for this element of the research for several 
reasons.  
As discussed in Chapter 4 the PACA introduces several reforms to the current police 
complaints system which represent a significant departure from the previous trend in 
terms of how ‘independence’ is conceived. From 1976 and the establishment of the PCB 
to the creation of the IPCC in 2002 the trend has been for reforms to police oversight 




while the PACA does increase the IOPC’s investigatory powers to some degree, it also 
removes the statutory requirement for the majority of senior figures within the IOPC to 
be ‘independent’ in the sense that they can now be ex police officers262. Further, as argued 
in Chapter 4 (at 4.2.3) the PACA significantly reduces the considerable oversight and 
transparency the IPCC had exerted over the internal investigation of police complaints 
through the exercise of its appeals function.  Simultaneously the PACA gives PCCs specific 
responsibility for holding Chief Officers to account for how complaints are handled in their 
force263 thereby linking the ‘independent’ oversight of complaints with the democratically 
elected ‘independent’ status of PCCs (rather than the ‘independence’ of the statutory 
body). It was therefore considered that the texts produced as part of this significant 
change would provide an important and valuable data set to probe in relation of the 
question of how police complaints are currently understood to contribute to police 
legitimacy.  
The potential to include in the data set similar government texts generated in the process 
that led to the establishment the IPCC was considered. However precisely because a 
fundamental idea such as ‘independence’ is treated differently in relation to the IPCC (as 
originally established) and the reformed police complaints system under the PACA, it was 
considered that including all the texts in one data set would cause potential confusion and 
may distort the findings. A comparative study of the texts generated by the establishment 
of each of the previous police complaints bodies is a potentially fascinating research 
project and it is accepted that the results of such a study would have been valuable to the 
current research. However, that broad textual study was beyond the scope of this 
research and arguably the results of this research may contribute substantially to any later 
comparative research on the establishment of each of the previous oversight bodies.  
A methodological point arises in relation to the choice of texts. The theoretical idealisation 
relating to police complaints hypothesises a link between police complaints, the 
organisational legitimacy of the police, and this legitimacy being sustained by a thick 
proceduralisation of the surrounding communicative processes. However, that does not 
require the dataset analysed in relation to police complaints to be limited to aspects of 
 
262 Discussed in Chapter 4 at 4.2.1 




the administration, or that it must itself include purported incidents of thick 
proceduralisation.264 In accordance with the hypothetical mappings (outlined above and 
in Chapter 1) it is anticipated that the government papers and parliamentary debates 
included in the PACA texts will invoke the full range of normative, pragmatic and empirical 
reasoning. It is methodologically appropriate to analyse this reasoning for what it reveals 
about the ways in which the complaints process is envisaged as being enriched by 
opportunities for thick proceduralization, particularly given the enhanced role for PCCs 
noted directly above.  
 
6.4.1. The Selection of Texts  
 
The Government statements in parliament, the reports that were commissioned, and the 
consultation documents and other related texts that were published during the passage 
of the PACA were taken as the data set concerning the current official perception of the 
complaints and discipline process and its main functions (hereafter collectively referred 
to as the PACA texts).  
On 22nd July 2014 The Home Secretary announced a review of “the whole police 
disciplinary system from beginning to end”265 to be conducted by Major Chip Chapman. 
This together with a review of the Police Complaints System conducted by the Police 
Integrity and Powers Unit in the Home Office, informed the consultation exercise which 
preceded the Policing and Crime Bill. In gathering data for this research, the researcher 
made a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request in relation to the Review conducted 
by the Police Integrity and Powers Unit, which was rejected.266 However, the Chapman 
Review is publicly available and forms part of the PACA texts. As part of the reform 
process, the Government also commissioned a review of the IPCC governance 
 
264 An interesting and valuable future project might include qualitative empirical research into the ways in 
which super-complaints or PCCs' involvement with the complaints system (when they are established) 
include opportunities for translation as envisaged by Black. 
265 Hansard 22 July 2014 Volume 584 Col 1267. 




arrangements which was conducted by Sheila Drew Smith.  The PACA texts also include 
this review and the subsequent consultation responses and next steps documents. 267 
It is important to view documents of this nature with some caution (Bryman, 2008: 521). 
Government pronouncements concerning the police complaints system and proposals for 
reform, no doubt, serve political as well as practical functions. Therefore, they will not 
necessarily convey an accurate account of how the complaints system operates or even 
the true priorities and compromises that exist behind the political rhetoric. What can be 
claimed however, is that the representations made in these documents exemplify the 
‘official line’ concerning what the complaints system does or should do. Consequently, 
they have the potential to reveal those issues which are conceived as necessary to address 
or emphasise in the public presentation of the government’s position.268 For this reason, 
it is considered that a thematic analysis of these documents could provide valuable 
insights into how police complaints are understood to contribute to police legitimacy and, 
indeed, what is understood by the term ‘legitimacy’ in this context.  
The relevant parts of the parliamentary debates relating to the passage of the Act are also 
included in the PACA texts. The parliamentary process is designed to probe the proposed 
legislation and, therefore, these debates may potentially give deeper insights into how 
police legitimacy is conceived more generally, by reference for example, to what they 
assume or the issues that go unquestioned.  
 
6.4.2 Analysis  
 
The Nvivo software was used to store and code the data for this part of the research. It is 
widely recognised that while computer-assisted software packages do not replace the 
researcher in coding and analytic decision-making (Bryman, 2008: 556), they nevertheless 
“greatly assist” qualitative analysis (Gilbert, 2008: 347). They facilitate the process of what 
Fielding describes as axial coding whereby once the initial coding is complete, elements 
 
267 A list of the PACA texts is at Appendix 3. 
268 The idea that these documents represent only an ‘official position’ is perhaps highlighted by the 




of texts stored under each code can be reviewed and reflected upon separately or in 
relation to other sets of coded text, to see what relationships or patterns may emerge 
(Fielding: 2008: 347). Since the themes driving the initial coding exercise were developed 
during the first part of the research, it was considered that this secondary stage of axial 
coding would be important in assessing how the themes are linked within the PACA texts. 
An example of the benefits of using of using Nvivo software is provided by the first main 
finding discussed in Chapter 8 (see 8. 1).  Initial coding was undertaken on the basis of the 
themes developed in Part One. For example, instances where ‘public confidence’ was 
raised (either directly or by implication) were grouped together.  However, the analysis in 
Part One also drew attention to ‘public confidence’ encapsulating ‘public confidence in 
the police to maintain a disciplined force’. It was in the process of scrutinizing and 
conducting axial coding of those elements of the texts that related to ‘public confidence’ 
and of that ‘encapsulating maintenance of discipline’, that the tendency (in the texts) to 
give public expectations as the founding reason for police propriety became apparent. 
Braun and Clarke describe thematic analysis as permitting careful organization of data 
such that it is possible to “describe it in (rich) detail”. However, it can also be powerful in 
assisting with ‘interpretation’ of the research topic (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 79). In the 
example outlined above the thematic analysis of the texts facilitated the finding which it 
is contended extends our understanding of how police legitimacy is currently perceived 
and provides avenues for further research. 
6.5 Data generated as part of the research process 
 
Chapter 9 presents the findings from analysis of two sets of data: Freedom of Information 
Act 2000 (FOIA) requests to forces seeking claims data concerning police actions; and 
interviews with professional standards officers and force legal personnel. This represents 
stage two of the empirical research process and the analysis (where appropriate) draws 
on the themes developed in Part One and the findings of the textual analysis conducted 
in relation to the judgments and the PACA texts. There is little overlap between these two 
data sets. In constitutional terms the judgments centre on the judicial understanding of 
the role of police actions (although, as will be seen, this analysis also provided insights 




conception of the police complaints and discipline process.  However, it will be recalled 
that these data sets were subject to analysis prior to the analysis of the data relating to 
the settlement of police actions on the assumption that the way in which settlement of 
police actions is understood will be dependent on underlying notions concerning the 
processes of police complaints and police actions (and the broader roles these processes 
may perform). To this extent the two data sets are complimentary and the flexibility of 
thematic analysis which permits consideration of themes across all three data sets is 
valuable.   
6.5.1 Statistical Data on Police Actions 
A concern of this research is that claims data relating to police actions is not made 
centrally available. Consequently, at the start of the research, in the Summer of 2012, 
FOIA requests seeking claims data were sent to each of the 43 police forces in England 
and Wales.269  Correspondence with some forces concerning these requests became 
protracted and, as discussed below, access to interviews with force legal personnel and 
professional standards officers was obtained during that correspondence.270  In particular, 
one of the interviews271 was initially a continuation of correspondence concerning the 
FOIA request to that force. It therefore became necessary to consider the research ethics 
of the responses to the FOIA requests and the interviews together. Since access to 
interviews was secured during correspondence about force FOIA responses it was agreed 
that individual forces would not be identified in the discussion of FOIA responses.  
The FOIA questionnaire was designed to reveal patterns about forces’ settlement 
practices at different stages of the litigation process. Consequently, it sought data in two 
categories of case: those for which proceedings were issued; and those which were 
settled under the ‘threat or suggestion of’ a claim, without proceeding having been issued. 
Within the first category, data was also sought about those cases which settled after 
proceedings were issued but before trial. The questionnaire also requested data 
 
269 A copy of the FOIA questionnaire (and the guidance provided for forces in how to respond to it) is at 
Appendix 7. 
270 A schedule of the coded force and interviewee details is at Appendix 5. 




concerning the level of damages or settlement sums, and third party and internal or 
external legal costs.  
The FOIA requests outlined above did not result in a full set of reliable claims data for 
several reasons. One small force had so few claims that it refused to provide the data, 
because to do so might lead to individual claimants being identified. Another force 
provided data which conflicted with information given on its website. Several other forces 
provided data, which on analysis appeared internally contradictory or incorrect (for 
example, annual external legal costs which were high in most years but exceedingly low 
in others (where the number of claims defended etc appeared consistent over the period).  
A further difficulty was that forces store claims data in different formats. S12 of the FOIA 
permits organisations to refuse to provide data if the costs of collating it are above a 
certain level. The FOIA questionnaire sought to overcome s12 FOIA by including detailed 
guidance which asked for the data in the format that it was stored (if the costs of providing 
it in the format requested would be prohibitive). Thus, some forces did provide data, but 
it was not in a format that could be analysed as anticipated when the questionnaire was 
drafted.  
It also became apparent that some forces were resistant to complying with the FIOA 
requests. Despite the guidance seeking to circumvent the s12 FOIA issue, some of the 
forces still refused to provide data on the basis that the costs of collating the data in the 
format requested (or at all) would exceed those set by the Information Commissioner. 
Others stated that they simply did not have the information, or some elements of it (in 
any format). For example, one force stated that because all its legal work for police actions 
was done externally, it did not hold data concerning claims and costs etc. and so could not 
provide it. This excuse is implausible. At the time the FOIA requests were made, s88(2)(b) 
of the Police Act 1996 required local police authorities to approve settlement sums in 
police actions.272 Thus, it was suggested in correspondence with forces which claimed not 
to hold any relevant data, that they could (at least) provide details of the reports produced 
 




to police authorities in accordance with s88(2)(b). However, this did not produce positive 
results.273 
At the commencement of the research in 2012, it was anticipated that the process of 
seeking the police actions data would be a preliminary exercise that could be conducted 
while the theoretical framework for the thesis was being developed. Instead, it became 
exceedingly time-consuming. It would have been necessary to make multiple appeals to 
the Information Commissioner (for information which it was not clear forces do in fact 
hold) to obtain more data. Consequently, the decision was taken to work with the data 
that had been provided and to note the limitations on what conclusions might be drawn 
from it. Therefore, the findings in Chapter 9 concerning the police actions data obtained 
is based on analysis of the information obtained from 16 forces.274   
6.5.2 Interviews  
 
6.5.2.1 Access Arrangements  
As indicated above, the FOIA requests led to correspondence with forces and it was in the 
course of this correspondence that interviews with force legal personnel and professional 
standards officers were arranged. Access was obtained in 2013 to conduct five interviews 
overall. Three of the interviews were with force legal personnel in three separate forces 
(two medium-sized and one smaller force). The remaining two interviews were conducted 
with professional standards officers, (one from the smaller force and one from one of the 
medium-sized forces). The first interview (with force A) was arranged in the context of 
correspondence about the s88(1)(b) reports to the force’s police authority and was 
therefore (at the outset at least) being given from a potentially defensive position. The 
main interviewee was the force solicitor A(LO) who was accompanied in the interview 
with two ex-police officers who were employed as legal assistants in the force at that time 
(A(LA) and A(LB). For most of that interview, questions were answered only by A(LO) but 
as will be noted in the discussion of interviews in Chapter 9 (at 9.2), there were interesting 
exchanges between A(LO) and A(LB) on some issues. Interviews with the other two forces 
 
273 See the recommendations in section 9.2.2 and 9.2.3 below. 
274 These include a range of large urban and smaller county forces, but it was not possible to obtain claims 




developed from correspondence which was more congenial and so did not include the 
focus on s88(1)(b) issues. For each of these interviews, only the interviewer and 
interviewee were present. 
6.5.2.2 Conduct of Interviews and Interviewer Effects  
It would have been beneficial for the full theoretical framework and detailed research 
aims to have been fully developed prior to the interviews (Bryman, 2008: 438-439). 
However, as indicated above, the FOIA requests were undertaken as a preliminary 
measure and, since access for the interviews was obtained consequent upon those 
requests, the interview schedules275 were prepared before the analysis in Part One of this 
thesis had been undertaken. As a result of the way in which access to the interviews had 
been arranged, strict adherence to a set of questions was deemed potentially detrimental 
to the openness of responses. Consequently, the interviews were only partially structured 
by reference to the interview schedules. A judgement was also made that seeking formal 
prior signed consent forms might undermine the access arrangements that had been 
agreed. Therefore, ethical approval was obtained for consent to be given orally.  
Accordingly, at the start of each interview, the research project was explained in broad 
terms to each of the interviewees, assurances were given concerning confidentiality, and 
the storage and use of the data, and each of the interviewees consent was then given 
orally and recorded.  
While non-standardised interviews are considered valuable where the subject matter is 
sensitive, they also provide increased potential for the impact of ‘interviewer effect’ by 
which the conduct of the interview can have significant impact on the interview responses 
(West and Blom, 2017: 185). Interviewer effect can find expression in multiple ways 
“misdirected probing and prompting, ignoring the impact of interviewer characteristics 
and behaviour, neglecting the cultural context in which the researcher is located and 
problems with question wording” (Fielding and Thomas, 2008: 261).  
Concerns regarding interviewer effect are intimately connected with one’s position 
towards the data obtained and how that is interpreted. For example, standardised 
interviews are frequently conducted with multiple interviewees and engage many 
 




interviewers in the same project. The responses tend to be treated in a positivistic manner 
as social facts, and the validity of that data is therefore dependent on minimising any 
differences in response that might be attributable to interviewer effects (Fielding and 
Thomas, 2008: 263).  In contrast in non-standardised interviews there is greater 
recognition that “interviews are interactional encounters and that the nature of the social 
dynamic of the interview can shape the nature of the knowledge generated”. 
Consequently, rather than eschewing and seeking to eradicate interviewer effect with 
rigid interview schedules etc, such recognition, is able to embrace the social character of 
the constructed knowledge that emerges during the interview process (Fonatna and Fey, 
2000: 699). Such a stance requires careful attention to be paid to the interview process; 
the potential power imbalances in the interview dynamic and the approaches adopted to 
analysing the interview responses. 
All the interviews were conducted by the researcher who had no prior professional 
experience with the interviewees or the forces in which they worked.  Importantly when 
handling police actions the researcher was employed by the Local Police Authority (which 
exercised an oversight role in relation to the Chief Constable276). In contrast the force legal 
personnel interviewed were employees of the force, which is a significantly different role, 
in particular, for example, in relation to the sometimes contentious contact the researcher 
had with some of the forces concerning the S88(1) issue discussed above. 
Gaining trust and establishing rapport are vital to the success of unstructured or partially 
structured interviews where one of the key aims is to gain understanding. The 
interviewers “presentational self” can consequently have an enormous effect on the data 
that are gathered (Fontana and Fey, 2000: 707). In this research, the researcher sought to 
maximise the potential for gaining trust and establishing rapport by adopting a 
presentational self that was very much ‘ex-insider’. For example, the researcher dressed 
as she had when practicing and was able to prompt in ways that demonstrated shared 
experience. Some of the responses, for example B(LO) referring to potential claimants as 
‘little scrotes’ and the A(LB) referring to  it being ‘nice to get back one’ on potential 
claimants suggests a candidness that, arguably, would not have been extended to 
 




interviewers without the researchers’ previous experience. However, what is said in 
interviews may not necessarily correlate with the interviewees values or actions (Feilding 
and Thomas, 2008: 261) The presentational stance the researcher took may have induced 
the type of response referred to above in circumstances where those expressed 
frustrations with potential claimants do not represent the  interviewees’ true feelings. 
Nonetheless in all the interviews the impression the researcher gained was that that the 
interviewees were seeking to present a specific and very measured account of their role 
and their personal responses to it, but that they ‘slipped’ in and out of more genuine 
accounts of their working practices and values277.  This was particularly evident in the 
finding that while all the legal officers maintained that they did not settle claims on 
economic grounds, they all also proceeded to give examples of occasions when they had 
done just that (see Chapter 9 at 9.2.5).  
 
6.5.3 Analysis  
 
As noted above the were only 5 interviews in total, each of which was between one and 
two hours long. The interviews were transcribed verbatim and the transcripts were then 
coded. The coding process adopted was different to that adopted for the textual analysis 
and the Nvivo software was not used. Instead a broader approach was taken which 
attempted to incorporate those occasions when the interviewees were maintaining a 
more ‘official paradigm’ stance and those they appeared more candid. Importantly, the 
findings outlined in Chapters 7 and 8 reveal that the processes of both police actions and 
police complaints depart significantly from the hypothetical idealisations delineated in 
this research. Consequently, the interviews were coded by reference to the themes that 
were developed in Part One but with particular attention being given to ways in which the 
interviewees’ responses accorded with or departed from the findings in earlier textual 
analysis. The coding process became complex and reflexive (as between the themes, the 
earlier findings and the interviewees’ changing positions) as the discussion in section 
9.2.3.2. and 9.2.4 below illustrates  
 
277 This would accord with the views expressed by Goldschmidt and Anonymous (2010) in their account of 




Partially structured or non-standardised interviews can be used to establish the variety of 
opinions that exist concerning a topic, as a means of scoping for further interviews in 
relation to the same research questions (Fielding and Thomas, 2008: 248). The number 
and range of interviews here makes it inappropriate to make any claim that they are 
representative of force legal personnel and professional standards officers generally and 
scoping for further interviews is the key function these interviews will ultimately serve (as 
discussed in Chapter 10). However, they do provide a snapshot of these interviewees’ 
conceptions of police complaints and police actions. They are, therefore, illustrative of 
some of the types of views about police complaints and police actions that existed within 
police professional standards and legal departments at the time the interviews were 
conducted. Further, while it is not possible to extrapolate beyond the interviews, some 
issues were raised by most, if not all, the participants, and these are worthy of further 
examination in future research.  
This chapter has explored the methodological approaches adopted for this research and 
discussed the limitations these may place on the overall findings. The following three 
chapters outline and assess the findings of each of the empirical stages of the research 










Chapter 7.  Analysis of Legal Judgments  
 
This chapter presents the findings from the analysis of legal judgments278 and explores 
the extent to which they accord with the theoretical idealisation relating to constitutional 
legitimacy. Section 7.1 explores police perceptions of the civil legal process, and Section 
6.2 assesses the courts’ conception of and responses to police (mis)conduct. Section 6.3 
addresses aspects of the reasoning in Thompson that are of pertinence to this research 
and Section 6.4 focuses on how the interpretation of the (Thompson) Guidelines in 
subsequent cases has affected the ability of police actions to contribute to the 
constitutional legitimacy of the police. 
 
7.1 The Police Position  
 
7.1.1 The Operational Code 
  
Analysis of the selected judgments exposes a pattern of unlawful police practices. In 
almost all the actions considered, the police had fabricated or exaggerated evidence of 
unlawful conduct on the part of the claimant and this had frequently been done in the 
context of (or in response to) the use of excessive force against the claimants by officers. 
In Thompson, Miss Thompson was subject to extreme and unnecessary force by officers 
who then fabricated an account of her having assaulted an officer by biting his finger so 
hard that it bled. Similarly, police gave false evidence that Mr Hsu has pushed an officer 
in the chest as a means of justifying their use of force against him which included him 
being kicked so hard in the back that he later passed blood in his urine.  In Rowlands v 
Chief Constable of Merseyside Police (Rowlands)279 the claimant was unnecessarily 
handcuffed, dragged backwards to a police car using the handcuffs and when, in the back 
of the police car, she asked for the handcuffs to be loosened the officer ‘yanked’ them to 
cause her additional pain. The claimant in Rowlands was maliciously prosecuted for 
‘obstruction of an officer in the execution of his duty’ (having originally also been charged 
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with ‘assaulting an officer in the execution of his duty’). In Isaac v Chief Constable of West 
Midlands Police (Isaac)280 the claimant was maliciously charged with ‘threatening 
behaviour’ under s4 of the Public Order Act 1986 and ‘assault with intent to resist arrest’, 
after officers had deliberately kicked him and grabbed him by the throat.  In Browne v 
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (Browne)281 a police officer used unreasonable 
and unnecessary force sufficient to cause Mr Browne a severe comminuted fracture of his 
right leg.282 The court found that the police officer lied about the surrounding 
circumstances, including his description of the claimant as appearing to be under the 
influence of drugs 283 and the reason given for the officers’ assessment that force was 
necessary at all.284 A striking aspect of this case is that the officer also created a 
deliberately dishonest account of returning to the ambulance which had been called to 
attend the claimant and the claimant at that stage admitting possession of drugs (which 
the court commented suggested an intention that the purported confession should be 
used at a criminal trial).285 
In many cases, junior and senior officers were found to have conspired, either to 
maliciously prosecute claimants or to lie to the court at the civil trial.  This was the case 
on the facts in Thompson, and in Manley v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis 
(Manley)286 a custody officer was also part of the conspiracy in fabricating charges that 
the claimant had refused to take a breath test. Further, in Watson v Chief Constable of 
Cleveland (Watson),287 an inspector sought a deal with the claimant’s solicitor whereby 
the charges against the claimant would be dropped if the police action was discontinued.  
This finding of patterns of police misconduct repeats the conclusions of much of the 
research relating to police practices, discussed in Chapter 4 (at 4.1.1). It aligns with 
Punch’s comment that low levels of officer misconduct can be catalysts for ‘process’ 
corruption (Punch, 2011: 31) and adds to Newburn’s observation concerning the 
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existence of some managerial complicity in both rule bending and rule breaking at this 
level (Newburn, 1999: 18, 2015: 9). The repeated perjury on the part of officers also 
accords with Goldschmidt’s finding that an aspect of the operational code includes a firm 
belief that effective policing can only be achieved by high levels of dishonesty on the part 
of officers (Goldschmidt and Anonymous, 2008: 130). However, the findings presented 
here make a significant additional contribution to that literature, because the facts upon 
which each judgment is based have been determined by the formal legal processes in 
place to secure the constitutional legitimacy of the police. 
 
7.1.2 the Police Organisational Response  
 
The police response to police actions suggests that the patterns of behaviour outlined 
above are endorsed by the police at an organisational level. The legal and political context 
of the appeal in Thompson was outlined at the close of Chapter 3. In those circumstances 
it was open to the Commissioner to take the large exemplary awards being given as 
indicative of a need to enforce discipline (in particular in relation to officers’ conduct 
towards ethnic minority communities) and to ensure transparency in the complaints 
process.  Therefore, the very fact of the appeal in Thompson indicates a defensive 
response to the role of police actions in exposing officer misconduct and, importantly, to 
apparent deficiencies, complacencies, or corruption in the internal investigation of police 
complaints.  
This defensive attitude on the part of the police is underscored by counsel for the 
Commissioner’s submissions in Thompson that exemplary damages should be limited 
because parliament has provided for the complaints system to serve the function of 
punishing and deterring officers.288 This narrow framing of the purpose of exemplary 
damages ignores the importance of the civil process in providing a mechanism for the 
public expression of disapproval of the police response to officer misconduct. It also seeks 
to undermine the courts’ role in protecting citizens against abuses of police power and 
 




attempts to shift the balance of control over officer conduct towards the complaints 
system (over which, as has been noted, the police retain considerable control).   
The Commissioners’ counsel in Thompson also submitted that in making an award, juries 
should be directed to take account of the claimant’s conduct and whether it might have 
provoked the officers.289 This was accepted and forms part of the Guidelines.290 However, 
this position can only be described as a misunderstanding of the importance of the rule 
of law. The surrounding circumstances might legitimately operate as mitigation in 
disciplinary proceedings, but to ask a court (where a jury has found that in all the 
circumstances the force used was excessive) to, at some level, endorse the police use of 
additional gratuitous violence (because of the character or behaviour of the claimant), is 
strong evidence of police acceptance of such conduct in respect of some sectors of the 
community. Moreover, it is particularly alarming in the context of the analysis in section 
7.1 above, which indicates that the fabrication of evidence that claimants had ‘provoked’ 
the police may be a frequent practice.   
The police attitude revealed in Thompson is also apparent in other cases. In Manley 
(where, among other things, the claimant had been held down by two officers while being 
beaten by another and gratuitously sprayed in the face with CS gas), counsel for the Chief 
Constable argued that “if one had regard to what started this incident the appellant to a 
great or some extent brought things on himself”.291 Similarly, in Clark v Chief Constable of 
Cleveland Police292 (Clark) the Chief Constable argued that although the officers had 
fabricated an account of what occurred, it would have been possible to charge the 
claimant with a different offence (which would have had the same or a similar outcome) 
on the basis of what had actually happened. Therefore, damages for malicious 
prosecution should not be increased. 293 This argument was rejected by the majority, on 
the basis that it would not be right for a jury, when assessing damages for malicious 
prosecution, to consider what other charges might have been brought.294 However, that 
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it was run at all indicates an acceptance by the police that the officers’ conduct in 
fabricating accounts was acceptable (or even encouraged) at a moderately high level 
within the organisation. 
Overall, the two cases in Thompson and the 6 claims in the subsequent judgments 
analysed here present a picture of a police force which does not consider itself subject to 
the rule of law.  The apparent acceptance of a practice of perjury in the criminal courts 
and, again, in the civil courts to defeat police actions, indicates a profound disrespect for 
the legal process. Lord Denning’s famous dicta in Blackburn295 that an officer is 
accountable to the law and the law alone, only has any force if (and interestingly assumes 
that) that accountability is meaningful to the police themselves. However, the analysis 
above suggests that the police do not regard the civil legal process as a form of 
accountability and therefore, unless the available sanctions are able to have a meaningful 
impact on officer conduct (and managerial control thereover), the court process is of 
limited value, and the idea that officers are accountable to the law must be reassessed. 
 
7.2 The Courts’ Attitude 
 
A second significant finding from the analysis of the judgments is that the courts are not 
only familiar with the police practices outlined above, but also, while not overtly accepting 
of them, are equally not overtly condemnatory of them either.  
 
7.2.1 The Police as Aligned with Other Organisations 
  
A finding in almost all the judgments during this analysis296 is a judicial tendency not to 
expressly refer to police powers or any requirement for officers to be held to account. In 
Thompson, Lord Woolf does note that the judicial committee were “very conscious” that 
the conduct of the officers could only be described as “outrageous and totally inconsistent 
with their responsibilities”.297 However, given the factual background, the legal and 
 
295[1968] 2 Q.B. 118 at 123D. 
296 Rowlands is an exception and is discussed in section 7.4.2 below.  




political context and the nature of the claimants’ submissions concerning the 
constitutional importance of the jury’s role in police actions,298 it is noteworthy that the 
judgment did not include an account of the constitutional position of the police and the 
importance of police actions as a bulwark against tyranny.   
More subtly, in Thompson, reference to police actions as actually involving the police is 
avoided on several occasions and instead they are frequently referred to as ‘this type of 
action’ or ‘these category of cases.’299 Furthermore, police actions are treated by Lord 
Woolf as analogous with personal injury and defamation actions, without reference to the 
nature of the claim in police actions or the role and powers of the police.300 
This limited reference to the constitutional position of the police is coupled with a general 
conception in Thompson of the police as aligned with private organisations. For example, 
as discussed below, Lord Woolf fails to recognise the two distinct categories of case 
delineated by Lord Devlin in Rookes v Barnard for which exemplary damages can be 
awarded (as discussed in Chapter 5 at 5.1.5.2). He also makes an unreasoned (and on the 
basis of Rookes v Barnard legally unsustainable301) assertion that when it comes to 
exemplary damages, the similarities between defamation and police actions is closest.302 
Lord Woolf proceeds to suggest that what distinguishes the two classes of case as regards 
exemplary damages is that in defamation actions “the award is [often] to prevent a 
newspaper profiting from the libel” whereas “[t]his element of profiting from your tort is 
almost invariably absent from” police actions.303 Since the majority of modern day libel 
actions involve publishing corporations, treating police actions as largely indistinguishable 
from libel claims also implicitly aligns the police with a private body in the eyes of the civil 
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7.2.2 The Courts’ Expectations of Police Officers  
 
The courts’ tendency to align the police with other organisations is mirrored in their 
approach to police officers.  The analysis of judgments reveals that the courts do not view 
dishonesty on the part of police offices as any more reprehensible than dishonesty on the 
part of the general public.  As noted above, Lord Woolf in Thompson did express the view 
that officers’ conduct was reprehensible. However, the jury’s finding in Watson that the 
inspector had offered to drop the charges against the claimant if the police action was 
discontinued is noted entirely passively by the court without a clear expression of 
disapproval. Indeed, it was suggested by Chadwick LJ that this did not constitute an 
‘exceptional feature’ of the case.304  
Similarly, in Browne, the High Court found that one of the officers had entirely fabricated 
evidence about returning to an ambulance which was attending to the claimant and 
rejected much of that officer’s other evidence. However, again there is no sense within 
the judgment in Browne of the officer having any status different to that of the claimant 
concerning the truthfulness of his evidence, nor is any concern expressed by the judge 
that an officer of the law had been engaged in giving clearly dishonest evidence in court.  
Further in Manley, the fabrication of evidence by a custody officer was expressly criticised 
because the role of the custody officer is to “protect the prisoner”.305 However, in that 
case Waller LJ, goes on to state “this is not a police officer who in the heat of the moment 
takes some action which is then covered up by false stories” and refers to this as “a 
situation bad enough in itself”. 306 The censure of the custody officer is therefore in the 
context of considerably weaker condemnation of officers in other circumstances perjuring 
themselves in order to maliciously prosecute innocent citizens.  
The official paradigm as outlined in Chapter 4 (at 4.1.1) encompasses an image of the 
police as fully committed to the rule of law.  One would expect the courts to endorse this 
and yet, the discussion above suggests courts implicitly accept the operational code. A key 
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element of the rule of law is equality before the law, and here we see this aspect of the 
rule of law transcending any recognition of the coercive powers enjoyed by the police. 
However, in having equal expectations of both officers and claimants concerning the 
standards of (dis)honesty expected, the courts are equating the police with the people, 
which, as discussed in Chapter 1 (at 1.3), is an aspect of organisational legitimacy.  
This is a significant point. The court’s approach may reflect an understanding of police 
actions as concerning officers (seen as private individuals) faced with a difficult job and 
needing to be accorded some latitude in how they carry it out. But that lens ignores the 
fact that they are acting, not in their private capacity, but as police officers. In the context 
of police actions, the idea of police officers as ‘citizens in uniform’ should not take 
precedence. Instead, they should necessarily be seen as (and be treated as) the bearers 
of oppressive state powers precisely because it is the courts’ role to demarcate the 
legitimate use of those powers. It may be appropriate to take account of the difficulty of 
the police role in relation to officer discipline or a determination of how much force was 
‘reasonable,’ but it cannot be justifiable for that to extend to officers giving false evidence 
in court.   
A corollary to this suggested explanation of the courts’ approach is judicial support, at a 
macro level, for the autonomy of the police (as an organisation) in how they balance the 
official paradigm and the operational code (worryingly in circumstances where the 
operational code may extend to routine perjury).  Some support for this view is perhaps 
given by Lord Woolf in Thompson. When referring to the fact-finding role of juries he 
states: “very difficult issues of credibility will often have to be resolved. It is desirable for 
these to be determined by the plaintiff's fellow citizens rather than judges, who like the 
police are concerned in maintaining law and order”.307 This suggestion of an affiliation 
between the courts and the police in circumstances where it is police conduct at both an 
individual officer and organisational level that is in question, also raises larger issues 
concerning the relationship between the judiciary and the police, which are beyond the 
scope of this research. 
 




7.3 Reasoning and Arguments  
 
As noted above, the reasoning in Thompson is flawed and, in several places, arguably 
unsustainable; those elements of judicial reasoning in Thompson most pertinent to this 
thesis are explored below.  
 
7.3.1 Exemplary Damages for Executive Abuse.  
 
The legal issue in Thompson was the proper interpretation of Section 8 of the Courts and 
Legal Services Act 1990 in cases of executive abuse. Section 8 extended the Court of 
Appeal’s powers if it considered a jury award excessive or inadequate, permitting it to 
substitute its own award, instead of ordering a new trial. At the time of the Thompson 
ruling, the application of Section 8 had only been explored in the context of defamation 
actions and the courts had been very careful to make clear that their reasoning in these 
decisions was limited to defamation and libel cases (See Rantzen v Mirror Group 
Newspapers (1986) Ltd,308 John v MGN Ltd309).  
It is difficult to imagine that this caution was not largely a consequence of the clear 
distinction made by Lord Devlin in Rookes v Barnard310 between the two types of action 
where exemplary damages may be awarded.311 Not surprisingly therefore, counsel for the 
claimants in Thompson argued that the principles relating to when the appellate court 
may interfere with awards of exemplary damages in defamation cases were wholly 
different to those relating to executive abuse.312 In particular, the point was made that 
exemplary damages in police actions take account of the defendant's conduct of the 
proceedings before the jury which the appellate court may not be able to assess fully or 
properly. Counsel for the claimants in Thompson also submitted that: 
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as matter of public policy juries have been retained as the constitutional tribunal 
for deciding issues which touch on the civil liberty of the subject. It is part of their 
function to mark the public's disapproval of outrageous conduct so as to deter 
public servants from abusing their powers313 [and consequently] juries are 
entitled to award substantial damages so as to deter other officers and to 
vindicate the rule of law.314 
It therefore can only be described as an abdication of the courts’ proper role that in 
Thompson these issues were not addressed, and that instead (as noted above) Lord Woolf 
treats police actions and actions in defamation as comparable. The Habermassian ideal 
requires the courts to give reasoned decisions.  In setting the Guidelines, Thompson 
radically changed the deliberative machinery that contributed to the constitutional 
legitimacy of the police without conforming to that ideal.  
The discussion of exemplary damages in the main section of the judgment in Thompson 
focuses only on their punitive quality (understood narrowly as ethical retribution).315 It 
therefore fails to refer to either their deterrent function or their broader vindicatory role 
in expressing disapproval of executive abuse. In contrast, the part of the judgment 
following the heading “The Guidance that Should be Given”316 does acknowledge the 
classic legal position as set out in Rookes v Barnard317 noting all three functions. However, 
within this context, punishment is stressed to such a degree that a final sentence which 
refers to exemplary awards as marking the jury’s disapproval of oppressive or arbitrary 
behaviour has very much the character of an afterthought.318 In the guidance section, 
Lord Woolf also emphasises that the jury should be told that any payments will be drawn 
from the police fund and, thereby, reduce resources for other policing functions.319 
Implicit in the idea that the payments are a wasteful use of public resources is an 
acceptance that the threat of being brought before the courts and made subject to large 
awards of damages will have no instrumental effect on officer behaviour or police 
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organisational decision-making concerning officer discipline. Such a view may reflect the 
general official position of trust in the police as so committed to the official paradigm that 
the officer conduct under scrutiny can only be conceived in terms of errors or bad apples. 
Arguably, however, the findings above point to an alternative conception of the police as 
so contemptuous of the rule of law that censure by the courts will have no impact (and 
the courts’ acceptance of that).   
The final section of the judgment in Thompson addresses the awards granted by the juries 
following each of the civil trials. Mr Hsu’s exemplary award is reduced from £200,000 to 
£15,000 and Lord Woolf states that “this should suffice to demonstrate publicly the 
strongest disapproval of what occurred and make it clear to the commissioner and his 
force that conduct of this nature will not be tolerated by the courts” (emphasis added).320 
It is submitted however that the reverse is true. The analysis in this chapter suggests that 
the courts are implicitly tolerant of police misconduct and that, in any event, the police 
would be impervious to judicial censure even if it was more pronounced. The prospect of 
public disapproval having an instrumental effect in restraining the arbitrary abuse of 
power was mooted in Chapter 5 (at 5.2.2) but will be limited by the settlement of police 
actions (which the judgment in Thompson is concerned to promote). Most interesting 
about this element of the judgment however is that there is no sense that exemplary 
damage may provide a fiscal inducement for forces to amend their practices so as not to 
engage in ‘oppressive, arbitrary and unlawful’ conduct.  The view that no amount of 
financial incentive will change these extreme police behaviors is again obliquely 
permissive of them or, at the very least, passively accepting that either such practices 
cannot be changed or that it is not, in fact, the courts’ role to restrain them.  
 
7.3.3 The Courts’ role and the public  
 
It has been argued that the inappropriate comparison made between defamation and 
police actions in Thompson permitted Lord Woolf to sidestep the significant constitutional 
issues raised by counsel for the claimants.321 Instead, the judgment prioritises consistency 
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of approach in personal injury, defamation and police actions: “[O]nce section 8 of the Act 
of 1990 has been given an interpretation as to one category of cases, that interpretation 
must apply across the board. It is difficult to see how the same words can have different 
meanings depending upon the type of action to which they are being applied”.322 Hence 
it is not the regulation of police conduct that is problematised in the judgment but, rather, 
the coherence of the civil justice system.  
In John V MGN,323 Sir Thomas Bingham M.R. expresses the view that “[i]t serves no public 
purpose” for potential claimants in defamation actions to consider it a road to “untaxed 
riches” “[n]or is it healthy if any legal process fails to command the respect of lawyer and 
layman alike, as is regrettably true of the assessment of damages by libel juries”.324 He 
continues: “It is offensive to public opinion, and rightly so, that a defamation plaintiff 
should recover damages for injury to reputation greater perhaps by a significant factor 
than if that same plaintiff had been rendered a helpless cripple or an insensate 
vegetable”.325  
Both these remarks were quoted with approval in Thompson.326 However, again the 
comparison is inappropriate because it does not take account of the fact that the public’s 
response to libel damages may be quite different from their response to large awards for 
outrageous police conduct.327 Importantly, in the context of police complaints, the ‘public’ 
is a public that needs to have confidence in the police. In contrast, the ‘public’ that is of 
concern to the court in Thompson is a public that is understood as prioritising a civil justice 
system which offers comparable awards across a range of actions, and a police force 
whose funds are not depleted by punitive awards for outrageous conduct. This ‘public’ is 
therefore painted as remote from the claimants and disinterested in ensuring that police 
comply with the rule of law. 
The remote role implicitly suggested for the public is evidenced in other aspects of the 
Thompson judgment.  Counsel for the claimants argued that the role of the jury in police 
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actions was to mark the public’s disapproval of outrageous conduct (so as to deter public 
servants from abusing their powers). In contrast, Lord Woolf limits the jury’s role to 
marking its own disapproval of the oppressive or arbitrary behaviour.  
Similarly, the claimants’ counsel highlighted the public interest in police actions and the 
substantive value in a public airing of the facts: “the public interest is often better served 
by exposure of the conduct complained of through the trial process than by 
settlement”.328 This aligns with the active role of police actions in restraining oppressive 
police conduct by the preservation of public outrage that was discussed in Chapter 5 at 
5.2.2.2. However, Lord Woolf does not address the point at any stage. Instead, by 
presenting the public as disinterested in the substance of police actions he obliquely paves 
the way for settlement to be privileged over adjudication. 
 
7.4 Subsequent Judgments  
 
7.4.1 Deference to the Guidelines  
 
Lord Woolf states that the Guidelines are appropriate for “straightforward” cases and 
should not be used in a “mechanistic manner”.329 However, based on the incidents that 
led to the appeal, it is difficult to imagine what might fall outside the category of 
‘straightforward’.330 Two inspectors conspired with junior officers to fabricate charges 
against Miss Thompson and went on to commit perjury at her criminal trial with the aim 
of securing a miscarriage of justice. In doing so, those senior officers were inevitably 
demonstrating to the junior officers that such conduct is an acceptable (or possibly 
expected331) element of police practice. For the Master of the Rolls to describe this as 
‘straightforward’ is a matter of grave concern, and Lord Woolf’s choice of words provides 
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an additional example of the courts’ oblique acceptance of officer misconduct. In any 
event, subsequent judgments have not engaged in an assessment of whether the case 
before them fell into the category of ‘straightforward’ and have shown a high degree of 
deference to the Guidelines, frequently treating them as limiting further judicial reasoning 
in this area.   
In Isaacs,332 the issue was whether exemplary damages could be awarded when a jury had 
not awarded aggravated damages. Thompson is not clear on the point and Isaacs provided 
an opportunity for the relationship between aggravated and exemplary damages to be 
expounded and the function of exemplary awards in police actions clarified. This 
opportunity was not taken and instead, in a narrow construction of the issues, Lady Hale 
(with Longmore LJ concurring) simply states that she cannot read the guidelines as 
suggesting that if you have one type of award you must have the other.333  
An issue in the appeal in Clark334 was whether Thompson could be seen as lowering the 
benchmark for when courts could intervene in a jury award. Both Rock LJ335 and Peter 
Gibson LJ336 held that Thompson had lowered the benchmark (Henry LJ dissenting) and 
each of them referred to the Guidelines as an aspect of that decision-making process.   
The fact that guidelines have been given in Thompson seems to me to make it a 
little easier to say in an appropriate case that the award, when scrutinised 
against the facts of the case, is disproportionately high or low. I do not thereby 
suggest that there has been a major alteration of the threshold for intervention 
by an appellate court…But if the award when considered against the facts is seen 
to be substantially out of line with the guidelines, then in my judgment the 
appellate court can and should interfere.337 
Before Thompson, the facts of each case and the awards given would have been key issues 
in the courts’ determination of whether it could properly interfere with a jury award. In 
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Clark however, it was the Guidelines themselves that were regarded as the benchmark. 
The reasoning in Clark is therefore rather circular in using the Guidelines as the criteria for 
their own application.  
The case of Watson demonstrates the extent to which the Guidelines have emasculated 
juries’ ability to express outrage.  As noted above (at 7.1 and 6.2.2), Watson involved an 
inspector offering a deal to the claimant’s solicitor to drop the charges against the 
claimant in return for the police action being withdrawn. The Guidelines include a 
suggested direction to the jury that it would be unusual for exemplary damages to be 
more than three times the basic award338 and this one element of the guidance had been 
omitted by the trial judge. The jury awarded sums near the lower end of the bracket 
suggested by the judge in relation to the compensatory damages, which is explicable on 
the basis the claimant was a habitual thief. For exemplary damages, the bracket given was 
£7,500 – £15,000 and the jury awarded £16,000. Despite this being above the bracket 
suggested by the judge, and more than three times the compensatory award, it did not 
take the overall award above the maximum suggested by the judge. In all the 
circumstances, therefore and, in particular, on the basis of the inspector’s attempt at 
make a deal with the claimant’s solicitor, it was open to the court to respect the jury’s 
assessment of exemplary damages. Instead the court considered that the inspector’s 
conduct was not an ‘unusual feature’ of the case and reduced the exemplary award to 
£9000.339 
Counsel for the Commissioner in Thompson specifically requested that a tariff system 
should be introduced for damages in police actions. The courts’ findings of what counts 
as ‘usual’ or ‘straightforward’ oppressive, arbitrary and unconstitutional conduct on the 
part of the police, coupled with a mechanistic deference to the Guidelines and readiness 
to interfere with jury awards, has effectively acceded to that request. This is of concern 
because as Skolnick and Fyfe observe “[f]or those…who believe that a degree of police 
brutality aids overall police efficacy, payments in settlement of police claims may be 
viewed as a reasonable price for the perceived benefits of officers’ unlawful and violent 
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conduct” (Skolnick and Fyfe, 1993: 205). Arguably Thompson and subsequent cases have 
invited (or indeed condoned) that view of police actions.  
 
7.4.2 exemplary damages and discipline outcomes  
 
The judgment in Thompson has resulted in confusion about when exemplary damages can 
be awarded. In the latter part of the judgment, Lord Woolf confirms that the 
organisational response to police actions (which must ultimately be a matter for the chief 
constable) can found a claim for exemplary damages. In particular he states “where a false 
defence is persisted in this can justify an increase in the aggravated or exemplary 
damages”.340 His Lordship also agrees that if disciplinary action is almost certainly going 
to be taken against an officer (and is likely to result in a discipline outcome), this could 
potentially be a reason for exemplary damages to be reduced.341 Lord Woolf thereby 
recognises a link between the discipline process (which is also ultimately a matter for the 
chief constable) and exemplary damages. Unfortunately, this recognition of the 
organisational aspect of exemplary damages is contradicted by a statement earlier in the 
judgment: 
Even if the use of civil proceedings to punish a defendant can in some 
circumstances be justified it is more difficult to justify the award where the 
defendant and the person responsible for meeting any award is not the 
wrongdoer, but his employer342. 
This was interpreted by Waller LJ in Manley as meaning that exemplary damages could 
not be awarded because the chief constable was the police officer’s employer.343 
Consequently, in Manley Waller LJ restricted his comments to aggravated damages: 
Any reasonable jury should have appreciated that a failure to award something 
other than a substantial sum for aggravated damages would send out an entirely 
 
340At 518F.  
341 At 518C. 
342 At 512H. 
343 At para 21. This was clearly wrong in law as accepted by the court later in the same year in Rowland v 




wrong message to the respondent. The police officers humiliated the appellant 
during the incident; they behaved in a high-handed, insulting, malicious and 
oppressive manner; those who were parties to the incident lied to found false 
charges, lied at the criminal trial and lied at the civil trial. The custody sergeant 
then fabricated or supported the fabrication of a story as well. No disciplinary 
proceedings of any kind have apparently resulted. No jury in my view could have 
awarded less than £10,000 as aggravated damages344(emphasis added). 
It is possible that all the conduct listed above was seen only as relevant to additional 
compensation. However, the assertion that anything less “would send out an entirely 
wrong message” to the respondent suggests that the court was motivated far more by a 
desire to express disquiet at the police conduct (at an organisational level), than to 
address the claimant’s proper feelings of pride and dignity. The concern that no officer 
had been disciplined also suggests a disquiet concerning the institutional response to the 
officers’ misconduct.  
This is the only case on the application of the Guidelines that draws links between awards 
of damages and potential disciplinary outcomes for officers and it is unfortunate that it is 
wrong in law about the application of exemplary damages and confuses the roles of 
aggravated and exemplary damages.   
The role of exemplary damages was subsequently clarified in Rowlands where the trial 
judge refused to put the possibility of aggravated or exemplary damages before the jury. 
Here, Moore-Bick LJ held that exemplary damages against the chief constable are “simply 
a means of expressing the jury’s ‘vigorous disapproval’ of the conduct of the police force 
as an institution as well and the individual police officer, on the occasion in question”.345 
He concludes: 
 …since the power to award exemplary damages rests on policy rather than 
principle, it seems to me that the question whether awards can be made against 
a person whose liability is vicarious only must also be answered by resort to 
considerations of policy rather than strict principle. While the common law 
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continues to recognise a power to award exemplary damages in respect of 
wrongdoing by servants of the government of a kind that has a direct effect on 
civil liberties, which for my own part I think it should, I think that it is desirable 
as a matter of policy that the courts should be able to make punitive awards 
against those who are vicariously liable for the conduct of their subordinates 
without being constrained by the financial means of those who committed the 
wrongful acts in question. Only by this means can awards of an adequate amount 
be made against those who bear public responsibility for the conduct of the 
officers concerned.346 
This description of exemplary damages is again inconsistent with the House of Lords in 
Rookes v Barnard where Lord Devlin sets out the occasions when exemplary damages can 
we awarded as a matter of law not policy. In the passage above, Moore-Bick LJ also adopts 
a narrow interpretation of that policy as punitive, and thereby fails to accommodate Lord 
Devlin’s more nuanced account of the purpose of exemplary damages (as outlined in 
Chapter 5 at 5.1.5.2). There is also nothing in the judgment in Rowlands to assist with 
what aims the ‘policy’ might seek to achieve.347   
 
7.5 Application to the Theoretical Idealisation 
 
The analysis of judgments was directed at addressing the secondary questions: What are 
the broader functions of police actions? How is police legitimacy conceived within them? 
What are they seen to contribute to police legitimacy?  The findings above indicate that 
the police have little or no regard for the civil legal process and that the courts do not 
conceive of or articulate their own role in terms of ensuring police compliance with the 
rule of law. On this basis it appears that police actions are conceived primarily in terms of 
compensation for individual claimants and as having little, if any, role in securing the 
constitutional legitimacy of the police. Further, the secondary question - ‘how is police 
legitimacy conceived within police actions?’ - is difficult to address. As noted above, there 
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is a tendency within the judgments not to differentiate between police officers and 
citizens and this is coupled with a tendency (noted particularly in Thompson) to align the 
police with private organisations. So, the answer appears to be that the question itself is 
slightly misplaced. Police legitimacy does not appear to be a feature of police actions: they 
do not address or consider it.  
These findings indicate that the practical reality of police actions diverges greatly from the 
theoretical idealisation delineated in Chapter 1. The theoretical idealisation comprised a 
mapping of constitutional legitimacy, police actions and Habermas’s conception of 
deliberative democracy. This envisaged the courts conceiving of their role as promoting 
the constitutional legitimacy of the police, and a police response to police actions which 
was deferential to the legal process and included, for example, internal police censure for 
perjury on the part of officers. The findings above indicate that neither the courts’ nor the 
police conception of police actions accords with the idealisation.   
The theoretical idealisation also envisaged jury engagement in police actions contributing 
to the constitutional legitimacy of the police by ensuring details of each claim were put 
into the communicative sphere. This would facilitate the degree of deliberation 
concerning police practices (and police regulatory mechanisms) necessary to conform to 
the Habermassian ideal of deliberative democracy. However, the enhancement of the 
communicative sphere anticipated by the idealisation has been undermined because the 
Guidelines (and the mechanistic manner in which they have been applied in subsequent 
judgments) have limited juries’ engagement in police actions. 
This chapter has presented the findings of the analysis of judgments and concluded that 
the theoretical idealisation comprising a mapping of constitutional legitimacy, police 
actions and Habermas’s conception of deliberative democracy is not representative of the 
reality of police actions. The following chapter presents the findings of the analysis of texts 
and addresses the extent to which these accord with the theoretical idealisation involving 















This Chapter presents the findings of the empirical enquiry into the police complaints and 
discipline system. Analysis of the PACA texts348 reveals a shift in focus from public 
confidence in the police (stemming from the ability of the police to ensure individual 
officer discipline) to an emphasis on systemic concerns regarding the police more 
generally.  Section 8.1 discusses what the PACA texts reveal about how police 
organisational identity is conceived and Section 8.2 examines the impact of the shift in 
emphasis to systemic concerns on conceptions of the role of the complaints and discipline 
system. The attention to police systemic failings coincides with a focus on police officer 
and police organisational ‘integrity’349 and Section 8.3 probes conceptions of ’police 
integrity’ within the PACA texts. Section 8.4 discusses how the role of PCCs is conceived 
within this dataset and section 8.5 draws on the findings presented in this chapter to give 
an account of current understandings of police organisational legitimacy.  
 
8.1 Organisational identity and public expectations  
 
Chapter 7 noted that the special constitutional position of the police and their mandate 
to use coercive force is seldom referred to in judgments in police actions. Analysis of the 
PACA texts reveals a similar tendency. Further, just as the judgment in Thompson aligned 
the police with private organisations, so in the PACA texts the police are aligned with other 
large public and private sector organisations, for example, the “National Health 
Service”,350 “the Aviation Industry”,351 “Banks”,352  “blue chip companies”,353 “a 
 
348 A list of the texts is set out in Appendix 3. References below relate to the document number and Title 
given to each of the texts in the Appendix.  
349 As noted in Chapter 4 (at 4.5) and discussed further below. 
350 PM3 Col 18. 
351 PM3 col18. 
352 T1 p13. 




commercial organisation”.354  Consequently, the idea that the regulation of officer 
conduct or oversight of police organisational responses to allegations of misconduct 
should be subject to specialised mechanisms because of the intrusive nature of police 
powers is not a feature of the reasoning in the texts. Instead, the repeated stance is that 
the police need to be exemplary because the public expect it. For example, in a paragraph 
about police integrity and legitimacy, Chapman explains:  
But they must be better than good – they must be ‘exemplary’. It is no less than 
the public would expect. (T1: 6) 
 
And later Chapman commences a section headed “The Start Point: Ethics, Trust and 
Confidence in the Police” with the following: 
 
The need to maintain the reputation of the police and the trust of the public 
imposes on the police the need for a code of conduct and standards more 




Similarly, in the forward to the Police Complaints Consultation Document, in a 
paragraph about the police complaints system, Theresa May (the then Home 
Secretary) states: 
 
The public have a right to expect that those who uphold the law on their behalf 
are properly held to account when their actions fall below the standards 
expected. (T2 :4) 
 
These statements express valuable and worthy aims. However, they underscore the 
lack of focus on police coercive powers as the key reason that special attention should 
be paid to how the use of those powers is regulated.  
In apparent contrast to this focus on public expectations, while the notion of ‘policing 
by consent’ does appear occasionally in the PACA texts, there is little, if any, reference 
to the connection between the police and the people.  Instead, recourse to public 
expectations as the founding reason for the police to maintain high standards, is 
 




coupled with a frequent use of ‘public perception’ as a filter or barrier for any 
normative stance in relation to the police use or abuse of their powers. This is 
demonstrated by the excerpts from the Chapman Review and Police Complaints 
Consultation Document below:   
The headlines [of multiple police scandals] often make uncomfortable reading. 
There is no getting away from the damage they create in the perception of the 
public. The public expect the police to act with integrity. (T1: 32) 
 
Strengthening integrity and tackling corruption is not only an issue for the police. 
The Government too is taking action to ensure that the public continue to have 
confidence that the police are exercising their powers appropriately.355(T2: 
para1.7) 
 
This filtering by public expectation is so prevalent throughout the dataset that 
instances of it that arise in the remaining excepts are highlighted in bold. 
The second excerpt above, appears in a section headed “The Challenge” which sets out 
the issues that the proposed reforms are intended to address. It is therefore of note that, 
instead of being concerned to ensure that police powers are used ‘appropriately’, the 
discussion is limited to the maintenance of ‘public confidence’ in their appropriate use.  
The filter by public perception therefore diverts attention away from a focus on what 
‘appropriate’ use of police powers may mean. This is noteworthy because if (as the 
findings in Chapter 7 indicate) ‘appropriate’ does not mean ‘only within the boundaries of 
the legal rules by which they are mandated’, alternative meanings need to be formulated. 
The theoretical idealisation concerning organisational legitimacy conceived of the 
measure of ‘appropriateness’ becoming apparent by reference to the connectedness 
between the public and the police.356 However, as noted above, the connection between 
the police and the people is not a feature of the dataset.  
This links with a subtler point. The filtering by public expectations encourages police 
organisational legitimacy to be conceived at a macro level. Instead of vesting in the 
outcome of myriad interactions between the police and individual members of the public, 
 
355 The emphasis on integrity is clear in both these excerpts and is discussed in section 7.3 below.  
356 The analysis of interviews in section 8.2 below reveals that is it not always clear how professional 




attention is focused on legitimacy at the larger scale level of the public in general and the 
police as an organisation.  It is submitted that the former, smaller scale conception, is 
more vulnerable to being undermined by single instances of poor officer conduct (or that 
that conception of organisational legitimacy places more importance on getting each 
interaction right). In contrast, the latter is necessarily more concerned with the bigger 
picture of how the organisation is operating (or perceived to be operating). This is 
important to this thesis because significantly, the former would resist arguments 
associated with a discourse of necessary evil, while the latter may embrace it. The change 
in the scale at which organisational legitimacy is conceived in the PACA texts may 
therefore invite considerable substantive change to conceptions of police legitimacy.  
 
8.2 The Official Position, Bad Apple Reasoning and Systemic Issues.   
 
8.2.1 Police systemic failings  
 
Many of the PACA texts, rearticulate the official position of trust in the police357 and 
consequently adopt ‘bad apple’ reasoning in relation to the function of the complaints 
and discipline system.358 However, this official position is not the dominant narrative and 
instead (as noted above) the PACA texts reveal a focus on systemic issues. This is evident 
in the Chapman Review where, in his foreword, he states:  
 
At the heart of the issue throughout this report is not discipline at all (sic): it is the 
sum of governance, leadership, management, ethos, ethics, training, culture and 
behaviours. (T1: 6) 
 
Later in the same section, having noted the importance of proper ‘processes’359 Chapman 
continues:  
 
Changing processes do not, by themselves, make things better, or necessarily 
make a difference: a change in ethos and culture are the main drivers of change 
in any transformational programme. (T1: 6) 
 
357 For example, PM1, T2:4, T4: 4. 
358  For example, T1:6, T1:26/7, T2:5, T4: 4.   





Moreover, (as detailed below), the idea that the police are substantially beyond reproach 
is undermined in several sources. Collectively these suggest that the mischief the reforms 
are seeking to address goes beyond a restructuring of ‘the processes’ and extends to 
deeper systemic issues concerning core values held by the police as an organisation. For 
example, in the Second Reading debate in the House of Commons on the Policing and 
Crime Bill, Sir Mike Penning MP refers to imposing a sanction of loss of pension on officers 
because they have committed certain types of offence on a weekly basis.360 In the same 
debate, several high-profile policing scandals are cited “as testimony to the uphill struggle 
that ordinary people face in holding the police to account, even when there is clear 
evidence of wrongdoing” (Andy Burnham MP).361 Further, John Woodcock MP implies 
that Cumbria Constabulary purposefully delayed a disciplinary process against officers to 
suppress a report that is critical of the police response to the death of Poppi 
Worthington.362  
 
We are left with a situation in which a force is in control of the disciplinary 
process, but by delaying that process it can hold up the publication of a report 
that is critical of that force. I am not saying necessarily that Cumbria 
constabulary is deliberately doing so, but that is clearly the effect.  (PM2 Col 74).  
 
These criticisms are reminiscent of those made during the debates on the Whitehead Bill 
in 1973, discussed in Chapter 3 (at 3.2.1). What signals a substantive official change in 
focus toward systemic issues is that this criticism is not limited to the representations of 
MPs. The Chapman Review is critical of police cultural failings, senior management 
complacency in relation to discipline, and police organisational commitment to ‘values’:   
 
Many cases studied for this report show that there is often a failure to recognise 
(from serving personnel) that they have done anything wrong (T1:15)  
 
There have been too many examples where this expectation [as expressed in the 
oath of office] has not been achieved. Either because of failures in supervisory 
 
360 PM2 col75. 
361 PM2 col51. 






behaviours, lack of interventions, organisational culture, or in circumstances of 
small team loyalty or loyalty to the colleague or force outweighing loyalty to 
either values or the public, there has been a perception of wrongdoing – and 
also a perception of a lack of accountability when this wrong doing occurs. 
(T1:9)363  
 
 [T]he notions that have been entertained to keep people in service during 
disciplinary procedures would not be acceptable in letting people into the 
service during recruitment. (T1:17) 
 
Although an organisation should be allowed to conduct its own 
investigations and disciplinary outcomes, this is not an inalienable right, but 
must be based on fair and transparent investigations - and credible 
outcomes. (T1 :35) 
 
The Home Secretary also departs from the bad apple stance in some instances: 
 
 
But as I have said before, the good work of the majority threatens to be damaged 
by a continuing series of events and revelations relating to police conduct. 
(emphasis added) (T4: 4) 
In addition, the Government proposes to end the current practice on non-
recording of complaints. Some complainants did not understand the rationale for 
requiring forces to take a decision about whether or not a complaint should be 
recorded. Some considered that this was a way in which their complaints could 
be ignored. Some stakeholders considered that the large number of appeals that 
were upheld against non-recording decisions was an indication that the police 
did not fully grasp how decisions about recording should be taken. More 
fundamentally, however, a decision not to record a complaint means that the 
police lose vital information about the integrity or performance issues affecting 
them. (T2:10) 
 
This shift to a concern for systemic failings is reflected in the way the complaints and 
discipline process is conceived, as explored in the following section.  
 
 
363 This is a particularly stark example of the use of ‘perception’ as a means of distancing the writer from 




8.2.2 The Role of Complaints and Discipline  
 
All the PACA texts state that ‘public confidence’ is a key aim of the police complaints 
system as the following examples demonstrate.  
The overriding objective of the police disciplinary system is to ensure public confidence 
(T3:8) 
Addressing issues of public confidence in the police has been a key impetus for reform. 
(T5:13) 
When I launched the public consultation in December 2015, I explained the need for a new 
governance structure for the IPCC to meet its new challenges and play a stronger role in 
securing and maintaining public confidence in the reformed police complaints and 
discipline systems. (T6:2) 
However, a finding of this research is that the question of how the complaints and 
discipline system will improve public confidence is less associated with the maintenance 
of a disciplined force (as discussed in Part One of this thesis) and, instead, articulated in 
terms of integrity and lesson learning: 
 
Officers who deserve to be dismissed are increasingly understanding that that 
there is no hiding place in the service for them: reflective of a police service willing 
to set and enforce high standards of professional behaviour and one which fully 
appreciates the need for public confidence in rooting out those officers who lack 
integrity, who are corrupt, who commit criminal offences either on or off duty, or 
who significantly fail to adhere to any of the recognised standards of professional 
behaviour. (T1 25-26) 
 
Police integrity is at the heart of public confidence in the police and underpins 
the model of policing by consent. It is what gives rank and file officers the 
legitimacy to do their jobs effectively. (T6:2) 
 
Complaints must be responded to in a way that restores trust, builds confidence, 
and allows lessons to be learned. (T2:4) 
 
Scrutiny of the system is provided by the IPCC, through its role ensuring that 










A further finding is that ‘integrity’ is now conceived as the central legitimating feature of 
the police:364 
In an organisation the values at every level are the key. For the police, integrity 
is, perhaps, the key value – followed closely by trust. They both confer legitimacy. 
(T1:6) 
In December, I launched a public consultation on my proposals for long-term 
reforms to improve police integrity. At the heart of those reforms were changes 
to the police complaints system. (T4:4) 
 
Chapter 4 (at 4.4) noted how ‘police integrity’ is interpreted differently by the COP and 
the HMICFRS. Broadly speaking, within the PACA texts individual officer integrity is 
conceived in the same sense as outlined in the Code of Ethics produced by the COP. 
However, the idea of police integrity operates at two levels within the PACA texts: 
individual officer integrity and organisational integrity, and this imports subtle changes as 
to how police legitimacy is conceived. 
 
8.3.1 Individual Officer Integrity, Discipline and Blame  
 
The analysis of the PACA texts highlights a concern about what is referred to as a 
‘damaging blame culture’ within the police. For example, the COP states: 
The emphasis on identifying ‘blame’ has compromised the system and as a result 
led to a defensiveness within the service that defeats the ends that are sought. 
(T3: 5)  
 
The disquiet about a blame culture is consistent with a shift in emphasis away from 
discipline and towards a focus on officer integrity. Importantly, an officer can be blamed 
for a lapse in discipline. However, an officer of integrity who makes a mistake deserves 
 
364 In the Government White Paper, Policing a New Century: A Blueprint for Reform (CM 5326) preceding 
the Police Reform Act 2002 which established the IPCC, the word ‘integrity’ appears just twice and the 
words ‘public confidence’ appear 21 times. In the Government’s consultation document following the 




the support of the organisation and an organisation that values integrity will want to know 
how the mistake occurred. Chapman advocates that: 
…the question is not “did he or she do it” but “what should we do about it”. (T1: 
75)   
This is important, because it potentially changes what is understood as a proportionate 
response in relation to the internal investigation of complaints. If the motivation is to find 
out what happened, a deeper level of inquiry is needed. In contrast, if the aim is to 
improve systems, then, for example, a formal hearing to test facts is unnecessary (Smith 
2009a: 424). Both are worthy aims.365 But which is prioritised on each occasion will have 
a substantial impact on what is conceived as a ‘reasonable and proportionate’ internal 
investigation.  
Interestingly, while the College of Policing is neutral on the reason for the blame culture, 
police evidence in the Committee Stages of the Bill indicates a police view that 
responsibility rests with the IPCC: 
In my six years as a national officer for this association, the blame culture in 
policing has got progressively worse, and it is having a huge impact on morale 
and the confidence of officers to do their job. (Chief Superintendent Curtis PM2 
col18) 
 
The IPCC has a key role to play in tackling the whole issue of the blame culture in 
the police service. …We must get back that sense of proportionality in how we 
deal with conduct issues in policing. The IPCC has a key role to play in that, as do 
police forces, but the IPCC in particular. (Chief Superintendent Curtis PM2 col18) 
 
In the evidence from the superintendents, they made powerful points in relation 
to how the inspectorate regime works and also about what they described as the 
difficulties of a blame culture within the police service and the importance of 
proportionality. …I distinguish between that which clearly should be the subject 
of disciplinary action and what the police organisations said to us today. Dame 
Anne, convince us you can put it right. (Jack Dromey MP PM2: col 73) 
 
The then Chair of the IPCC, Dame Anne Owers’ response to the parliamentary committee 
gives some additional insights into the tension between the IPCC and the police (discussed 
 




in Chapter 4). She explains that she is on record as agreeing with the idea that the police 
complaints system is too focused on blame.  However, she continues: 
At the moment, the appeals system has complaints being upheld, but 
complainants largely do not want them to be upheld; they want an answer. The 
Bill goes some way towards trying to create a more effective complaints system, 
but I would pass over to the Committee the extent to which you and others still 
think that it disentangles itself sufficiently from the necessity of finding blame, 
rather than finding the truth. (PM2: col 73) (emphasis added)  
 
As noted in Chapter 4 (at 4.2.3.3) the IPCC upholds a high proportion of appeals from 
internally investigated police complaints. Chapter 4 suggested that a reason for this may 
be that the IPCC expects more thorough investigations which are premised on the idea 
that the credibility of officers’ accounts may be questioned. It is therefore appropriate to 
speculate that the idea that the IPCC is responsible for a ‘blame culture’ may simply be 
matter of different perspectives on what is a ‘proportionate’ investigation. ‘Getting an 
answer’ in relation to each of the cases discussed in Chapter 7 may involve officers being 
‘blamed’ for unlawful conduct when the police as an organisation had, in fact, encouraged 
the practices.  
Chapter 4 also argued that, as a statutory feature of the complaints investigation process, 
‘proportionality’ will increase police autonomy in their own internal investigations. The 
analysis presented here suggests that an emphasis on integrity may operate to expand 
that area of autonomy further, by narrowing the field of allegations for which a more 
probing investigation is considered proportionate. 
 
8.3.2 Organisational Integrity   
 
The way in which ‘integrity’ is used throughout the dataset spans both individual officer 
integrity and organisational integrity: 
 Any activity or personal behaviour that is counter to an individual’s 
professionalism or damages the reputation of the police and that places at risk 
the trust and respect of colleagues and the public must be avoided. So, must any 
behaviour that calls into question the integrity of any officer, but more so those 





The Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) provides a vital service to 
the public by independently investigating serious allegations made against the 
police, overseeing how the police deal with complaints, and how they provide the 
public with redress in case of failures. In doing so, the IPCC has a key part to play 
in securing the integrity of the police (emphasis underlining added) (T6 :2) 
 
Together, these reforms will represent a substantial overhaul of the systems that 
hold police officers to account. They will build on our radical programme of police 
reform. And they will help to ensure that police honesty and integrity are 
protected, and corruption and misconduct rooted out. That is what the public 
and the many thousands of decent, dedicated and hardworking police officers 
of this country deserve. (T4 :4) 
 
The underlined aspects of the above excerpts are of note. There are two distinct meanings 
of the word integrity, one aligns with virtue and honesty, the other with togetherness and 
cohesion. Understood in the former sense (which the context invites, but does not 
require), one does not ‘secure’ or ‘protect’ the integrity of an individual, one tests, doubts 
or extolls it. Similarly, it is strange to suggest that mechanisms might ‘protect’ or ‘secure’ 
the actual bona fides of an organisation’s responses to particular incidents. What is 
‘secured’ or ‘protected’ is reputation or public image.  It is therefore, (very tentatively) 
intimated that what these excerpts express is that, at some level, what is sought to be 
‘protected’ or ‘secured’ is something different: the public belief in the police to work with 
an appropriate balance between the official paradigm and the operational code – in short, 
the public willingness to continue to clap366. Section 8.4 below explores this idea further 
in the context of what the PACA texts reveal about conceptions of how ‘police integrity’ 
may be ‘protected’ or ‘secured’. 
 
8.4  PCCs, Accountability, Independence and Transparency  
 
The independence of the IPCC and the accountability of officers for their actions do 
feature in the PACA texts. However, the former is only a dominant feature in the IPCC 
 




Governance review367 and focus on the latter mostly occurs in the parliamentary debates 
concerning proposed provisions to discipline officers who have retired.368 Instead, the 
concepts of ‘independence’, ‘accountability’ and ‘transparency’ within the PACA texts 
tend to be more frequently related to the role of PCCs:  
   
One of the main strengths of the PCC model is the increased transparency and 
direct accountability it has brought to policing. PCCs are able to take a system 
wide view in a way that police authorities never could. One element of this is the 
complaints system. It provides PCCs with early sight of the issues that are of 
concern to their electorate and areas where there is scope for improvement in 
force performance. (T2:14) 
 
Since the introduction of PCCs, we have seen a clear line of accountability from 
the electorate, through the PCCs, to chief constables and ultimately police 
officers themselves. There is no ambiguity about where the buck stops, and that 
is absolutely how a democracy should work. (PM3:Col84) 
 
To improve the independence of the complaints system, the Government 
proposed to enable a greater role for directly-elected PCCs. (T4:7) 
 
The theoretical idealisation for police complaints envisages legitimacy vesting in the 
provision within the process for thick proceduralisation. Chapter 4 (at 4.3) noted that by 
giving PCCs responsibility for the complaints process at a local level and providing 
opportunities for PCCs to handle some aspects of the complaints process, the PACA 
distances the police from the public, particularly at the point of disquiet. Consequently, it 
was suggested that for the organisational legitimacy of the police to be enhanced in the 
manner envisaged in the theoretical idealisation, PCCs would need to act as effective 
conduits, providing a means of translation between the police and the public. In contrast, 
the analysis of the PACA texts suggests that the role of PCCs is conceived in terms of 
democratic accountability for how the police handle complaints more generally (i.e. again 
at a more macro level). 
 
Increased democratic accountability concerning local policing priorities and the handling 
 
367 As discussed in Chapter 4, the PACA has sought to strengthen the IOPC’s investigatory powers.  The 
review also addressed the independence and perceived independence of the IOPC from the government 
but considered it not to be an issue (see T5 para 2.5 p17). 




of police complaints at a local level is arguably a worthy aim.369 However, the analysis 
above suggests that it has embodied a shift towards a macro level conception of police 
legitimacy. As discussed in Chapter 4, the relationship between PCCs and their chief 
constables is varied, and the democratic legitimacy of PCCs is contested.  Importantly 
however, democratic accountability is, in any event, a blunt instrument in relation to 
policing (Crawford 2013: 11-12) and, in particular, the sorts of police practices that the 
analysis in Chapter 7 indicates may be relatively routine. Moreover, it is difficult to 
imagine how PCCs might provide transparency concerning police decisions about whether 
officers are disciplined, when a ‘proportionate’ investigation is unlikely to result in many 
instances of officer misconduct coming to light. Instead the PCCs’ role is conceived, at the 
larger scale level of the potential for systemic change.  
 
8.5 Police Organisational Legitimacy  
 
The systemic emphasis within the PACA texts is underlined again by the discussion of 
super-complaints.370 If the organisations that can bring super-complaints are able to 
provide effective translation between the police and the public, the super-complaints 
process may include some thick proceduralisation. However, again, the emphasis is 
on changing police practices rather than enhancing police-community relationships 
directly. This is particularly important since a potential benefit of super-complaints is 
their ability to respond to concerns raised by members of those groups who are 
currently less inclined to make complaints directly to the police. Interestingly 
however, the value of super-complaints is not articulated in terms of integrity.  
Instead, they are described as allowing “organisations to identify trends and patterns 
of aspects of policing that might be harming the interests of the public” (T2: 23), or 
“on a particular issue, which might relate, for example, to a pattern of policing that 
could undermine legitimacy” (PM3: col 42). 
 
Overall, the way the police complaints and discipline system is conceived in the PACA 
 
369 Many commentators are ambivalent about the political underpinnings and the perceived role of PCCs 
as discussed in chapter 4 at 4.3. 




texts does not reflect the theoretical idealisation relating to organisational 
legitimacy. In fact, the analysis here signals a move away from police legitimacy being 
understood as enhanced by the connection between the police and the public. 
Instead reduced opportunities for direct contact between the police and the public 
coincide with a different conception of police organisational legitimacy as enhanced 
by a network of external (independent) bodies371 with specific responsibilities for 
identifying systemic issues and suggesting and ensuring the implementation of 
systemic improvements.  
 
Of course, at many levels the potential benefits of a focus on constant practical 
improvement in policing is a good thing. However, the overall sense is of forces now 
more distanced from the public and shielded from direct criticism by a new official 
position of ‘police integrity’, understood as the police organisation being surrounded 
by bodies which are empowered to enforce the implementation of systemic 
improvements. Importantly, however, this is not the same as the police as an 
organisation demonstrating integrity in the sense of being honestly motivated 
towards such improvements. Furthermore, the level of supervision and forms of 
systemic improvement provided by the PCCs, the HMICFRS, the IOPC and the bodies 
that are designated as able to bring super-complaints are unlikely to encroach on the 
types of police behaviour which are the focus of this research and are evidenced in 
Chapter 8.  
 
The following Chapter explores what the empirical data gathered for this research 
reveals about the settlement of police actions. This is with a view to assessing (in 
Chapter 10Chapter 10) whether settlement data might assist in ensuring that those 









Chapter 9 The Settlement of Police Actions  
 
Introduction 
This Chapter presents the findings from analysis of empirical data gathered for this 
research.  Section 9.1 discusses the claims data obtained from forces and section 9.2 
complements this with a thematic analysis of the interviews conducted with police legal 
and professional standards officers. 
9.1. Findings from FOIA Requests  
 
When the research question was conceived in Spring 2012, the IPCC was still publishing 
statistics for substantiated complaints. At that time, it was considered that comparison 
between substantiated complaints and settled police actions might be valuable in 
exploring the interface between police actions and police complaints. Consequently, FOIA 
requests were sent to each force with the aim of obtaining police actions data. As 
discussed in Chapter 6, this did not produce reliable results from all 43 forces in England 
and Wales. The analysis below is therefore based on the results obtained from 16 forces 
asked in 2012 to give claims data for the preceding 5 years. The findings are therefore 
limited and both the propensity to claim and forces’ settlement practices may have 
changed since the responses to the FOIA requests were given. 
The process of seeking to obtain the police actions data produced some findings (in 
addition to the actual data sought). As noted in Chapter 6, some forces appeared resistant 
to providing the data. Notwithstanding this, many forces have different recording 
practices and, therefore, obtaining and collating comparable claims data across forces is 
not likely to be possible unless consistency of recording practices is enforced at a national 
level.  This point is discussed in Chapter 10. 
The FOIA questionnaire372 asked for details of claims which were settled or had proceeded 
to trial over the last five years. Litigation is a slow process and a claim may, very 
frequently, be held in abeyance pending the outcome of any complaint related to it. There 
is, therefore, something quite arbitrary about recording or analysing claims figures on a 
 




strict year by year basis.  To overcome this, for each force the mean figures (for the period 
over which that force was able to provide figures) were used.373  
 
The questionnaire sought figures (numbers of actions, settlement sums or damages 
awarded, and third-party costs) in relation to three separate stages in the litigation 
process:  
 
1.  Cases that proceeded to trial;  
2.  Cases which were settled after proceedings had been issued but before trial; and 
3.  Cases that were settled without proceedings having been issued.   
 
The analysis below is structured around these three stages of the process and is based on 
the averages for each force in relation to each stage. Handling the data as averages over 
a 5-year period and, for example, as a percentage of cases settled at each stage of the 
litigation process, inevitably provides a limited picture and more detailed statistical 
analysis of more accurate claims figures would inevitably produce more nuanced results. 
However, it was considered appropriate because of the variation in size and types (e.g. 
urban or rural) of force. Further, the consistency of results in some of the analysis 
provided reassurance that this was a valid approach and consequently some tentative 
conclusions have been drawn which point to avenues of further enquiry. 
 
9.1.1 Numbers of Claims  
 
Chapter 5 (at 5.2) noted that in 2010 the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police made 
representations to the Home Secretary concerning the number of police actions being 
brought. It was not possible to obtain claims data from the Metropolitan Police, but the 
data obtained from the 16 forces willing to provide them do not indicate that the number 
of actions or threatened actions the police were facing in 2012 was increasing dramatically 
 
373 This is possible because there does not appear to be any significant increases or decreases in claims over 




year on year. The claims per year for each force that provided police actions data 
appeared quite stable.   
 
9.1.2 Matters Going to Trial 
 
The percentage of claims that proceeded to trial for each force varied from 5-16%. The 
mean percentage, across those forces whose figures could be assessed in this way, was 
12%. This represented a total of 96 cases of which 81 (84%) were successfully defended. 
For the forces whose data were analysed, only 2% of claims went to trial and were lost.374 
Broadly speaking, therefore, it appears that only a small proportion of police actions 
proceed to trial and those that do are generally successfully defended.  
The questionnaire did not request the quantum of damages sought in those cases that 
were successfully defended (and which form the substantial majority of those that went 
to trial). It is not therefore possible to speculate regarding the type of cases that 
proceeded to trial generally. However, a perusal of the damages and third-party costs 
awarded in cases that were lost at trial indicates that these were not, on the whole, very 
high value cases. This of course represents  a small number of cases (15 in all) so any 
conclusions must necessarily be rather speculative. However, for the majority of these, 
the damages awarded were in the region of £7,000 - £10,000.  Similarly, third party costs 
for these cases varied from £16,000 - £65,000375 with a (median) average of £35-40,000.  
 
9.1.3 Matters Settled Before Trial but after Proceedings are Issued  
 
The percentage per force of matters settled after proceedings had been issued but before 
trial varied from 6% to 30%. The mean percentage across those forces whose figures could 
be analysed in this way was 15%.  
For these matters, the average quantum per claim for each force varied from £2,690 to 
£13,576 with a mean average across those forces whose figures could be analysed in this 
way of £7,194. Similarly, the range of third party costs per claim for each force was £1,333-
 
374 16% are lost at trial and 16% of 12% gives 1.92% 




£18,533 with a mean across forces of £11,611. Therefore, in very general terms, 
approximately 15% of claims  were settled  
 
 after proceedings are issued with an average quantum in the region of £7,000 and third-
party costs in the region of £11,500. 
 
9.1.4 Matters Settled Before Proceedings are Issued 
 
The percentage per force of matters settled before proceeding were issued varied from 
54% to 90% with a mean across forces whose figures could be analysed in this way of 71%. 
For these, the average quantum per claim for each force varied from £1,488-£2,554 with 
very few falling outside that range. Similarly, average third-party costs for these cases 
varied between £923- £1912, with a very small number falling outside that range.  
These figures suggest that approximately 70% of claims are settled before proceedings 
are issued with an average quantum of £2,000 and third-party costs of £1,500. 
The results are summarised in the table below  
Results summary  
 
Type of case Percentage of all settled 



































*That these don’t add to 100 is to be expected since they are calculated from means of percentages but as indicated, since there was 
broad consistency across forces in relation to the distribution of settlement practices these figures have some validity. 
**These represent a very small percentage of all those cases that went to trial and as noted the quantum and potential third-party 




It is only possible to draw tentative conclusions from such limited data. One area where 
there was consistency between the forces was the success rate at trial. However, (as 
noted in the Introduction to Part One), it is not possible to say whether this might be 
because, for example, juries are more likely to believe officers’ accounts of events or 
because force legal personnel make cautious settlement decisions.  
An interesting observation is that, for those (minority of) cases that are lost at trial, the 
average level of damages is only slightly higher than those settled after proceedings have 
been issued (but before trial). As one would expect, the third-party costs are substantially 
higher for such cases because they include the claimants’ solicitors’ and counsels’ costs 
for preparation and conduct of the trial. This points to a tentative conclusion that, from a 
police perspective, the motivation to defend cases all the way to trial is not always 
primarily economic or based on the head of claim or likely quantum, but some other 
qualitative aspect of the case.376 Meanwhile, it does appear that lower level claims may 
be routinely settled before proceedings are issued. These are both areas where further 
quantitative and qualitative enquiry would be valuable.  
Given the concern in this thesis that police actions data should be published, the analysis 
set out above is problematic. If claims data permits an assessment of force settlement 
practices, forces may (unsurprisingly) be reluctant to disclose such data for fear of 
encouraging more (and potentially more) speculative claims. 
 
9. 2 Interviews 
 
 




As indicated in Chapter 6, five interviews were conducted with force legal personnel and 
professional standards officers. The findings below can therefore only provide an 
illustration of the types of views and practices that exist in some police forces (three in 
total). They do nevertheless provide a valuable insight into areas where further qualitative 
research might be conducted and some of the issues it might address.  
 
9.2.1 Authorisation of payments from police funds  
 
The introduction to Part Two explained how access for interviews emerged from 
correspondence concerning the FOIA requests for police actions data. One interview was 
arranged in the context of an exchange about whether the force was willing to disclose 
the information it provided to its police authority in compliance with S88(1) of the Police 
Act 1996. That interview therefore addressed this issue and the legal officer indicated that 
the police authority exercised very limited supervision over settlement payments:  
 
 
A(LO): I used to have to report to the police authority every quarter on civil 
claims, but it became a meaningless report because it was just numbers and 
figures on a page which meant nothing to them. And also, quite often the 
statistics were out of date because by the time you’ve settled a claim, the action 
incident that it relates to was 4 years ago… .And the behaviour that happened 
then is completely different to the behaviour now when you’re actually settling 
the claim. So you look at it and go, ‘well, this wouldn’t happen nowadays. Well, 
thank goodness, because the policy has changed’. …So, what we do for them, or 
what we have been doing for them is an annual report, picking up on all our areas 
of work and on the threads and themes, bringing to their attention the major 
cases that we’ve dealt with where we’ve had to settle and then they will have an 
interest as to what should happen.  
 
The duty to authorise settlement payments under S88(1) of the Police Act 1996 is now 
exercised by PCCs.  Importantly, as discussed in Chapter 4, PCCs also now have an 
overarching duty concerning the way each force handles police complaints. Therefore, it 
is important to consider ways in which the use of public funds in handling police actions 








9.2.2 Officers, Complainant and Claimants.  
 
Chapter 8 noted how the reforms brought about by the PACA appear to distance the 
police from the public. However, the interview data indicates that within both the 
complaints process and in the settlement of police actions, the police are motivated by a 
desire to maintain connections with the public and do what is perceived (by the 
interviewees) as ‘right’ or ‘fair’:  
B(PS): …we welcome complaints, we’re not opposed to them. We’re very 
customer focused. …And what we like to do is say to people, ‘look, if you’ve got 
an issue or a problem, we want to know about it, because for us it’s about 
learning lessons, it’s about making sure the service we give to you is the right 
service and we get it right every time, and if we don’t, we want to say to you, 
‘okay, what have we done wrong?’, apologise where we need to and if we need 
to, and then put things right, and then learn from it’. And that’s what our culture 
is trying to be. 
 
A(LO): It’s just one of those things that just happened. But for her it’s a case of 
actually, we need to be bigger here and we need to go out and we need to 
apologise and we need to say we got it wrong and we need to make good that 
difference, so, yes, we will do those. There are occasions when we do need to do 
that, and we do need to actually be the bigger people and stand up and say, 
we’re sorry. 
 
However, these comments were made in the context of clear distinctions between those 
deemed ‘worthy’ claimants or complainants, and those deemed to be ‘unworthy’ or at 
least more easily dismissed:  
A(LO): But there are times when we do need to just stand up and just say, I’m 
sorry, we got it wrong. And if we got it wrong, actually how can we … ? There 
have been occasions where perhaps we have given not necessarily the person the 
cash but we’ve actually said to them, ‘we’ll find a jeweller’ – this particular watch 
or something – and ‘find where it is and we’ll give you a cheque for the jeweller, 
so you can go and buy a replacement item as opposed to giving cash’. So, yes, 





A(LB): Particularly if they’re the victims and we’ve seized property off them 
because they’re the victim and we’ve lost it, then, yeah, let’s try and build some 
bridges. 
 
B(LO): The thing is, people who come in contact with the police don’t want to 
come in contact with the police. They don’t want to be stopped from walking 
down the street doing whatever they’re doing, knocking on their ex-girlfriend’s 
door, or they don’t want to be locked up in a van for 6 hours, or a police station 
for 6 hours, or transported to the other end of the County, and I think they lose 
their perspective. 
 
A similar binary distinction was made between ‘bad’ officers and those who had ‘made 
mistakes’ and therefore ‘needed supporting’: 
A (LO): They need to know that they’re supported because they have a difficult 
job to do. And that’s the thing that we know, working here, and working within 
the Headquarters site, we’re very fortunate that we know the type of work that 
they do, and it’s horrendously difficult for them. I wouldn’t want to do it. You’ve 
done it actually, haven’t you, and I certainly wouldn’t want to do it, to turn up to 
people, especially on a Saturday evening when everybody’s being chucked out of 
pubs and being spat at and goodness knows what, when you’re supposed to call 
everybody Sir and Madam and deal with them professionally and politely. 
 
C(PS): And again that comes down to the majority of them are that officers have 
either been over-zealous but unintentional, or have made a … the vast majority 
of complaints are because an officer has made mistakes 
 
B(PS):  I think it’s blown out of all proportions because what Theresa May’s done 
in her wisdom is she has let the public believe that there are massive corruption 
issues and integrity issues and everything else – they’re rife throughout the police 
service. It’s not the case. It really isn’t the case. There is maybe one bad apple in 
a barrel somewhere.   
 
Together these binaries of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ members of the public and ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
officers formed the overarching logic which fuelled both the form of complaints 
investigation and, to some degree, the settlement practices of the forces in the study (as 





9.2.3 Complaints and the IPCC 
 
The findings reinforce the suggestion of tension between the police and the IPCC that was 
noted in Chapter 4.  All but one of the interviewees expressed dissatisfaction with the 
IPCC.377 C(LO) who was an ex police officer, offered the view:  
C(LO): I always think there’s an element in the IPCC of trying to come down on 
the complainant’s side where they can to justify their being, and to show that 
they are being effective, because they can’t always agree with the police, can 
they?  
 
Further the IPCC’s reasoning was questioned:  
C(LO):..and I think, ‘well, actually, with the best will in the world, who are the 
IPCC to make this decision? What qualifies their IPCC investigator to say that that 
is actually an unlawful arrest?’ 
 
In relation to the IPCC’s own investigations, one professional standards officer was 
openly scathing:  
B(PS): An awful lot of them, I think, are incompetent. And I don’t use that word 
lightly. From experiences we’ve had, and they’re on about them wanting 
independent … they want to be independent and use investigators which aren’t 
from a police background, they’re wanting to have less than 25% of investigators 
to come from a police background previously. But when you look at the quality 
of some of these people who come up when they’ve referred matters and they’re 
coming up to do independent investigations, it’s absolutely frightening, and you 
stand there gob-smacked because you’re thinking, crikey, I wouldn’t let you 
investigate a shoplifting offence, let alone investigate someone for a death 
following police contact or a death in custody or something of that nature. No 




Discontent extended to the IPCC’s conduct of appeals: 
 
C(PS): If you made a complaint, I’ve investigated it, you’re not happy with it, you 
appeal, but in your appeal letter, you add 3 or 4 other things that you’ve not 
mentioned in the complaint - the IPCC are now looking at those as well in relation 
to the appeal and it states that they should be looking at the circumstances of 
 




the complaint. To me, if they’re looking … yes, if we’ve done something 
particularly wrong, should we have picked it up? Well, we haven’t got a crystal 
ball. If the person’s not told us about it, how could we possibly have that as part 
of the investigation.  
 
At a more systemic level, A(LO) expressed dissatisfaction with the IPCC for stating in their 
guidance that all complaints documents had to be disclosed:  
A (LO): Because, whereas the court turned round and said, ‘pre-action protocol, 
don’t go fishing’, they tied it up quite nicely with Letter Before Action should say 
this but it’s not a fishing expedition. The IPCC have just opened that up now. 
 
Overall, the interviewees presented a picture of the IPCC as inept in almost every regard. 
However, this appears to stem from the interviewees and the IPCC having considerably 
divergent views as to how police complaints should be approached. The limited interview 
data available for this research indicated that two areas of divergence are the rigour of 
investigation and levels of transparency, both of which are discussed below.  
 
9.2.3.1 Transparency  
 
Police frustration with the IPCC was particularly evident in relation to transparency.  As 
noted in Chapter 6, the interviewees all shifted from the official paradigm to the 
operational code throughout the interviews and this was apparent in their comments 
concerning the IPCC.  A(LO)’s dissatisfaction with the IPCC for encouraging or permitting 
‘fishing expeditions’ (noted above), was premised with a recognition of the need for 
transparency. However, A(LO)’s comments indicate a divergence of opinion about what 
levels of transparency are appropriate:  
A (LO): No because the IPCC guidance is simply guidance to assist the complainer 
– what you can expect, what you can do, what the obligations of the police are 
in relation to your complaint. And then they put in this lovely little paragraph 
about transparency. Transparency is great, fine, I don’t have a problem with that, 
but not to be abused, and that’s what it is being at the moment. It is being 
abused. 
 





B(PS) And I can see why we need to be transparent but for me, what they [the 
IPCC] have is they go by – that’s the Advice Guidance from that copy – they go by 
that, and that’s black and white. Policing isn’t black and white. Policing’s got all 
of its grey areas and if it isn’t black and white in there, they don’t know what 
to do (emphasis added)  
 
 
Transparency is recognised in both contexts as an important element of the official 
paradigm. However, in both instances, this coincides with a strong sense that, in terms of 
practical policing, such transparency needs to be limited and that the IPCC fails to 
recognise this.  
 
Further, B(PS)’s comments (in bold) potentially augment the findings in Chapter 7 
concerning the police attitude to the rule of law.  If the law is seen as ‘black and white’ it 
may be worthy of the same contempt as expressed in relation to the IPCC. Further, various 
aspects of the ‘grey areas’ became apparent in other parts of the interviews (as discussed 
below).  
 
9.2.3.2 Investigations  
 
Chapter 8 noted how during the passage of the PACA, the development of a damaging 
blame culture within forces was attributed to the IPCC. Interestingly, the interviews do 
not support the existence of such a blame culture within the police or the IPCC.378 Instead, 
they suggest a complex network of practices, fuelled by varying levels of mutual distrust 
which span both the complaints and discipline, and the police actions processes.379 
 
As noted above, officer B(PS) was particularly outspoken about the inadequacy of the 
IPCC. This officer explained their own approach to officers under investigation in the 
following terms:    
 
 
378 A(LO) refers to a general (ie global) increased blame culture as a reason officers “need to be 
supported”. It is also important to note that the interviews were conducted some 4 years before the PACA 
was being debated. 




B(PS): ..look, if we ever come to see you, all we just want is the truth, 
because as soon as you tell us what you’ve done, we can put it right. Let 
us keep it in force, let us put it right, rectify it and then put it to bed 
because if you don’t and you start to tell porky pies or dig a hole for 
yourself, that’s when it’s going to go external to the likes of the IPCC 
and that’s out of our hands and that’s where it doesn’t want to be. So 
we’re trying to encourage cops to be open, to be honest. We don’t go 
in there with an oppressive attitude when we see them. 
 
This makes very clear that in this force (or, at least, for this officer) police autonomy over 
complaints and discipline was something to be preserved. However, within police internal 
investigations, a picture emerged of unclear boundaries concerning when an officer might 
face a discipline charge. Professional standards officer B(PS) referred separately to two 
different types of investigations. The first were investigations carried out to confirm that 
an event had not happened:  
 
B(PS): You can pick them up straightaway. You know about them straightaway. 
There is occasions when you’ll be open and honest and frank with individuals who 
you know, where a complaint potentially just hasn’t happened, …. You’d 
investigate it and you’ll investigate it fully and demonstrate that it hasn’t 
happened, so when the civil claim comes in, it will be completely denied and 
fought against and knocked back by... Are you with me? So it’s kind of doing an 
investigation to knock it back. 
 
Later when questioned about circumstances where there may not be enough evidence, 
but professional standards officers might suspect a closing of ranks concerning the 
incident in question, B(PS) responded: 
 
B(PS) and then if that’s the case, we will always try our very best to ensure that 
the evidence … we will look for the evidence in relation to that individual if 
things start to come up with that individual, because it kind of stinks of a bad 
apple in a barrel if that’s the case.  
 
The highlighted aspect of this excerpt where the officer appears to alter the description 
from ensuring evidence (is found) to ‘looking’ for it, is potentially revealing, in 
circumstances where the discussion at this stage of the interview was premised on there 





Similarly, the professional standards officer with Force C focussed on the feedback 
potential in complaints, but this again led to opacity concerning which conduct might 
attract a discipline sanction.  
 
 C(PS): whenever a complaint comes in and we’re going to investigate, before we 
decide to investigate it, if the officer is identified, we will look to see, has that 
officer got two previous complaints of a similar nature in a 12-month period? 
C (PS): If he’s got one for excessive force, one for failing to breach the codes of 
practice (sic) and incivility in the last 12 months, and this is a second one of those, 
is that a trend? Probably not. But we do look to see if there is a trend in an 
officer’s complaints. Of course, you could have an officer with half a dozen 
complaints of excessive force, none of which are upheld. 
C(PS):  The things now are: is it proven or unproven? And has the officer got a 
case to answer? Because it could be that a matter is proven but then an officer 
hasn’t got a case to answer. You’re going to ask me possibly for an example. 
 
However, when pressed for an example, the two illustrations given (below) are consistent 
with the determination of whether a breach should lead to a disciplinary outcome being 
driven by an unspoken operational code:  
C(PS): I suppose it could be that somebody has breached codes of practice and 
they have done but they haven’t got a case to answer because the reason for 
breaching the code of practice was to comply with something else. I’m grasping 
at straws here because … 
And later: 
C(PS): It could be something that you’ve done something which the complaint is 
proven but you’ve had to do that because perhaps our processes are wrong. 
 
Further decisions about where the lines are to be drawn concerning officer conduct do 
not necessarily appear to equate with the lawfulness of his/her actions: 
 
C(PS): if it’s for an unlawful arrest, was the arrest necessary, or did circumstances 






Taken together, the sets of comments from the two professional standards officers 
directly above suggest that some investigations may be considerably more rigorous than 
others, and that it may not always be clear to officers which conduct will result in 
disciplinary outcomes and which will not.  
 
The findings overall, (as illustrated in the excerpts concerning both transparency and 
investigations) point to a police view that it is for the police to determine the degree of 
rigour required. It is therefore, tentatively, suggested that some of the tension between 
the IPCC and the police stems from the IPCC applying the same rigour to all cases, or 
having different perspectives concerning the degree of rigour required in each case. This 
is particularly important in the context of the provisions in the PACA concerning police 
internal investigations of complaints needing to be ‘reasonable and proportionate’ (as 
discussed in Chapter 4 at 4.2.3.3) 
 
9.2.4 Professional Standards Officers, Legal Officers and Trust  
 
The analysis in the previous section points to a lack of clarity regarding the boundaries of 
acceptable officer conduct, or the level of internal investigation an officer may be subject 
to. Consistent with this, there was a consensus among the legal officers interviewed that 
police officers do not trust professional standards departments (PSDs). This is perhaps 
exemplified by the fact that in two out of the three forces PSDs were referred to 
colloquially as ‘the dark side’:      
 
Interviewer: Dark side?  
 
C (LO): PSD, anti-corruption, that sort of thing. That’s what people refer to it as. 
 
Interviewer: And where does that come from? 
 
C(LO):  Don’t know. That’s what some people think it is – a distant dark murky 
world. 
 
Interviewer:  Dark as in hidden or dark as in …? 
 





C(LO): Maybe I should have said the sneaky beaky squad – that’s what some 
people think. 
 
Further, in one of the forces interviewed, the legal team had separated from the PSD 
specifically to avoid being connected with the ‘dark side’:  
 
A (LO): We used to be part of them but that wasn’t terribly appropriate because 
it was almost like we were seen as the dark side and officers are not … I mean, 
potentially officers are our defence witnesses … 
 
Interviewer: Legal were seen as the dark side? 
 
A (LO): Yeah, well PSD is always seen as the dark side. And we were sort of 
dragged almost along with them … , and you end up with officers then not 
wanting to help on defence because they say, ‘oh, have I been called up to PSD?’ 
 
A (LB): Yeah, it’s awkward. ‘They’ve sort of given me discipline but you want me 
to help you’. It’s, ‘oh god, we’re not one of them’.  
 
Police officers’ lack of trust in PSDs presents practical difficulties for legal officers because 
they need police officers’ co-operation to defend claims. C(PS) recognised this and gave 
the impression (as demonstrated in the excerpt below) that it would not be appropriate 
for matters that officers had revealed during the investigation carried out by force legal 
personnel to then be used in relation to an assessment of the discipline outcome for the 
officer:  
C(PS):  And that’s why they’re dealt with by different people as much as anything 
else. Of course, however, if we get anything that would assist a civil claim, it 
would be stupid for us working for the same organisation not to pass it on. And 
likewise with …, although of course he will have got that information purely just 
by asking questions, whilst we would have cautioned them, and would it be right 
then for… to pass the stuff over to us? And the answer’s got to be no because it 
would be outside the rules and regulations governing complaints.380 
 
C (PS):  It depends because once we’re going to the civil case, it may be that we’ll 
get further evidence. It may be that the officer isn’t prepared to say stuff on 
interview and don’t forget he’s already been cautioned if they’ve been 
interviewed, and yet when it comes to looking at the civil claim,… un-turns a 
 
380 This is not entirely accurate since Schedule 3 Para10(1) of the PRA requires conduct issues that come to 




stone that we didn’t or elicits from the officer something that he wasn’t prepared 
to say. 
 
In contrast, the legal personnel interviewed for this research confirmed that they were 
alive to the need to identify conduct issues in police actions and refer them to PSD (in line 
with the official paradigm). However, if officers’ accounts in court seemed implausible, 
this would not be raised with professional standards unless it reached the benchmark of 
suspected corruption. This could suggest a deep cultural accord between force legal 
personnel and PSD officers concerning the appropriate line for raising concerns about 
officers. However, the point was made by legal officer C(LO) that, by the time officers 
were in court in the context of a police action, they may have made statements or been 
cross examined on several occasions (during the criminal, complaints and potentially 
disciplinary process) and, therefore, there were bound to be inconsistencies which could 
be picked up upon by counsel for the claimant:   
C (LO):  Now, if you bear in mind that the officers have given evidence at court, 
given an account to PSD and then got interviewed again in relation to civil 
proceedings to give statements and then were actually giving evidence in court. 
So you’ve got 4 officers who’ve given evidence, or given accounts on 4 different 
occasions – they were always going to make mistakes, because you’re not going 
to get that account right. 
 
The last comment from C(LO) indicates that, from the police perspective, jury findings 
against officers in police actions are of no consequence. This potentially refines the 
findings in Chapter 7 about the police attitude to the rule of law and suggests that it may 
extend to (or be fuelled by) frustration at the interface of the different legal and quasi 
legal processes in which police officers are engaged. 
Chapter 5 (at 5.3.2) noted Schwartz’s study in the US which revealed that police actions 
result in substantially deeper and more detailed internal investigations than are 
undertaken in relation to complaints (Schwartz, 2009, 2011). These interviews suggest 
that (in England and Wales) officers’ willingness to give fuller information to assist with a 
police action may contribute to the discrepancy in the perceived rigour of different 
investigations. The differences in responses of police officers to legal personnel as 
opposed to PSD officers is important because it may also impact on settlement practices 




9.2.5 Settlement practice 
 
Chapter 3 (at 3.2.3) drew attention to the influence (or potential influence) of insurers on 
the settlement of police actions.  Similarly, Chapter 5 noted work in the US which indicates 
insurers may perform a regulatory role based on claims data (Rappaport, 2016). The 
relationship between insurers and police regulation is an area where substantially more 
empirical research would be valuable, not least because of insurers’ ability to influence 
policy and legal reform (Morris, 2012a). However, the interviewees in this research 
indicated that for their forces, the force insurance policies operate with very large 
excesses and that in practice, force legal personal retain control (or feel they retain 
control) over when to defend and when to settle:  
A(LO): And sometimes even they’ve gone, ‘well, we think you’re liable on that 
and it’ll cost you £5000’ whatever, and we’ll go, ‘no, don’t think actually that’s 
right’ and we’ll go back and argue and say, ‘actually if you thought about this, 
this and this, we think we’re only liable for £1500’, and they’ll go, ‘okay, well, 
we’ll give it a go’ – because we’ve got that good working relationship. They’ll 
trust our judgement because as much as they’ve been working with us for a 
number of years, we’re still here, we still work with the officers, we’re still very 
much part of operational policing, and we may know an officer and think, 
actually we know he wouldn’t have done that, you know, because actually that’s 
not his demeanour, or that’s not his conduct, or whatever, and we would then 
interfere and say, ‘no, actually we think it’s less’. 
 
B(LO):   It is, yeah. They’re quite happy for me to do all the instructing because it 
means that I’m doing all the work and I like doing that because then I’ve got 
control over what’s happening and what’s being disclosed and what’s being said 
to whom, whereas if you leave it off to insurance companies, they might just 
wander off at tangents and do whatever they like.  
 
Further, while all the interviewees stated that as a matter of policy they did not settle on 
economic grounds alone, they all then referred to occasions when they had done so. It 
was however very difficult to discern what was fuelling these settlement practices: 
A(LO): Yes. There are occasions where sometimes the economics do come into 
play because sometimes if something’s worth … I don’t know … £4-5,000 and you 
know they’ll settle for £6000, and sometimes you think, actually the cost of going 
to trial, it’s actually worthwhile because of the economics there. But we’ve got 
one at the moment where we’ve got a Part 36 offer in which economically it’s 




anything wrong. And ... have been very clever to pitch the offer at the amount 
that we know, if she was awarded something at court and we are found wanting, 
would be around about that sort of amount of money. 
 
B(LO): Yes, I’m very aware of how the public perceive the police force. This 
particular one was always going to settle. We did not want that one to go to 
court....  So, there is an element of how the public perceives things. But that isn’t 
the first point of why we would settle something. 
 
B(LO): There’s quite a few …... firms ... that specialise in claims against the police 
and they would soon cotton onto the fact that Force A or Force B381 were a soft 
touch and, you know, they just settle. Also, it’s not good for officer morale, and 
the insurance company wouldn’t agree with it anyway. So, we don’t settle just 
for economic grounds. 
 
C(LO): It’s a real hard area to answer really. I try and refute what I can if I think 
the officers are correct because I think it’s the right thing for us to do because I’m 
not being mindful that I’m spending the organisation’s money when I settle 
something. A claim comes in and my view will be, right, we will refute this claim 
- unless I look at it and think, uhh, we got this badly wrong and then I will try and 
settle it on the best economic basis of the organisation. There are occasions 
where you think, this is such a minor matter that for the sake of £200 or whatever 
– cos sometimes it can be as little as that – let’s not waste too much time on it 
and we’ll settle it really, really quickly because I’m sure you’re aware but, you 
know, a £500 claim can eventually be backed up by a £10,000 solicitors’ bill. 
 
As noted above, claimants were divided in to ‘good’ and ‘bad’ by all the interviewees. 
There were those for whom contact with police was a rare or unexpected occurrence and 
in respect of which the consistent narrative was that “we got it wrong”. In these cases, 
early settlement was seen as obvious and beneficial to the police as an organisation: 
C(LO): I said very early on, I said, ‘I’m really sorry, we’ve made an error here’. I 
explained it to the officers who could see it. And they said, ‘yeah, we accept that 
we made an error here’. No intent to do anything wrong. It was just they got it 
wrong. So, we admitted liability. 
 
 





In contrast, there were claimants who were perceived as just wanting money or who had 
long criminal records, and were therefore in what was seen as an ongoing relationship 
with the police:  
C(LO): It was one of those cases – police officers arrested a gentleman in the 
street, right, who for want of a better phrase has got a bit of a history with the 
organisation. He resisted in some order. He claimed for assault, unlawful arrest, 
etc.  
 
This coincided with a tension between a sense that it was right that claimants should bring 
claims when the police had ‘got it wrong’ and a belief that for some claimants, payments 
(and indeed the process of claiming) was somehow wrong. B(LO) commented: 
B(LO) Yeah, could be. A lot of people, they say, a thoroughly undeserving 
claimant – they might be a thoroughly undeserving claimant but if they’ve been 
unlawfully arrested, then they should be compensated. You know, you can’t say, 
‘he’s not a nice man, you can’t pay him out’. 
But later expressed the view: 
B(LO): I don’t like settling if I think these little scrotes have wandered off with 
£3000 of money they’re just going to drink and drug up to the eyeballs with, but 
we get them the next time round. (emphasis added) 
 
This sense of ‘us’ and ‘them’ is also evident in the following exchange between the 
solicitor A(LO) and one of the legal officers that was also present at the interview with 
force A: 
 
A(LO): As I said at the beginning, we’re very much a blame culture now, and 
unfortunately nobody takes … people don’t take personal responsibility for 
anything now. It’s like, something happened – it’s not my fault, it was because of 
this. The washing machine broke down – it’s not because the washing machine 
broke down, it’s because it’s a faulty washing machine – everything is blamed on 
something else, and I think the more knowledge that people have around claims 
culture ... 
A(LB): Everybody knows that you can complain about a police officer but not 
everybody knows that you can get compensation. And it’s nice to get back one 
…(emphasis added)  





In line with this sense of frustration at the possibility of some types of claimants being 
able to bring police actions, legal officers spoke of needing to support officers by 
defending claims:  
A(LO): The officers were courteous. They haven’t done anything wrong, they need 
supporting, and they need supporting on this and they don’t need to know, or 
they shouldn’t know that we would just buy the claim off because it’s cheaper 
and easier for them. They need to know that they’re supported because they 
have a difficult job to do. 
 
Significantly, this support was seen as important to the ongoing relationship with 
officers: 
A(LO): Yeah, and they’ll use it against us because the next time they’re stopped, 
they’ll say, ‘oh, we got £2000 off you, we’re going to see you again, because we 
got £2000 out of you last time’. And we find that, and the officers then will come 
back and say, ‘well, why are we going to help you now because you paid him that 
last time’. ‘But we had to. This time might be different if you’ve done it properly’.  
 
C (LO): Okay. Part of what I have to do is a PR exercise for police officers. There 
appears to be a bit of a misconception of police officers is if somebody fires in a 
claim, we settle it straightaway, because we’re the police or on an economic 
basis, or whatever. In some respects, our automatic standpoint is, we will defend 
a claim if we can. Sometimes you have to take an economic point of view ... … 
sometimes you’ve got to defend things on a matter of principle. So I’ve done quite 
a lot of work with police officers to say, ‘look, this is what we do, this is how we 
fight’. 
  
The interviews suggest that force legal personnel are also aware of the need to maintain 
the trust of officers when making settlement decisions because settlement was perceived 
as undermining police officers’ authority at street level in some circumstances: 
C(LO): a couple of our claimants that we’ve had to pay out on are people with 
long criminal records. Obviously that annoyed people in the organisation 
generally because they do throw it back in the face because they do get arrested 
over and over again, and nothing worse than arresting somebody, I’m sure, and 






As indicated in Chapter 6, it is not possible to draw any firm conclusions about settlement 
practices for police actions generally from these interviews. However, the discussion 
above does indicate that settlement of police actions is a complex social process that 
bears on how policing itself is conceived within the police organisation. Further qualitative 
study of this area would therefore be potentially very enlightening. Chapter 10 below 
draws on the findings presented in Part Two to address the central research question. It 
then proceeds to make recommendations concerning how police actions might contribute 











Chapter 10.  Research Question and Recommendations  
 
 
10.1 What does the Interaction Between Police Complaints and Police Actions Reveal 
about how Police Legitimacy is Conceived? 
 
The principal research question this thesis seeks to address is what the interaction 
between police complaints and police actions (and particularly the process of settlement 
of police actions) reveals about police legitimacy. A key assumption has been that the 
answer to this question will depend on how the processes of police complaints and police 
actions operate and how each is understood separately to contribute to the legitimacy of 
the police. The development of themes in Part One and the empirical analysis in Chapters 
7 and 8 was directed towards providing that broad understanding.  
The premise of police actions is that the individual case of unjustifiable state interference 
with liberties is important at law; that the vindication of the rights of the individual in a 
police action is vindication on behalf of all citizens. However, the findings in Chapter 7 
reveal that police actions are not conceived in this way (by the courts or the police) and 
that the macro level legitimating aspects of recourse to the civil courts to uphold police 
compliance with the rule of law are being lost.382 Claimants are merely individuals who 
are seeking a monetary award and the process is devoid of any public benefit.  
Meanwhile, the findings in Chapter 8 point to a police increasingly separated from the 
public at the point of disquiet. Further it is increasingly shielded from detailed public 
scrutiny by a complaints and discipline process that is focused on the ability of non-police 
bodies to provide macro level feedback aimed at systemic improvements in police 
practices. The individual complaint and, consequently, the individual complainant, has 
therefore been backgrounded.  
Consequently, while the individual complainant has been rendered substantially invisible 
by the focus of the complaints process on systemic issues, the individualised status of 
 
382 The excerpt from parliamentary debate concerning of Garratt v Eastmond at 2.3 indicates that police 




claimants in police actions has rendered tort law largely impotent as regards the greater 
public and constitutional goods that police actions should protect. At a scalar level the 
two processes can therefore be envisaged as ships that pass in the night. An important 
finding therefore is that the research question appears misplaced: processes which 
operate at such different levels cannot interact in any meaningful way and consequently 
a focus on how they may impact on each other is unlikely to add to our understanding of 
police legitimacy.  
To some extent, the discussion in Chapter 9 confirms this idea of a disconnect between 
police actions and police complaints. The complaints and discipline system is seen as 
concerned with rooting out the worst of the rotten apples, and police actions are just a 
frustrating draw on police time and funds which contribute nothing to the regulation of 
officers’ conduct. However, the research question also operated at the deeper level of 
what the interaction (or interface) between police complaints and police actions tells us 
about police legitimacy.  It is therefore valuable to reflect on how the empirical findings 
in Part Two compliment the analysis in Part One to provide additional insights into the 
balance that is being struck between police organisational and constitutional legitimacy 
and to consider the implications of this for police legitimacy more generally 
 
10. 2 Reflecting on Organisational and Constitutional Legitimacy  
  
This thesis has adopted the ideas of organisational and constitutional legitimacy as a 
framework through which to structure analysis of how police actions and police 
complaints operate and how their primary functions are perceived. Overall, the 
conclusion of the thesis is that the diminished role for police actions (outlined in Chapters 
5 and 7) has resulted in police legitimacy now being understood predominantly in terms 
of police organisational legitimacy. In addition, as discussed below, changes in the 
perceived role of police actions have, arguably, created both the conditions in which the 
most recent reforms to the police complaints and discipline system could take place, and 
have also impacted on the police complaints and discipline process in a way that requires 




It will be recalled that when constitutional legitimacy was delineated in Chapter 1 a key 
feature of it centred on the police as embedded state actors and primary bearers of the 
state mandate to use coercive force. Consequently, constitutional legitimacy highlighted 
the state’s obligation to provide a mechanism for achieving a degree of accountability 
which is directly linked to the devolution of coercive powers to the police. It was 
recognised that police actions play a crucial role in securing the constitutional legitimacy 
of the police because they constitute the mechanism by which the courts, operating as 
the constitutional arbiters of executive discretion, can satisfy that state obligation. There 
is however some reflexivity between the legitimacy of the police and the legitimacy of the 
state. The exercise of arbitrary force is seen as anathema to legitimate democratic states 
and failure of the state machinery (in the form of the courts) to constitute a meaningful 
accountability mechanism in relation to the use of state force against citizens will 
ultimately prove undermining to both police and state legitimacy.  
Drawing on Felstiner’s ideas of naming, blaming and claiming, (discussed in the 
Introduction to this thesis) Chapter 5, observed that the construction of police actions as 
serving only (or primarily) a financial compensatory function had ramifications for the 
nature of citizenship.  If abuse by the state is not a cause for public outrage and the 
subsequent vindication of rights, but merely for compensation, the quality of naming, 
blaming and claiming when such abuse does occur are all altered and the relationship 
between citizen and state is similarly changed. Yet it was the machinery of state (in the 
form of the court in Thompson) that created (or cemented) that change383. Hence a 
circularity arises whereby the constitutional legitimacy of the police is diminished not just 
as a consequence of the narrower conception of the role of police actions, but because 
the mandate to use force is granted by a state whose ability or commitment to ensure its 
proper use is no longer expressed in terms of strict boundaries for its use. Importantly the 
legitimacy of the state is undermined because a perception of police actions as a 
mechanism for recompense rather than as securing prevention of breaches of the 
mandate subtly includes implicit permissions to exceed the boundaries of the mandate 
 
383 Here it is valuable to draw comparison Daniel Priel’s careful analysis of impact of external political 
ideologies on the interpreting by the courts of their ‘neutral’ position in relation to the judgements 




when ‘necessary’ which has implications for our understanding of police legitimacy 
generally.  
This shift in constitutional legitimacy also has specific implications for our understanding 
of police organisational legitimacy. A central facet of police organisational legitimacy as 
delineated in Chapter 1, is the police as an organisation being (and being perceived as) 
worthy bearers of the mandate to use state sanctioned force. As delineated further in 
Chapter 4 this comprises a sense of the police being sufficiently well regulated but also 
and importantly of the police being able to demonstrate that they are sufficiently well 
motivated in relation to the appropriate exercise of the mandate. The reforms under the 
PACA are discussed below but it is first valuable to reflect on the how the findings of this 
research contribute to our understanding of the worthiness of the police in terms of 
motivation.   
As discussed Chapter 4, the motivation of the police in the operation of the internal 
investigation process for police complaints is brought into question by much of the 
research on police complaints. Similarly, the analysis in Chapter 3 of the campaign of 
police actions which culminated in the Commissioner’s appeal in Thompson, highlighted 
occasions when it seemed clear that officers had transgressed and yet no disciplinary 
proceedings were commenced. The concern was not only a police complaints oversight 
mechanism that was not functioning effectively, but a lack of commitment on the part of 
the police to discipline officers who abused their powers; underscoring some lack of 
authenticity in the official paradigm. The findings in Chapter 7 demonstrate frequent 
disregard by the police for the rule of law which extends to senior officers joining with 
lower ranking officers to perjure themselves and thereby pervert the course of justice. 
This inevitably casts additional doubt on any assessment of police motivation to operate 
the complaints and discipline system in a fair and just manner and consequently also 
undermines police organisational legitimacy.  
It is first important to consider these findings alongside the findings in Chapter 9 of an 
apparent lack of clarity concerning the level of investigation that officers may be subject 
to during the internal investigation process and the types of behaviours and contexts that 
may attract a disciplinary outcome. Police officers are uniquely vulnerable to complaints 




the rules concerning strict adherence to the rule of law envisaged by the ideas associated 
with constitutional legitimacy. However, it has been suggested that the emphasis on 
‘independence’ as a feature of complaints oversight bodies imports into the police 
complaints process the normative ideals of impartiality associated with court processes; 
thereby preserving these normative ideals as an important measure against which the 
internal investigation processes may be judged. Arguably therefore the ideal of 
democratic policing understood as eschewal of arbitrary force at the hands of state actors 
is incorporated into the police complaints process precisely because it exists in genuine 
practical form alongside the police complaints process via police actions (as they existed 
pre-Thompson). 
It is therefore profoundly significant that 20 years after Thompson ‘independence’ within 
the police complaints system is re-envisaged so that it no longer incorporates or purports 
to incorporate the normative ideals associated with constitutional legitimacy to the same 
degree. The analysis in Chapter 4 reveals how the reforms to the police complaints and 
discipline system under the PACA increase police autonomy over the internal investigation 
of the majority of complaints, reducing the level of oversight and transparency the OIPC 
can provide. Similarly a key element of the independence within the police complaints 
system is now understood as being provided by PCC oversight which is of a very different 
nature to that provided by the PCB, PCA and IPCC.  
Police organisational legitimacy is not only concerned with maintaining a disciplined force 
(as outlined in Chapters 2 and 3) or a force that operates with integrity (as currently 
emphasised) but a force that is seen as efficient and effective in what the police are tasked 
with doing (which, as discussed in Chapter 1, is contested in any event). The idea that 
officers’ authority is drawn from their membership of an organisation that is revered 
remains important. However this now primarily secured by PCCs who publicly hold Chief 
Constables to account for the generally efficiency and effectiveness of their force. The role 
of PCCs needs to be considered in the context of the analysis of police accountability and 
public confidence conducted in Part One. There, it will be recalled, public confidence with 
the police was linked to ‘public confidence in the police to maintain a disciplined force’ 
which was undermined by the perceived need for external accountability mechanisms. 




more easily aligned because the form of accountability for police complaints envisaged by 
the new explicit role of PCCs will inevitably be assimilated in to PCCs’ broader role. Chief 
Constables are now to be directly accountable to PCC’s for how complaints are handled 
by their force (in a general way) and it is contended that this will implicitly parallel their 
accountably to PCCs for implementation of the police and crime plan and all their other 
functions. The performance of force complaints and discipline departments will be 
balanced against other measures in a way that further subordinates individual instances 
of officer misconduct to an overall measure of public confidence in the police. The extent 
to which the ideal of a complaints and discipline system that conforms to the normative 
ideas associated with adherence to the rule of law is significantly diminished  and has been 
replaced by accountability at a macro and arguably quite remote level via the 4 yearly 
democratic cycle for election of  PCCs. Arguably therefore the shift in emphasis within 
police actions that has been described in detail in this thesis can be seen to have created 
the conditions in which the PACA reforms could occur.  
A significant finding in Chapter 8 was that the PACA texts frequently gave public 
expectations as the founding reason for police propriety. It is noteworthy that the lack of 
emphasis on normative ideals inherent in this very much mirrors the shift away from 
normative ideals noted above. At the same time the link between police conduct and 
public expectations does accord with the importance of connection between the police 
and the public which has been noted as a key feature of organisational legitimacy. Again, 
however the context is changed. An important finding in both Chapters 7 and 8 was a 
propensity to equate the police with other large (private) organisations rather than being 
recognised as a unique institution (whose members can use coercive force against 
citizens). Arguably, this ushers in the potential for public expectations of proportionate or 
proper police conduct to be less bounded by the constitutional parameters (that would 
delimit the legitimate exercise of a state mandate to use coercive powers) and renders 
them more open to interpretation on the basis of what a private institution might consider 
appropriate. This potential is increased by the structure of accountability created by PCC’s 
as discussed above. It is difficult to assess the extent to which this realignment of public 
confidence and accountability will impact of the duality between police as a force or police 




discipline to the democratic accountability of PCC’s does provide the structure whereby 
the rights of a demonised minority can be disregarded in a way that is abhorrent to the 
ideals of democratic policing properly understood. The dichotomy between force and 
service may therefore need to be reenvisaged in more nuanced terms concerning ‘force 
against whom’ and service for whom’. 
The overall result of the historic and more recent interaction between police actions and 
police complaints raises serious questions about the current conceptions of police 
legitimacy in England and Wales. This research has highlighted a police that is increasingly 
insulated from direct public scrutiny and enjoys an increasingly large pocket of impunity 
in relation to the types of practices that are the focus of this research. More importantly, 
the combination of how police actions and police complaints are now conceived invites 
the collective gaze to turn away from individual incidents of officer misconduct, from 
individual occasions of citizens being subject to alarming arbitrary state violence. The 
changes in these two process highlighted in this research combine with the enhanced role 
for PCCs to structure the collective understanding of police legitimacy in terms of the 
bodies that have been created to monitor the police at a macro level. This is not merely 
paving the way for the necessary evil discourse to take root. This is the necessary evil 
discourse in action in a subtle systemic form.  
 
 
10.3 Recommendations  
 
10.3.1 Public Confidence 
 
This thesis has argued that measures of public confidence in the police are dangerous for 
several reasons. Most pressingly, as discussed above, narratives that focus on public 
confidence permit a surface level sanitisation of what are very difficult issues and usher 
in shallow acceptance of a necessary evil discourse. Chapter 1 noted Walker’s observation 
that in policing "neither the range of problems nor their range of treatments can ... be 
confined within narrow legal terms” (Walker 1996: 56).  However, that does not mean 
that ‘grey areas of policing’ should not be openly debated, and the assertion of ‘necessity’ 




globalisation (see Sheptycki and Bowling, 2017). That the public has confidence in the 
police is of course important. But a recommendation stemming from this research is that 
all those involved in police regulation should recognise the potential political 
consequences of reliance on ‘public confidence’ as a measure of the success of police 
regulation mechanisms, and that policing scholars in particular should highlight and 
question the way in which it is used in policing discourses.  
 
10.3.2 Exemplary Damages 
 
A consequence of the finding that police actions have no bearing on officer discipline is 
that exemplary damages become an unjustifiable draw on public funds. Particularly when 
police actions settle, awards of exemplary damages do not even operate at a symbolic 
level and, in these circumstances, become nothing but an expensive windfall for 
claimants. Yet, as discussed in Chapter 7 (at 6.4.1) in Rowlands, Moore-Bick LJ held that 
exemplary damages continue to operate at the level of policy.384 Since it is wholly 
inappropriate to have a policy that achieves nothing, it is important to find a way of giving 
the existence of exemplary wards in police actions some instrumental impact.  
In Thompson, Lord Woolf refuted the Commissioner’s argument that claimants should not 
be able to bring a police action unless they had first made a complaint. However, his 
Lordship did agree that if disciplinary action was almost certainly going to be taken against 
an officer (and was likely to result in a discipline outcome), this could potentially be a 
reason for exemplary damages to be reduced. Therefore, despite the overall impact of 
Thompson (as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6), it is legal authority for a practical link 
between police actions and complaints. Further, the reverse proposition (that lack of 
disciplinary action might result in an increase in either aggravated or exemplary damages) 
is implicit in the judgment in Manley.385  
The links between police complaints and police actions should be exploited to make 
exemplary awards meaningful by using them to open the debate about the line at which 
unlawful officer conduct is considered sufficiently reprehensible to warrant disciplinary 
 
384 [2006[EWCA Civ 1773 at para 47. 




action and hopefully maintain public outrage about those occasions when it does occur. 
There are two ways this might be achieved.  
First, PCCs should be required to review all the actions where exemplary awards have 
been agreed as part of the settlement (or awarded at trial) and provide a report outlining 
if any officer was subject to disciplinary proceedings in connection with the incident that 
gave rise to the claim. This would be consistent with their new duties in relation to the 
operation of the complaints system and give additional weight to the democratic 
accountability that they are understood as providing for policing.   
In addition, a body such as the Police Action Lawyers Group (PALG) should seek to 
coordinate claimant solicitors such that it becomes standard practice for claims where 
exemplary damages are likely to be agreed, to include an additional sum to reflect the fact 
that no disciplinary action has been taken against the officers. This way a picture of officer 
conduct which was not subject to disciplinary action might be built. Further, any pattern 
of failure to discipline officers in circumstances where moderate to large sums are being 
paid in exemplary damages should fit the criteria for super-complaints of being ‘harmful 
to the public interest’.386 It should therefore be possible for the PALG to apply to become 
designated as able to bring super-complaints.  
 
10.3.3 Settlement Accountability  
 
It is not suggested here that settlement should not be a feature of police actions. As was 
seen in Chapter 9, swift settlement is clearly of value when the police have made an error 
or in circumstances where individual officers have transgressed. The concern however is 
to ensure greater transparency about this process and that the public funds that are spent 
on the settlement of police actions are used to best effect.  
It is difficult to make direct quantitative comparisons between complaints and discipline 
outcomes and police actions over any given period because they are not handled 
concurrently, and the civil claims process can take several years to complete in some 
 




instances. However, any arguments that police action figures should not be made public 
could be sidestepped by a requirement that they are published in quite generalised 
formats. The government should require forces to collate police actions data in a 
standardised form that will enhance transparency and enable comparisons to be made 
between forces. It is contended that it will be possible to do this in a way that does not 
increase forces’ vulnerability to spurious claims (as suggested in Chapter 9 at 9.1.5).  In 
particular (in conjunction with the PCC reports suggested above), forces should be 
required to explain and justify all expenditure of public funds on awards of exemplary 
damages. In addition, there can be no argument against a requirement that forces publish 
annual figures confirming the number of claims involving malicious prosecution which 
were settled, and the overall sums paid out. This would permit comparison between 
forces and open avenues for debate concerning police practices more generally. 
  
10.3.4 Legal Aid   
 
 
The recommendations in sections 10.2.2 and 10.2.3 aim to ensure that the sums spent on 
damages in police actions are put to good public use in highlighting police malpractice and 
encouraging debate about where the line should be drawn in relation to ‘appropriate’ 
officer conduct. Such debate could be further fueled by research into the Legal Aid 
decisions following the case of R v Director of Legal Aid Casework (exp Sisangia),387  which 
limited legal aid to occasions involving abuse of position rather than simply unlawful 
officer conduct, as discussed in Chapter 5 (at 5.2).  
 
10.3.5 Further Research 
 
In addition to the research suggested above into legal aid decisions, this thesis has 
highlighted other areas where further research would be valuable. In particular, the 
interviews conducted as part of this research have revealed that focusing on the 
 




interaction between police complaints and police actions produced revealing responses 
that went beyond those particular topics and gave valuable insights into police practices, 
conceptions of the rule of law, and the point at which officers might be considered ‘rotten 
apples’.  Therefore, further interviews on similar themes would be extremely valuable in 
providing data which (in conjunction with recommendations above) might assist in 
shifting the focus rightly away from whether the public have confidence in the police and 
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Thompson v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [1998] Q.B. 498 
 
Miss Thompson was initially lawfully arrested for a drink driving offence. However, 
considerable unnecessary force was used against her with four or five officers bundling 
her into a cell and during which a clump of her hair was pulled out. She also suffered 
bruises and pain in her back and hands.  
The officers falsely claimed Miss Thompson had refused to be searched and that she had 
bitten one of the officers’ fingers causing it to bleed. She was maliciously prosecuted for 
assault occasioning actual bodily harm which involved the fabrication of a deliberately 
false case and two officers of the rank of inspector together with the other officers giving 
false evidence.  
 
Hsu v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [1998] Q.B. 498 
 
Mr Hsu refused police entry to his home because they did not have a warrant. In response 
he was arrested and racially abused, his arms were twisted behind his back, he was struck 
across the face with a set of keys and kicked in the back with such force that he later 
passed blood in his urine. The police falsely claimed that this level of force was justified 
because Mr Hsu had pushed an officer in the chest, which the court noted must have 
involved the evidence being deliberately falsely recorded in the officers’ pocket 
notebooks. 
 
Clark v Chief Constable of Cleveland Police.  [2000] C.P. Rep. 22 
 
There were disputed facts concerning whether Mr Clark had been involved in a relatively 
minor incident of reckless driving (there was no allegation that anyone was hurt) and the 
jury did not accept Mr Clark’s evidence on this point. Importantly, dangerous driving was 
not an arrestable offence388 at that time and therefore, on the police’s evidence they did 
not have any authority to enter Mr Clark’s house. Mr Clark’s case was that the officers had 
knocked on his door and that when he answered it they had come straight in. He also 
 




maintained that when he refused to take his dogs into the kitchen the officers had 
arrested him (using unnecessary force). The jury did not agree that the amount of force 
used against Mr Clark was unreasonable. However, they did find that the police version 
of events set out below was untrue.  
The police claimed that when Mr Clark came to the front door he was abusive and 
threatening and had set his dogs on the police while they were outside the house. They 
claimed that one of the dogs a Rottweiler had got hold of a female police officer by the 
top of her left arm and that she had had to hit the dog's nose with her truncheon to make 
it release her arm. The judge at the appeal noted that the police evidence at the civil trial 
was undermined by the absence of damage to the WPC's uniform or of injury to her arm; 
the fact that in the officers’ statements to the PCA, who investigated a complaint, they 
had failed to mention the appellant setting the dogs on them when they were outside the 
house; and the differing accounts given by the various officers as to the reason the 
appellant was given for his arrest. 
 
Isaac v Chief Constable of the West Midlands [2001] EWCA Civ 1405 
 
This case resulted from an incident when police officers refused the claimant entry to a 
snooker hall. The subsequent altercation resulted in him being charged with an offence 
under s4 of the Public Order Act (threatening behaviour) and assault with intent to resist 
arrest, which was subsequently reduced to assault on a police officer in the execution 
of his duty. He was acquitted of both offences. The civil jury did not fully accept the 
claimant’s version of events.  They found that the claimant had sworn and attempted to 
push past the officer, and that, when the officer took hold of the claimant’s arm, he did 
struggle. However, the jury also found that Mr Isaacs was not told why he was being 
arrested; that he was deliberately kicked in the shin and grabbed by the throat and that 
the officer did not honestly believe in the charges.  
 
Watson v Chief Constable of Cleveland [2001] EWCA Civ. 1547 
 
Mr Watson was lawfully arrested and detained in relation to the theft of some motor 




theft, taking without consent of the owner and handling stolen goods. On each occasion 
he was arrested for such offences he pleaded guilty.  On this occasion, whilst in custody, 
Mr Watson asked for a blanket and a toilet roll, and when it was not provided used the 
buzzer. In response two officers burst into his cell and grabbed him. He fell on his back on 
the bench in the cell and was kicked, punched and scratched. His hands were forced 
behind his back and he was forced onto the floor. 
Mr Watson was charged with the offences for which he had originally been arrested and 
was bailed. However, he was also charged with assaulting the two police officers in the 
execution of their duty in respect of which he did not receive bail for a further 6 days. The 
charges were persisted with for over a year before eventually being dropped. Importantly 
the jury found that an inspector had offered to make a deal with Mr Watson’s solicitor 
that the charges against Mr Watson would be dropped if he agreed not to persist with the 
civil claim.  
 
Manley v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2006] EWCA Civ 879 
 
Mr Manley had a long criminal record for offences involving serious violence. The jury 
accepted, police evidence that a Golf motor car was being driven at 80 mph in a residential 
area in the early hours of Christmas morning 1998 and that officers involved erroneously 
believed that Mr Manley was the driver. When the car came to a halt the occupants got 
out and Mr Manly did not stay by the car. The jury did not accept Mr Manley’s evidence 
that he was apprehended by PC Dakin who pulled his shirt ripping off the buttons but did 
accept the rest of Mr Manley’s evidence as follows: PC Dakin struck Mr Manley on the 
head with his extended baton without excuse; PC Dakin was lying when he asserted that 
his reason for so doing was because the appellant had put his hand in his pockets and 
threatened to kill the officer; that PC Dakin  sprayed the appellant in the face with CS gas 
because he feared that the appellant was going to attack him, but that it was not true that 
Mr Manley chased PC Dakin round a car parked in the road, jumped on a window sill of a 
house and head butted a window; that PC Dakin was lying in his assertion that two black 
males arrived and that  Mr Manley then said “now I am really going to get you cos my 




It was not disputed that two other police officers arrived, PC Marshall and PC Dawson and 
that PC Marshall hit the appellant with his baton twice on the left thigh again without 
excuse. It was also not disputed that PC Dakin hit the appellant over the back with his 
baton while he was being held by PC Marshall and PC Dawson, but the jury rejected the 
officers' evidence that the reason for this was that Mr Manley was struggling violently and 
trying to hit them. The jury also found that one of the officers then held Mr Manley on 
the ground and that Mr Manley was then hit with batons by several police officers (while 
on the ground) and then gratuitously sprayed in the face with CS gas by PC Dakin. Mr 
Manley had to be taken to hospital before being taken to the police station. The jury 
rejected PC Dawson and the custody officer’s evidence that Mr Manley refused to take a 
breath test. Mr Manley was initially charged with: refusing to take a breath test; 
threatening to kill PC Dakin; affray and resisting police officers in the course of their duties.  
On the basis of the jury’s findings the police knew that all of these charges were 
unsustainable. As a consequence of the charges Mr Manley was held in custody until his 
trial in May 1999, by which time the charges had been reduced to dangerous driving, and 
threats to kill (and he was acquitted of both counts). However, the police persisted with 
charge of failure to take a breath test (which on the jury's verdict the police also knew to 
be unsustainable) until September 1999 when it was also discontinued. 
 
Rowlands v Chief Constable of Merseyside Police. [2006] EWCA Civ. 1773 
 
Mrs Rowlands was acquitted by Magistrates of charges of assaulting an officer in the 
execution of his duty and obstructing an officer in the execution of his duty after having 
been arrested following her own call to the police concerning a noisy party on her street. 
The facts as found by the jury were that the arresting officer did not honestly believe that 
Mrs Rowlands was likely to cause a breach of the peace; that the use of handcuffs to 
restrain her was unreasonable; that Mrs  Rowlands was dragged backwards by Police 
Constable Patterson using the handcuffs; that when, in the police car, she asked for the 
handcuffs to be loosened the police officer yanked them to cause her pain and that the 






Browne v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis.  [2014] EWHC 3999 Q.B.  
 
Mr Browne was a security guard and friend of the comedian Noel Fielding. They were 
walking back from one of Mr Fielding’s shows late at night when they were arrested in the 
course of which Mr Browne suffered a broken nose and a very sever comminuted fracture 
to his tibia which resulted in him being in hospital for a month and requiring extensive 
aftercare.  The Police case was that two officers thought Mr Fielding and Mr Browne had 
been taking drugs and therefore attempted to stop them with the intention of talking to 
them. The officers claimed that Mr Browne was clearly under the influence of drugs; failed 
to stop or respond when the officer asked and instead put his hand in his pocket such that 
the officer thought he was trying to get rid of drugs or reaching for a knife.  
Mr Browne’s evidence (which was largely accepted) was that when the officers 
approached him and Mr Fielding they did not say they wanted to stop the two men and 
so Mr Browne went into a nearby shop, where he was effectively struck from behind by 
the officer, PC O’Leary, who kicked Mr Browne so hard in the lower leg that he fell to the 
ground and passed out as a result of the pain. Her Honour Judge Coe Q.C.  found the 
officers’ evidence largely false. In particular, she found that the officers’ suggestion that 
Mr Fielding was ‘stumbling and high’ was untrue, as was the description of Mr Browne as 
dishevelled and apparently high. She also rejected the officer’s account of what happened 
in the store and found that unreasonable and unnecessary force had been used. In 
particular she found that the officer’s account of returning to an ambulance that had been 
called to attend to Mr Browne and that Mr Browne (at that stage) admitted to possession 
of drugs was “a case of deliberate dishonesty on the part of PC O’Leary which suggested 































The guidance that should be given 
 
While there is no formula which is appropriate for all cases and the precise form of a 
summing up is very much a matter within the discretion of the trial judge, it is suggested 
that in many cases it will be convenient to include in a summing up on the issue of 
damages additional directions on the following lines. As we mention later in this judgment 
we think it may often be wise to take the jury's verdict on liability before they receive 
directions as to quantum. 
(1) It should be explained to the jury that if they find in the plaintiff's favour the only 
remedy which they have power to grant is an award of damages. Save in exceptional 
situations such damages are only awarded as compensation and are intended to 
compensate the plaintiff for any injury or damage which he has suffered. They are not 
intended to punish the defendant. 
(2) As the law stands at present compensatory damages are of two types. (a) Ordinary 
damages which we would suggest should be described as basic, and (b) aggravated 
damages. Aggravated damages can only be awarded where they are claimed by the 
plaintiff and where there are aggravating features about the defendant's conduct which 
justify the award of aggravated damages. (We would add that in the rare case where 
special damages are claimed in respect of some specific pecuniary loss this claim should 
be explained separately.) 
 (3) The jury should be told that the basic damages will depend on the circumstances and 
the degree of harm suffered by the plaintiff. But they should be provided with an 
appropriate bracket to use as a starting point. The judge will be responsible for 
determining the bracket, and we envisage that in the ordinary way the judge will have 
heard submissions on the matter from counsel in the absence of the jury (as suggested by 
Stuart-Smith L.J. in the Scotland case). Though this is not what was proposed in the case 
of a defamation action in John v. MGN Ltd. [1996] 3 W.L.R. 593 submissions by counsel in 
the absence of the jury are likely to have advantages because of the resemblance between 
the sum to be awarded in false imprisonment cases and ordinary personal injury cases, 
and because a greater number of precedents may be cited in this class of case than in a 
defamation action. We therefore think it would be better for the debate to take place in 
the absence of the jury.  
(4) In a straightforward case of wrongful arrest and imprisonment or malicious 
prosecution the jury should be informed of the approximate figure to be taken as the 
correct starting point for basic damages for the actual loss of liberty or for the wrongful 
prosecution, and also given an approximate ceiling figure. It should be explained that 
these are no more than guideline figures based on the judge's experience and on the 
awards in other cases and the actual figure is one on which they must decide. 
 (5) In a straightforward case of wrongful arrest and imprisonment the starting point is 




his or her liberty. After the first hour an additional sum is to be awarded, but that sum 
should be on a reducing scale so as to keep the damages proportionate with those payable 
in personal injury cases and because the plaintiff is entitled to have a higher rate of 
compensation for the initial shock of being arrested. As a guideline we consider, for 
example, that a plaintiff who has been wrongly kept in custody for 24 hours should for 
this alone normally be regarded as entitled to an award of about £3,000. For subsequent 
days the daily rate will be on a progressively reducing scale. (These figures are lower than 
those mentioned by the Court of Appeal of Northern Ireland in Oscar v. Chief Constable 
of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1992] N.I. 290 where a figure of about £600 per hour 
was thought to be appropriate for the first 12 hours. That case, however only involved 
unlawful detention for two periods of 30 minutes in respect of which the Court of Appeal 
of Northern Ireland awarded £300 for the first period and £200 for the second period. On 
the other hand the approach is substantially more generous than that adopted by this 
court in the unusual case of Cumber v. Chief Constable of Hampshire Constabulary, The 
Times, 28 January 1995; Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Transcript No. 95 of 1995, in which 
this court awarded £350 global damages where the jury had awarded no compensatory 
damages and £50 exemplary damages.)  
(6) In the case of malicious prosecution the figure should start at about £2,000 and for 
prosecution continuing for as long as two years, the case being taken to the Crown Court, 
an award of about £10,000 could be appropriate. If a malicious prosecution results in a 
conviction which is only set aside on an appeal this will justify a larger award to reflect the 
longer period during which the plaintiff has been in peril and has been caused distress.  
(7) The figures which we have identified so far are provided to assist the judge in 
determining the bracket within which the jury should be invited to place their award. We 
appreciate, however, that circumstances can vary dramatically from case to case and that 
these and the subsequent figures which we provide are not intended to be applied in a 
mechanistic manner. 
 (8) If the case is one in which aggravated damages are claimed and could be appropriately 
awarded, the nature of aggravated damages should be explained to the jury. Such 
damages can be awarded where there are aggravating features about the case which 
would result in the plaintiff not receiving sufficient compensation for the injury suffered 
if the award were restricted to a basic award. Aggravating features can include humiliating 
circumstances at the time of arrest or any conduct of those responsible for the arrest or 
the prosecution which shows that they had behaved in a high handed, insulting, malicious 
or oppressive manner either in relation to the arrest or imprisonment or in conducting 
the prosecution. Aggravating features can also include the way the litigation and trial are 
conducted. (The aggravating features listed take account of the passages in the speech of 
Lord Reid in Broome v. Cassell and Co. Ltd. [1972] A.C. 1072, 1085 and Pearson L.J. in 
McCarey v. Associated Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [1965] 2 Q.B. 86, 104.)  
(9) The jury should then be told that if they consider the case is one for the award of 




each category. (This is contrary to the present practice but in our view will result in greater 
transparency as to the make up of the award.) 
(10) We consider that where it is appropriate to award aggravated damages the figure is 
unlikely to be less than a £1,000. We do not think it is possible to indicate a precise 
arithmetical relationship between basic damages and aggravated damages because the 
circumstances will vary from case to case. In the ordinary way, however, we would not 
expect the aggravated damages to be as much as twice the basic damages except perhaps 
where, on the particular facts, the basic damages are modest. 
(11) It should be strongly emphasised to the jury that the total figure for basic and 
aggravated damages should not exceed what they consider is fair compensation for the 
injury which the plaintiff has suffered. It should also be explained that if aggravated 
damages are awarded such damages, though compensatory are not intended as a 
punishment, will in fact contain a penal element as far as the defendant is concerned. 
 (12) Finally the jury should be told in a case where exemplary damages are claimed and 
the judge considers that there is evidence to support such a claim, that though it is not 
normally possible to award damages with the object of punishing the defendant, 
exceptionally this is possible where there has been conduct, including oppressive or 
arbitrary behaviour, by police officers which deserves the exceptional remedy of 
exemplary damages. It should be explained to the jury: (a) that if the jury are awarding 
aggravated damages these damages will have already provided compensation for the 
injury suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the  oppressive and insulting behaviour of the 
police officer and, inevitably, a measure of punishment from the defendant's point of 
view; (b) that exemplary damages should be awarded if, but only if, they consider that the 
compensation awarded by way of basic and aggravated damages is in the circumstances 
an inadequate punishment for the defendants; (c) that an award of exemplary damages 
is in effect a windfall for the plaintiff and, where damages will be payable out of police 
funds, the sum awarded may not be available to be expended by the police in a way which 
would benefit the public (this guidance would not be appropriate if the claim were to be 
met by insurers); (d) that the sum awarded by way of exemplary damages should be 
sufficient to mark the jury's disapproval of the oppressive or arbitrary behaviour but 
should be no more than is required for this purpose.  
(13) Where exemplary damages are appropriate they are unlikely to be less than £5,000. 
Otherwise the case is probably not one which justifies an award of exemplary damages at 
all. In this class of action the conduct must be particularly deserving of condemnation for 
an award of as much as £25,000 to be justified and the figure of £50,000 should be 
regarded as the absolute maximum, involving directly officers of at least the rank of 
superintendent. 
(14) In an appropriate case the jury should also be told that even though the plaintiff 
succeeds on liability any improper conduct of which they find him guilty can reduce or 
even eliminate any award of aggravated or exemplary damages if the jury consider that 




The figures given will of course require adjusting in the future for inflation. We appreciate 
that the guideline figures depart from the figures frequently awarded by juries at the 
present time. However they are designed to establish some relationship between the 
figures awarded in this area and those awarded for personal injuries. In giving guidance 
for aggravated damages we have attached importance to the fact that they are intended 
to be compensatory and not punitive although the same circumstances may justify 
punishment. 
 In the case of exemplary damages we have taken into account the fact that the action is 
normally brought against the chief officer of police and the damages are paid out of police 
funds for what is usually a vicarious liability for the acts of his officers in relation to which 
he is a joint tortfeasor: see now section 88 of the Police Act 1996. In these circumstances 
it appears to us wholly inappropriate to take into account the means of the individual 
officers except where the action is brought against the individual tortfeasor. This would 
raise a complication in the event of the chief officer seeking an indemnity or contribution 
as to his liability from a member of his force. It is our view if this situation does arise it 
should be resolved by the court exercising its power under section 2(1) or (2) of the Civil 
Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 to order that the exemplary damages should not be 
reimbursed in full or at all if they are disproportionate to the officer's means.  
In deciding upon what should be treated as the upper limits for exemplary damages we 
have selected a figure which is sufficiently substantial to make it clear that there has been 
conduct of a nature which warrants serious civil punishment and indicates the jury's 
vigorous disapproval of what has occurred but at the same time recognises that the 
plaintiff is the recipient of a windfall in relation to exemplary damages. As punishment is 
the primary objective in this class of case it is more difficult to tie the amount of exemplary 
damages to the award of compensatory damages, including aggravated. However in many 
cases it could prove a useful check subject to the upper limits we have identified if it is 
accepted that it will be unusual for the exemplary damages to produce a result of more 
than three times the basic damages being awarded (as the total of the basic aggravated 
and exemplary damages) except again where the basic damages are.  
Mr. Pannick submitted that the jury should be invited to take into account the disciplinary 
procedures which are available as against the officers when considering whether the case 
is one which warrants the award of exemplary damages. In our view this should only be 
done where there is clear evidence that such proceedings are intended to be taken in the 
event of liability being established and that there is at least a strong possibility of the 
proceedings succeeding. 
We are also not in favour of plaintiffs' non co-operation with the complaints procedure 
reducing an award of damages. It is highly desirable that complainants should co-operate 
in disciplinary investigations but they are not legally obliged to do so. If they are not 
sufficiently public spirited to do so, this cannot be held against them in law so as to reduce 
the amount payable when assessing the compensation to which they are entitled. 
Exemplary damages are awarded so as to punish the defendant. We have already referred 




determining whether to make any award of exemplary damages. If the jury decide an 
award is necessary then the amount is assessed on a consideration of the conduct for 
which the defendants are responsible which makes the award of exemplary damages 
appropriate. The plaintiff's conduct is here relevant only if it was a cause of the offending 
behaviour. 
 Where a false defence is persisted in this can justify an increase in the aggravated or 
exemplary damages (see Marks v. Chief Constable of Greater Manchester (unreported), 
27 November 1991); Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Transcript No. 1083 of 1991), but as 
this will almost invariably be the consequence of an unsuccessful defence, the guidance 
as to figures we have given takes this into account. If a malicious prosecution results in a 
conviction which is only set aside on an appeal this would justify a larger award.  
In many cases it will be convenient for the jury's verdict on liability to be taken before they 
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Dear  Ms Torrible  
  
Freedom of Information Request 44650  
  
Thank you for your e-mail of 14 July in which you ask for a copy of a report into the police 
complaints system following a review made by the Police Integrity and Powers Unit in the 
Home Office. I am sorry that we misunderstood your request in previous correspondence. 
request has now been handled as a request for information under the Freedom of Information 
Act 2000.   
  
The review of the police complaints system that you ask about was an internal review conducted 
by policy officials as part of the early development of policy on police complaints and discipline 
system and the advice was broad based   with officials giving consideration of all the options. 
Unlike the Chapman Review, the review of the complaints system did not result in a formal 
report but was work conducted to form the basis of policy advice to Government Ministers with 
proposals for policy and legislative change. Such advice to Ministers is not routinely disclosed 
but as indicated in previous correspondence, the conclusions and considerations that came out 
of the review fed into the public consultation document on the Chapman review and 
subsequently into the Government’s response: Improving police integrity: reforming the 
police complaints and disciplinary systems. This document sets out the agreed 
government position.  
   
After careful consideration we have decided that this information is exempt from disclosure 
under section (35)(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act. This provides that information can 
be withheld where it relates to the formulation or development of government policy and the 








Some of the exemptions in the FOI Act, referred to as ‘qualified exemptions’, are subject to a 
public interest test (PIT). This test is used to balance the public interest in disclosure against the 
public interest in maintaining the exemption.  We must carry out a PIT where we are considering 
using any of the qualified exemptions in response to a request for information.   
  
The ‘public interest’ is not the same as what interests the public. In carrying out a PIT we 
consider the greater good or benefit to the community as a whole if the information is released 
or not. Transparency and the ‘right to know’ must be balanced against the need to enable 




In general, and in terms of the application of the Freedom of Information Act, the formulation of 
government policy needs to be achieved without fear of premature disclosure and without a 
deterrent effect on external experts or stakeholders who might be reluctant to provide advice 
where it might be disclosed. Although we have considered that there may be a general public 
interest in disclosure we conclude that the balance of the public interest lies in maintaining the 
exemption and withholding the information.  
  
If you are dissatisfied with this response you may request an independent internal review of our 
handling of your request by submitting a complaint within two months to the address below, 
quoting reference 44650. If you ask for an internal review, it would be helpful if you could say 
why you are dissatisfied with the response.   
  
Information Rights Team  
Home Office  
Third Floor, Peel Building  
2 Marsham Street  
London SW1P 4DF  
e-mail: foirequests@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk    
  
As part of any internal review the Department's handling of your information request will be 
reassessed by staff who were not involved in providing you with this response. If you remain 
dissatisfied after this internal review, you would have a right of complaint to the Information 
Commissioner as established by section 50 of the Freedom of Information Act.   
  
Yours sincerely,  
  
  



















Force A    A medium sized force encompassing both urban rural districts.  
Interview 1 
The interview was conducted with one force solicitor who appears in the interview 
scripts as A(LO). However also present were two ex-police officers who were working as 
legal officers in the force legal team and who appear in the interview scripts as A (LA) 
and A(LB). 
 
Force  B    A small force encompassing both urban and rural district. 
Interview 2  
The interviewee B(PS) was a professional standards officer.  
Interview 3  
The interviewee B(LO) the sole force legal officer.  
 
Force C     A medium sized force with urban and rural districts  
Interview 4 
The interviewee C(PS) was a retired police officer who was working as a professional 
standards officer.   
Interview 5 
The interviewee C(LO) was a retired police officer who was working as a legal officer in 


























Legal Interview Schedule 
 
Consent on tape   (in line with ethical approval)  
Confidentiality ensured  
Storage and use of data explained and agreed 
 
Areas to be covered 
1. Internal structure and relationship between PS and Legal  
• General processes, as between PS and legal  
• Who is the client/ who do they take instructions from  
• Insurance and relationship with insurance company?  
 
2. Role of Police actions within the organisation 
• Conduct issues - feed-back re officer conduct. How are civ actions they viewed 
• Instrumental/ expressive elements in defending decision making 
 
3. Time 
• What FOI can’t give– what level of claims are deflected at the pre – proceedings 
stage. (as a guess)   
• Speculative claims 
 
• Officers and PandS time spent  
4. Settlement /different types of claimant 
• Settlement practices 
• Settlement before and after proceedings issued 
• Types size of claims 
• Is settlement after because of discovery/disclosure?  
• Settling when complaint has been unsubstantiated PS views? Officer morale? 





5. Trial  
• Trial and lose – officers not believed?  
• On what basis do you choose to defend? 
• Nature of complainants/claimants  
• How will officers come across in court? 
 
6. Interaction Civil/Complaints 
• That different functions e.g. info re complaints not tested in same way  
• Standard of proof. Does existence of civil make a difference how complaints 
handled  
• Assessment of whether officers believed  
 
7. General Role of Legal  
• Guardian of public funds/view of force/ reconciliatory aspects of settlement.     
• What overall function viz a viz policing do civ actions serve  
• What other things should I be considering? 
• Balance of power claimant/force 
• What about o/s solicitors 







PandS Interview Schedule  
 
Consent on tape  (in line with ethical approval) 
Confidentiality ensured  
Storage and use of data explained and agreed 
 
1. Internal structure and relationship between PS and Legal  
• General processes, as between PS and legal  
• Does pending police action alter investigation is done 
 
2. Impact of civil actions 
• Complaints handling/outcome -  impact of likelihood of an action   
• motivation of complainants/claimants. 
• Likelihood of court impact on substantiation?  
• Particular area of policing that give rise to more civ actions – particular types of 
complaint that you think 
• Particular types of complainant?  
 
3. Officers responses 
• Officers responses to police actions cf complaints 
4. The interrelation between claims and complaints 
• Complaints, discipline, officer morale? 
• Not upheld but PS officer not convinced that nothing happened? What do you 
do? 
• Degree of probing  - Civ follows court finds in favour of claimant – would you 
review   
• Complaint not upheld but legal advise to settle. How does that feel? 
 
5. Role of Civil actions within the organisation 




• The financial and organisational impact (feedback) 


























Freedom of Information Request  
Civil Actions Against The Police  
Phase 1: The National Picture 2012 
Defence, Settlement and Costs Questionnaire   
 
I am conducting research at Bristol University into civil actions against the police. As a 
preliminary to this research I am asking forces to complete a short questionnaire. Please 
find this attached together with some guidance notes. If you have any queries about the 
questionnaire, or any other aspect of the research, please do not hesitate to raise them with 
me. 
Many thanks for your assistance, 
Clare Torrible 
 
e-mail – Clare.Torrible@bristol.ac.uk 







  Questionnaire Guidance 
 
This questionnaire relates to public liability claims made by civilians concerning police conduct in 
the last 5 years (excluding those that involve property damage alone). Property damage is 
excluded because I am aware that forces have different ways of dealing with small claims of this 
nature and that therefore consistent figures will be difficult to obtain.   
Throughout, the information requested is in relation to broad categories and not specific cases.  
The information is requested, broken down in specific ways. If, however, it is not possible to 
deliver it according to the categories suggested, please provide it in the form in which it is stored 
for your force’s monitoring purposes. 
Question 1.4 includes a request in relation to aggravated and exemplary damages. This is in 
order to assess whether reform might be particularly desirable in these two areas. I recognise 
that aggravated and exemplary elements are also an issue in reaching settlement, but am aware 
that many factors come into play at that stage. I have not therefore included a request regarding 
aggravated or exemplary elements in the settlement figures requested in questions 1.6 and 2.2.  
If, however your force does keep a record of these aspects of settled cases, please provide 
details in the same manner as requested in question 1.4.  
 I am also aware that in settling some claims, forces may find it useful to incorporate 
confidentiality clauses into the settlement. This raises the issue of s41 of the Freedom of 
Information Act which confers an absolute exemption in relation to disclosure of information 
(and no duty to confirm or deny its existence) if or to the extent that to do so would result in an 
actionable breach of confidence. It is important to this research to have some overall sense of 
how much time and money is being spent on defending and dealing with civil claims. It is hoped, 
therefore, that the additional layer of generalisation introduced by questions 3.1 and 3.2 might 
assist in overcoming any issues in relation to confidentiality clauses.   
If the figures requested cannot be compiled for the full five years in the time limit specified by 
the Freedom of Information Act, please provide what information can be accessed within that 





1. Claims for which proceedings are issued.  Please give figures per year, for the last five years 
in respect of:- 
1.1. The number of cases defended all the way to trial 
1.2. The number of those successfully defended and the number lost 
1.3. Third party legal costs paid in respect of those that were lost 
1.4. Damages awarded by the court (broken down as between compensatory, aggravated and 
exemplary) indicating the number of a) aggravated and  b) exemplary awards  
1.5. The number of cases settled before trial  
1.6. Total sums paid as damages in settlement of these cases 
1.7. Third party legal costs paid in respect of these cases 
 
2. Settlement reached under the threat or suggestion of a civil claim without proceedings 
being issued. Please give figures per year, for the last five years in respect of:- 
2.1  The number of cases settled with liability admitted  
2.2  Total sums paid as damages in settlement of these cases 
2.3  Third party legal costs paid in respect of these cases 
2.4  The number of cases for which ex gratia payments were made  
2.5  Total sums paid ex gratia 
 
3. Confidentiality Clauses  
3.1 Are the figures in sections 1 and 2 complete or have cases for which settlement included 
a confidentiality clause been excluded? 
3.2 If so what proportion of overall settlement costs, damages, fees incurred and paid etc are 
represented by the answers to questions 1 and 2?  
 
4. Costs 
4.1  Please give the overall internal legal costs in relation to civil actions per year, by financial 
year if possible 
4.2 Please give the overall spend on external legal assistance/services (e.g. external solicitors 
or counsel)  per year, by financial year if possible 
 
5. Means of recording/monitoring  
1. Does the force collate claims information by reference to the heads of claim? If 




2. Does the force collate claims information by reference of the area of policing 
which gave rise to it? If so please also provide the information above broken down 



















Policing and Crime Act 2017  
  
 commencement  
  
This table sets out the commencement dates of the provisions of the Act  
  
Section(s)  Provision  Commencement date  
Part 1: Emergency Services Collaboration  
Chapter 1: Collaboration agreements  
1-5  Collaboration agreements  
  
3 April 2017389  
Chapter 2: Police and crime commissioners etc: fire and rescue functions  
6-7  Police and crime commissioners:  
fire and rescue functions  
3 April 2017390  
8  Combined authority mayors: 
exercise of fire and rescue functions  
17 July 2017391 (in so far 
as it is not already in 
force)  
Chapter 3: London Fire Commissioner  
9(1) and (2)  
  
9(3)  
The London Fire Commissioner  1 April 2018392  
  
1 March 2018 (in part)393  
22 March 2018 (in part)394  
1 April 2018 (in part)395  
10  Transfer of property, rights and  
liabilities to the London Fire 
Commissioner  
1 March 2018396  
Chapter 4: Inspection of fire and rescue services  
11(1)-(7)  Inspection of fire and rescue 
services  
17 July 2017397 (in so far 
as it is not already in 
force)  
12  Fire safety inspections  17 July 2017398  
 
389 The Policing and Crime Act 2017 (Commencement No. 1 and Transitional Provisions) Regulations 2017 
(SI 2017/399)  
390 Ibid  
391 The Policing and Crime Act 2017 (Commencement No. 3 and Transitional and Saving Provisions) 
Regulations 2017 (SI 2017/726)  
392 The Policing and Crime Act 2017 (Commencement No. 7) Regulations 2018 (SI 2018/227)  
393 Ibid  
394 Ibid  
395 Ibid  
396 Ibid  
397 The Policing and Crime Act 2017 (Commencement No. 3 and Transitional and Saving Provisions) 
Regulations 2017 (SI 2017/726)  




Part 2: Police Complaints, Discipline and Inspection  
Chapter 1:  13–24  Police complaints  To be determined399  
Chapter 2:  25-27  Police super-complaints  16 April 2018 (in so far as 
it is not already in force)12  
Chapter 3:   Investigations by the IPCC: whistle- To be determined13  
 





Disciplinary proceedings: former 
members of police forces and 
former special constables  
15 December 2017401 (in 
so far as it is not already 
in force)  
15 December 402403 (in 
part)  
30  Police barred list and police advisory 
list  
15 December 2017404 (in 
so far as it is not already 
in force)  
31  Appeals to the Police Appeals 
Tribunals  
To be determined405  
32  Guidance concerning disciplinary 
proceedings and conduct etc  
31 January 2017406  
3 April 2017 (in so far as 
it is not already in 
force)407  
Chapter 5: IPCC: Re-naming and organisational change  
33  Independent Office for Police 
Conduct  
3 April 2017 (in part)408  
17 July 2017 (in part)409 
8 January 2018 (in so 
 
399 Provisions enabling the exercise of powers to make subordinate legislation or to issue codes of practice 
or guidance came into force on 31 January 2017 by virtue of section 183(5)(e) of the Act.   12 The Policing 
and Crime Act 2017 (Commencement No. 8) Regulations 2018 (SI 2018/456)  
400 Provisions enabling the exercise of powers to make subordinate legislation or to issue codes of practice 
or guidance came into force on 31 January 2017 by virtue of section 183(5)(e) of the Act.    
401 The Policing and Crime Act 2017 (Commencement No. 5 and Transitional Provisions) Regulations 2017 
(SI  
402 /1139) as amended by The Policing and Crime Act 2017 (Commencement No. 5 and Transitional 
Provisions) (Amendment) Regulations 2017 (SI 2017/1162)  
403 Ibid  
404 Ibid   
405 Provisions enabling the exercise of powers to make subordinate legislation or to issue codes of practice 
or guidance came into force on 31 January 2017 by virtue of section 183(5)(e) of the Act.    
406 Provisions enabling the exercise of powers to make subordinate legislation or to issue codes of practice 
or guidance came into force on 31 January 2017 by virtue of section 183(5)(e) of the Act.    
407 The Policing and Crime Act 2017 (Commencement No. 1 and Transitional Provisions) Regulations 2017  
408 Ibid    
409 The Policing and Crime Act 2017 (Commencement No. 3 and Transitional and Saving Provisions) 




far as it is not already in 
force)410  
34  Exercise of functions  8 January 2018 (with the 
exception of subsection  
(3))411  
35  Public records  8 January 2018412  
Chapter 7:  36-37  Inspection  2 May 2017413  
Part 3: Police workforce and representative institutions  
Chapter 1: Police workforce  
38-44  Police workforce  15 December 2017414415  
45  Further amendments consequential  3 April 2017 (in part)416  
 
 on section 38 etc  15 December 2017417 (in 
so far as it is not already 
in force)  
46  Removal of powers of police in 
England and Wales to appoint 
traffic wardens  
1 December 201829  
47  Power to make regulations about 
police ranks  
31 January 418419420  
48  Section 47: consequential 
amendments  
To be determined  
Chapter 2: Representative institutions   
 
410 The Policing and Crime Act 2017 (Commencement No. 6 and Transitional Provisions) Regulations 2017 
(SI 2017/1249)  
411 Ibid  
412 Ibid  
413 The Policing and Crime Act 2017 (Commencement No. 1 and Transitional Provisions) Regulations 2017 
(SI 2017/399)  
414 The Policing and Crime Act 2017 (Commencement No. 5 and Transitional Provisions) Regulations 2017 
(SI  
415 /1139) as amended by The Policing and Crime Act 2017 (Commencement No. 5 and Transitional  
Provisions) (Amendment) Regulations 2017 (SI 2017/1162)  
416 The Policing and Crime Act 2017 (Commencement No. 1 and Transitional Provisions) Regulations 2017  
417 The Policing and Crime Act 2017 (Commencement No. 5 and Transitional Provisions) Regulations 2017 
(SI  
418 /1139) as amended by The Policing and Crime Act 2017 (Commencement No. 5 and Transitional 
Provisions) (Amendment) Regulations 2017 (SI 2017/1162)  
419 Ibid  




49-50  Duties of Police Federation for 
England and Wales  
3 April 2017421  
51  Removal of references to ACPO  3 April 2017422  
Part 4: Police powers   
Chapter 1: Pre-charge bail   
52-60  Release without bail or on bail   3 April 2017423   
61  Bail before charge: conditions of 
bail etc  
3 April 2017424  
62  Limit on period of bail under section 
30A of PACE  
3 April 2017425  
63  Limit on period of bail without 
charge under Part 4 of PACE  
31 January 2017 (in  
part)426  
3 April 2017 (in so far as 
it is not already in 
force)427  
64  Section 63: consequential 
amendments  
3 April 2017428  
65   Release under provisions of PACE:  
re-arrest  
3 April 2017429  
66-67  Notification of decision not to 
prosecute  
3 April 2017430  
68-69  Breach of pre-charge bail conditions 
relating to travel  
3 April 2017431  
Chapter 2: 70-71  Retention of biometric material  3 April 2017432  
Chapter 3: Powers under PACE: miscellaneous   
 
72-75, 77-79  Powers under PACE: Miscellaneous   3 April 2017433  
 
421 The Policing and Crime Act 2017 (Commencement No. 1 and Transitional Provisions) Regulations 2017  
422 Ibid  
423 Ibid  
424 Ibid  
425 Ibid  
426 Provisions enabling the exercise of powers to make subordinate legislation or to issue codes of practice 
or guidance came into force on 31 January 2017 by virtue of section 183(5)(e) of the Act.    
427 The Policing and Crime Act 2017 (Commencement No. 1 and Transitional Provisions) Regulations 2017  
428 Ibid  
429 Ibid  
430 Ibid  
431 Ibid  
432 Ibid  




76  PACE: audio-recording  31 March 2017434  
Chapter 4: 80-83  Powers under the Mental Health 
Act 1983  
11 December 2017435   
Chapter 5:  84-95  Maritime enforcement: English and 
Welsh offences  
1 March 2018 (insofar as 
they are not already in 
force)436   
Chapter 6: 96-106  Maritime enforcement: Scottish 
offences  
1 March 2018 (insofar as 
they are not already in  
force)437  
Chapter 7:  107-115  Maritime enforcement: Northern 
Irish offences  
To be determined  
  
Chapter 8:  116-119  Cross-border enforcement  1 March 2018 (insofar as 
they are not already in  
force)438  
Chapter 9: Miscellaneous  
120  Powers to require  removal of  
disguises – oral authorisations  
3 April 2017439  
Part 5: Police and crime commissioners and police areas  
121  Term of office of deputy police and 
crime commissioners   
3 April 2017440  
122  Eligibility of deputy police and crime 
commissioners for election  
3 April 2017441  
123  Deputy Mayor for Policing and  
Crime as member of local authority  
1 April 2018442  
124  Amendments to names of police 
areas  
31 January 2017 (in  
part)443  
3 April 2017 (insofar as it 
is not already in force)444  
Part 6: Firearms and pyrotechnic articles  
 
434 By virtue of section 183(6)(a) of the Act.  
435 Provisions enabling the exercise of powers to make subordinate legislation or to issue codes of practice 
or guidance came into force on 31 January 2017 by virtue of section 183(5)(e) of the Act.  Otherwise 
commenced by the Policing and Crime Act 2017 (Commencement No. 4 and Saving Provisions) Regulations 
2017 (SI 2017/1017)  
436 The Policing and Crime Act 2017 (Commencement No. 7) Regulations 2018 (SI 2018/227)  
437 Ibid  
438 Ibid  
439 The Policing and Crime Act 2017 (Commencement No. 1 and Transitional Provisions) Regulations 2017  
440 Ibid  
441 Ibid  
442 The Policing and Crime Act 2017 (Commencement No. 7) Regulations 2018 (SI 2018/227)  
443 Provisions enabling the exercise of powers to make subordinate legislation or to issue codes of practice 
or guidance came into force on 31 January 2017 by virtue of section 183(5)(e) of the Act.    
444 The Policing and Crime Act 2017 (Commencement No. 1 and Transitional Provisions) Regulations 




125  Firearms Act 1968: meaning of  
“firearm” etc  
31 January 2017 (in  
part)55  
2 May 2017 (insofar as it 
is not already in force)445  
 
126  Firearms Act 1968: meaning of  
“antique firearm”  
To be determined  
127  Possession of articles for 
conversion of imitation firearms  
2 May 2017446  
128  Controls on defectively deactivated 
weapons  
2 May 2017447  
129  Controls on ammunition which 
expands on impact  
2 May 2017448  
130  Authorised lending and possession 
of firearms for hunting etc  
3 May 2017449  
131  Limited extension of firearms 
certificates   
17 April 2018450  
132  Applications under the Firearms 
Acts: fees  
To be determined   
133  Guidance to police officers in 
respect of firearms  
31 January 2017 (in  
part)451  
3 April 2017(in so far as it 
is not already in force)452  
134  Possession of pyrotechnic articles 
at musical events  
31 January 2017 (in  
part)64  
3 April 2017 (insofar as it 
is not already in force)453  
Part 7: Alcohol and late night refreshment  
135-140  Alcohol licensing  6 April 2017454  
141  Cumulative impact assessments  6 April 2018455   
142  Late night levy requirements  To be determined  
Part 8: Financial sanctions  
 
445 The Policing and Crime Act 2017 (Commencement No. 1 and Transitional Provisions) Regulations 2017  
446 Ibid  
447 Ibid  
448 Ibid  
449 Ibid  
450 The Policing and Crime Act 2017 (Commencement No. 8) Regulations 2018 (SI 2018/456)  
451 Provisions enabling the exercise of powers to make subordinate legislation or to issue codes of practice 
or guidance came into force on 31 January 2017 by virtue of section 183(5)(e) of the Act.    
452 The Policing and Crime Act 2017 (Commencement No. 1 and Transitional Provisions) Regulations 2017 
64 Provisions enabling the exercise of powers to make subordinate legislation or to issue codes of practice 
or guidance came into force on 31 January 2017 by virtue of section 183(5)(e) of the Act.    
453 The Policing and Crime Act 2017 (Commencement No. 1 and Transitional Provisions) Regulations 2017  
454 Ibid  




143-156 Financial sanctions 31 January 2017 (in  
part)456  
1 April 2017 (insofar as 
they are not already in  
force)69  
Part 9: Miscellaneous and general  
Chapter 1: Miscellaneous  
157-158  Police collaboration and NCA 
powers   
31 March 201770  
159-160  Requirements to confirm nationality  To be determined  
 
161  Pilot schemes   31 January 2017457  
162  Requirement to give information in 
criminal proceedings  
13 November 2017458  
163  Powers to seize etc invalid travel 
documents   
3 April 201773  
164, 165 and 167  Posthumous pardons for convictions 
etc of certain abolished offences:  
England and Wales  
31 January 201774  
166  Power to provide for disregards and 
pardons for additional abolished 
offences: England and Wales   
31 January 201775  
168-172  Posthumous pardons for convictions 
etc of certain abolished offences:  
Northern Ireland  
To be determined  
173  Anonymity of victims of forced 
marriage: England and Wales  
31 March 201776  
174  Anonymity of victims of forced 
marriage: Northern Ireland  
31 March 201777  
175  Sentences for offences of putting 
people in fear of violence etc  
3 April 2017459  
176  Child sexual exploitation: streaming 
indecent images   
31 March 201779  
 
456 Provisions enabling the exercise of powers to make subordinate legislation or to issue codes of 
practice or guidance came into force on 31 January 2017 by virtue of section 183(5)(e) of the Act. 69 The 
Policing and Crime Act 2017 (Commencement No. 2) Regulations 2017 (SI 2017/482) 70 By virtue of 
section 183(6)(b) and (c) of the Act.  
457 By virtue of section 183(5)(e) of the Act.  
458 The Policing and Crime Act 2017 (Commencement No. 4 and Saving Provisions) Regulations 
2017 73 The Policing and Crime Act 2017 (Commencement No. 1 and Transitional Provisions) 
Regulations 2017 74 By virtue of section 183(5)(b) of the Act. 75 By virtue of section 183(5)(e) of the 
Act. 76 By virtue of section 183(6)(d) of the Act. 77 By virtue of section 183(6)(d) of the Act.  
459 The Policing and Crime Act 2017 (Commencement No. 1 and Transitional Provisions) Regulations 




177  Licensing functions under taxi and 
PHV legislation: protection of 
children and vulnerable adults  
31 January 2017 (in 
part)460   
3 April 2017 (insofar as it 
is not already in force)461  
178  Coroners’ investigations into deaths: 
meaning of “state detention”  
3 April 2017462  
179  Powers of litter authorities in 
Scotland  
31 January 2017463  
Chapter 2: General   
180  Consequential amendments, repeals 
and revocations  
31 January 2017464  
181  Financial provision  31 January 2017465  
182  Extent  31 January 2017466  
183  Commencement  31 January 201787  
184  Short title  31 January 201788  
Schedules  
  
Schedule  Provision  Commencement date  
1   Provision for police and crime 
commissioner to be fire and 
rescue authority   
31 January 2017 (in part)89 
3 April 2017 (in so far as it is 
not already in force)90  
2  The London Fire Commissioner  1 March 2018 (in part)91  
22 March 2018 (in part)92  
1 April 2018 (in part)93  
3  Schedule to be inserted as  
Schedule A3 to the Fire and  
Rescue Services Act 2004  
17 July 201794  
4  Amendments consequential on 
the amended definition of police 
complaint  
To be determined  
5  Complaints, conduct matters and 
DSI matters: procedure  
To be determined95  
 
460 Provisions enabling the exercise of powers to make subordinate legislation or to issue codes of practice 
or guidance came into force on 31 January 2017 by virtue of section 183(5)(e) of the Act.    
461 The Policing and Crime Act 2017 (Commencement No. 1 and Transitional Provisions) Regulations 2017  
462 Ibid  
463 By virtue of section 183(5)(c) of the Act.  
464 By virtue of section 183(5)(d) of the Act.  
465 Ibid  




6  Schedule to be inserted as  
Schedule 3A to the Police  
Reform Act 2002  
To be determined96  
7, paragraphs 1-5  Disciplinary proceedings: former 
members of MoD Police  
15 December 2017 (in so far 
as it is not already in force)97  
7, paragraphs 6-14  Disciplinary proceedings: former 
members of British Transport  
Police and Civil Nuclear  
Constabulary  
To be determined98  
8  Part to be inserted as Part 4A of 
the Police Act 1996  
15 December 2017 (in so far 
as it is not already in force)99  
9  Independent Office for Police  3 April 2017 (in part)100  
                                                           
87 Ibid 88 ibid  
1. Provisions enabling the exercise of powers to make subordinate legislation or 
to issue codes of practice or guidance came into force on 31 January 2017 by virtue of 
section 183(5)(e) of the Act.    
2. The Policing and Crime Act 2017 (Commencement No. 1 and Transitional 
Provisions) Regulations 2017 91 The Policing and Crime Act 2017 (Commencement No. 
7) Regulations 2018 (SI 2018/227)  
1. Ibid  
2. Ibid  
3. The Policing and Crime Act 2017 (Commencement No. 3 and Transitional and Saving 
Provisions) Regulations 2017 (SI 2017/726)  
4. Provisions enabling the exercise of powers to make subordinate legislation or to issue 
codes of practice or guidance came into force on 31 January 2017 by virtue of section 
183(5)(e) of the Act.    
5. Ibid  
6. The Policing and Crime Act 2017 (Commencement No. 5 and Transitional Provisions) 
Regulations 2017 (SI  
2017/1139) as amended by The Policing and Crime Act 2017 (Commencement No. 5 and 
Transitional  
Provisions) (Amendment) Regulations 2017 (SI 2017/1162)  
7. Provisions enabling the exercise of powers to make subordinate legislation or to issue 
codes of practice or guidance came into force on 31 January 2017 by virtue of section 
183(5)(e) of the Act.    
8. The Policing and Crime Act 2017 (Commencement No. 5 and Transitional Provisions) 
Regulations 2017 (SI  
2017/1139) as amended by The Policing and Crime Act 2017 (Commencement No. 5 and 
Transitional  
Provisions) (Amendment) Regulations 2017 (SI 2017/1162)  
9. The Policing and Crime Act 2017 (Commencement No. 1 and Transitional Provisions) 




 Conduct  17 July 2017 (in part)467  
8 January 2018468  
10  Schedule to be inserted as  
Schedule 3B to the Police 
Reform Act 2002  
15 December 2017469  
11  Schedule to be inserted as  
Schedule 3C to the Police  
Reform Act 2002  
15 December 470471  
12 – Parts 1 & 2  Powers of civilian staff and 
volunteers: further amendments  
15 December 2017472  
12 – Part 3   Minor correcting amendment to 
Police Reform Act 2002 re 
definition of anti-social behaviour   
3 April 2017473  
13  Abolition of office of traffic 
warden  
1 December 2018474  
14  Removal of references to ACPO  3 April 2017 (except for 
reference in paragraph 7(e) 
to section 45(3)(f) of the 
Police Reform act 2002)475  
15  Schedule to be inserted as  
Schedule 7A to the Criminal  
Justice and Public Order Act  
1994  
1 March 2018109  
16  Schedule to be inserted as  
Schedule 7B to the Criminal  
Justice and Public Order Act  
1994  
1 March 2018476  
17  Cross-border enforcement: minor 
and consequential amendments  
1 March 2018477  
 
467 The Policing and Crime Act 2017 (Commencement No. 3 and Transitional and Saving Provisions) 
Regulations 2017 (SI 2017/726)  
468 The Policing and Crime Act 2017 (Commencement No. 6 and Transitional Provisions) Regulations 2017 
(SI 2017/1249)  
469 The Policing and Crime Act 2017 (Commencement No. 5 and Transitional Provisions) Regulations 2017 
(SI  
470 /1139) as amended by The Policing and Crime Act 2017 (Commencement No. 5 and Transitional 
Provisions) (Amendment) Regulations 2017 (SI 2017/1162)  
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